Regret

August 14, 2009

Investor behavior seems stubbornly to resist all attempts to reform it. The primary reason is that investor behavior is rooted in emotions, not all of which are healthy. One problematic emotion that academics have identified is regret. The Psy-Fi blog recently carried a nice piece on regret, which I have excerpted here. (For the full post, you can go to this link.)

-”It makes perfectly rational sense in most walks of life to avoid situations that give rise to feelings of regret. Swapping lottery numbers and then seeing the sequence you’ve chosen for the last five years come up would be a horrible feeling although, rationally, the two sets of numbers are equally likely. Of course, rationally, you should never buy lottery tickets at all.

However, when it comes to stocks and shares regret is a terribly dangerous emotion because our attempts to avoid suffering from it lead us to do financially stupid things. Amongst the most irrational is to avoid selling shares at a loss. This happens frequently when people need to sell, for one reason or another. This may be to buy some other super future performer or simply to raise cash for another venture. The evidence strongly suggests that when people do sell their shares they overwhelmingly prefer to sell those that have made them a profit rather than those that are trading at a loss.

Rationally, the best basis for choosing which shares to buy should be to sell those you believe will perform less well in the future rather than those that are selling below some buying price anchoring value. But, no, people will sell winners and keep losers in order to avoid the feeling of regret that comes from making a duff investment. Such a trade also allows them the satisfaction of pride from having had a winner, an equally irrational response, especially as the damn things will usually carry on going up.

The Disposition Effect

Psychologists call this the disposition effect. It was beautifully illustrated in a study by Ferris, Haugen and Makhija in 1988 who showed that stocks which had had gains had higher transaction volume than those that had had losses: people were hanging onto their losers and trading away their winners. Further work by Terence Odean indicated that investors were 50% more likely to sell a winner than a loser and that the outperforming stocks that investors were selling went on to outperform over the rest of the year in which the trade was carried out.

The disposition effect is really a partial statement of something we’ve seen before – loss aversion, the unwillingness of investors and golfers to face up to a loss. However, regret takes us a step beyond this because it shows that simple loss aversion has longer term effects. Even better – or worse – the disposition effect doesn’t just say that we’ll avoid selling our losers but also that we’ll preferentially sell our winners in order to avoid selling losers. The effect appears to be fairly constant across all sorts of investors – professional and amateur, experienced and otherwise although there’s some limited evidence from Dhar and Zhu that experience reduces the impact of regret on trading decisions.

Future Choice

However, the disposition effect has ramifications far beyond simple loss aversion. No, as Barber, Odean and Strahilevitz have shown, the impact of this continues after a sale of stock has been made. Investors’ feelings of regret or pride impact their subsequent decisions about trading in the same stock. So they will buy back stocks they have previously sold for a profit, but not for a loss, in an attempt to repeat the pleasurable feelings they got from the previous trade.

That’s not all. Investors will also buy back a stock that’s trading at a lower price than they previously sold it for but not a higher price. This is also a pleasurable experience and although avoiding buying companies that have done well since a sale may well be irrational it at least avoids needing to face further feelings of regret on that particular score.

Finally investors vastly prefer to buy more shares in companies they already own if the share price has declined, but not if it’s gone up. This process of “averaging down” increases the potential for future pleasure and reduces possible future regret as the reference average buying price of the stock is reduced.

None of these strategies improves portfolio performance, of course. Quite the opposite according to the researchers.”-

Therein lies the problem. Data suggests a better way of dealing with portfolio issues, but emotions want to handle the problem another way. Unfortunately, the emotions make things worse rather than solving the problem. Our recognition of these behavioral issues is why we opted to operate all of our managed account products on a systematic basis. Building an adaptive model to incorporate our expertise and to expose the portfolio to a factor that outperforms over time is much easier from a distance when you don’t have to worry about the market swinging up and down. Now that the model is built, all we have to do is execute it. (Well, and maintain it and continue to try to improve it. It’s not as simple as it sounds.) Deciding to use a systematic approach is one thing about which we have no regrets.


Houses versus Stocks

August 14, 2009

New York Times columnist Jeff Brown discusses the investment merits of houses versus stocks. He makes a lot of good points that clients really need to think about. Price appreciation in homes is not nearly as high as in stocks over time, homes are less liquid, and well, homes are homes. Even the help from leverage is not as great as generally believed. The only real advantage houses have is psychological-the price isn’t quoted daily.

Maybe investor behavior in the stock market would be better if prices were only quoted once a year.


China and Big Business

August 14, 2009

China is finding out that business doesn’t like to have its profits threatened. More and more, big business is getting its opinion heard, which is more like the way the U.S. and Europe have operated for a long time. In other words, there is a slow movement underway that is tending to Westernize China. And I will bet it’s not just in China where business will raise its voice. I’m sure that all of the rapidly growing emerging economies will get to that same point eventually, if they haven’t already. As that happens, the competitive dynamic with the U.S. and the rest of the world could change radically.

This generation is going to face a very different investment environment going forward. We’ve tried to adapt with products like the Systematic RS Global Macro portfolio, the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund, and the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund. However you decide to address it in your own personal circumstance, it’s important to adjust your investment policy to reflect it.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.


More Emphasis on Saving

August 13, 2009

This article by Evan Cooper in Investment News is worth the read.

Although I disagree with Mr. Cooper’s conclusion that successful investing is not one of the keys to a successful retirement (just because an investor hasn’t been able to identify and commit to a number of the several market-beating investment approaches available doesn’t mean that it isn’t possible), I heartily agree with his sentiments on saving and spending. Saving and restrained spending are the unsexy aspects of retirement planning that make an enormous difference in the standard of living that will be enjoyed in retirement.


Hope Against Hope

August 12, 2009

Forecasters ignore their own lack of accuracy, as described in this article from the WSJ. It has been shown time and time again that nobody forecasts shocks with any degree of accuracy over time.

Those of us who fall into the pragmatic camp will stick with trend following.

HT to JS for bringing this article to my attention.


Dueling Strategists

August 11, 2009

CNBC’s website today had adjacent links to stories about the market. One strategist was forecasting a higher target and felt the market would stay overbought, and the other strategist felt the S&P could correct 15-20%. I might feel marginally better if either strategist had statistical evidence that one outcome was more likely than the other, but nothing at all was offered. They are simply opinions. A less formal term would be “guess.”

This is the problem with forecasting—people take it seriously and base investment decisions or asset allocations on guesses. I fail to see how this is going to help anybody invest in the long run. Sure, you might have a lucky guess here or there; after all, one of these two forecasters is going to be right about this situation since they have opposite opinions.

Relative strength is not based on guessing. It is based on math. That doesn’t mean it is never wrong; in fact, it can be out of synch for extended periods. It is just that historically there has been a long-term tendency for markets to follow strength. If we identify the relative strength mathematically and keep rotating to it, we hope to benefit from that long-term tendency of markets.


More Evidence of Decoupling?

August 11, 2009

In contrast to U.S. automakers, Brazil’s car manufacturers are thriving. In the U.S., we tend to think of the auto business as a mature industry that will grow only as fast as demographics allow, and domestically that may be true. But overseas is a completely different story. U.S. investors may be missing the boat by not figuring out how to selectively get international exposure into their portfolios.

Using relative strength in a systematic way allows the asset classes with the strongest performance to move to the forefront. I could not have told you anything about the Brazilian auto industry before reading this article, but, as an example, it turns out that our Systematic RS International portfolio currently has more than 30% exposure to Latin America. It’s not because we made a brilliant economic forecast that Latin America would bounce back faster than Europe—it’s simply because the markets in Latin America have been relatively stronger than those in Europe. By using relative strength to tactically allocate to the strongest markets, we often end up in the right place at the right time.


Aristotle’s Maxim: Seek moderation in all things.

August 11, 2009

Following Aristotle’s Maxim would likely lead investors to a nice mix of momentum and value strategies. Mark Hulbert wrote on the topic of mixing momentum and value strategies in this article in the New York Times last year.

HT to BR for bringing this article to my attention.


James Montier and the Dead Parrot of Finance

August 11, 2009

In a 7/22/09 post titled Failure to Adapt, I made reference to a piece by James Montier about the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Modern Portfolio Theory. It looks like John Mauldin has now picked up on it, so here is the link to the complete article. The article is clever and very insightful—it points out that many problems in the industry are caused by investors’ belief that they must forecast to be successful. As you know, we take the opposite view. We believe that forecasting is not fruitful and that the best returns will be earned by using an adaptive approach that will continue to adjust to market conditions no matter what they may be. Montier’s discussion of ongoing bubbles supports our thesis that trends to follow will be plentiful in the future.


DWAFX Ranks Highly at 3-Year Mark

August 11, 2009

The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX) is one of the top mutual funds in its class. It has finished in the 9th percentile in the Morningstar Moderate Allocation Category (better than 91 percent of the 924 funds in this category) over the last three years.

(Click to Enlarge)

DWAFX is the first Dorsey Wright managed mutual fund and we are very pleased with its success. Furthermore, we are very appreciative of the warm reception that it has received in the marketplace – thank you! We developed this strategy because of the following philosophy:

  • The standard 60/40 policy portfolio is too narrow. Broader diversification, with special emphasis on alternative investments, is helpful to returns and risk management.
  • Endowment managers, like David Swenson at Yale, have been generating superior results for years by creating allocations with significant exposure to alternative asset classes. Now that ETFs provide access to most all of the asset classes that have been used in the endowment models, such a broadly diversified approach has been made available to the public through DWAFX.
  • The tactical asset allocation approach, driven by our systematic relative strength process, allows us to be extremely adaptive. This unique process seeks to do an excellent job of protecting on the downside as well as capitalizing on bull market moves in a wide variety of asset classes.

Click here to access the fact sheet for the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund.


Silver Lining

August 10, 2009

Geoffrey Miller, Evolutionary Psychologist at the University of New Mexico, recently wrote a book, Spent, in which he explores the reasons why consumers behave as they do. He argues that consumers buy things because of one of two primary reasons: (1) a product displays our desirable traits and brings us “status” when others see that we own them, or (2) a product pushes our pleasure button and brings us satisfaction even if no one else knows we have them.

Surely, for much of this decade American consumers have been ruled by reason number one as can be illustrated with the following example from Spent.

Why would the world’s most intelligent primate buy a Hummer H1 Alpha sport-utility vehicle for $139,771? It is not a practical mode of transport. It seats only four, needs fifty-one feet in which to turn around, burns a gallon of gas every ten miles, dawdles from 0 to 60 mph in 13.5 seconds, and has poor reliability, according to Consumer Reports. Yet, some people have felt the need to buy it– as the Hummer ads say, “Need is a very subjective word.” Although common sense says we buy things because we think we’ll enjoy owning and using them, research shows that the pleasures of acquisition are usually short-lived at best.

However, this recession has brought significant change to consumer spending and saving behaviors. In fact, the Commerce Department reported that the personal saving rate, which dipped below zero during the housing boom as Americans tapped home equity loans and other easy lines of credit, rose to 6.9 percent in May. That was its highest point since December 1993. The big question is whether Americans will make permanent changes to their behaviors or if this is just a short-term blip. A silver lining to this great recession could be that consumers will worry a little less about Hummer-like spending and a lot more about adherence to a well-thought-out saving and investment plan that will put a greater percentage of Americans in a position in to be financially secure throughout their lives. Because of years of skimping on the part of many, there is some catch-up to do on the savings front. Americans will find that this behavior yields a more durable pleasure.


No Dice

August 10, 2009

As Frank Knight argued in 1921, ‘Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, from which it has never been properly separated… A measurable uncertainty, or “risk” proper… is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.’ (Frank H. Knight. Risk Uncertainty and Profit, 1921.)

To put it simply, much of what happens in the financial markets isn’t like a game of dice. Again and again an event will occur that is so entirely unique that there are no others or not a sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real probability. The problem with forecasting based on some previous market that we feel has similarities to today’s market is that every market unfolds a little, or a lot, differently. Correlations that were in place at points in the past may not hold true today, sector leadership coming out of past recessions may not be the leadership coming out of this recession, etc. However, what history can teach us is that markets, asset classes, and stocks trend. Relative strength is ideally suited to identify and invest in leadership, whether or not the current market follows historical precedent.


Two Kinds of Fear

August 8, 2009

Numerous studies show that the biggest barrier to good investment returns is investor behavior. The biggest problems with investor behavior tend to be emotionality and lack of patience. Focusing on a time frame that is too short typifies the patience issue. Investors should be prepared to carefully select a strategy that is likely to generate excess returns and then stick with it for a minimum of five years without touching it. Ten years is even better and probably more realistic.

Keeping hands off a portfolio is made difficult by the emotions that market gyrations can create. In Wall Street parlance, these emotions are typically referred to as fear and greed. When you look at psychological studies, however, greed is a much, much less powerful motivational force than fear. (Perhaps my background as a psychology major has cursed me to care about precision in these matters!) Tom Petruno’s column in the Los Angeles Times is the first one that I have seen for a long time that I think correctly categorizes the emotions that most investors feel: not fear and greed, but two kinds of fear. He writes that “a desperate fear of losing is what fueled the tidal wave of selling in the stock market last winter. Now, a desperate fear of not winning is pushing investors back to risky assets, maybe far too quickly.”

The other nice thing about his article is that he considers the only two realistic possibilities for avoiding fear and desperation at market turns. One possibility is to create a portfolio mix conservative enough to keep from panicking during difficult environments. That suggestion has merit, but when done realistically—investors often imagine they can handle more volatility than they really can—the allocation is so cautious that the long-term returns are not always satisfactory. The other realistic possibility is to remain flexible about buying and selling different asset classes as they move in and out of favor. This is the model on which our Systematic RS Global Macro portfolio is built, for example.

Whichever way investors decide to go, they need to think it through before they are in the middle of the storm.

Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.


GEnron?

August 7, 2009

General Electric has fallen from grace with the market, and lately, with the SEC as well. They recently paid a $50 million fine to the SEC to settle charges that they had falsified some of their accounting. Of course, GE neither admitted or denied the charges-they just paid.

Floyd Norris, in his High and Low Finance column, wonders whether their accounting problems were an aberration or just standard practice. The accounting issues in question occurred during 2003, although the SEC didn’t get their investigation rolling until 2005. Forensic accountants will have to figure out who knew what when. But if you look at the point & figure relative strength chart of GE versus the market, it went on a sell signal in September 2001. Since that time, the S&P 500 is up approximately 3%, while GE has lost more than 50% of its value.

This whole debacle points out why we prefer to use price as an input for relative strength, rather than relying solely on fundamental data like many investment management organizations. Fundamental analysts have been working with GE’s financial data for years—and basing investment decisions on it. Unfortunately, the data has now turned out to be false.


Disjointed

August 7, 2009

The August edition of Ford Equity Research’s newsletter (click here to learn more about Ford Equity Research) was in my inbox this morning. I certainly don’t anticipate seeing their newsletter in my inbox like I anticipate seeing the SI Swimsuit edition in my mailbox, but that’s a different story.

Ford did have one interesting piece of information I wanted to pass along. We have been noticing that relative strength strategies have been, for lack of a better term, disjointed recently. What I mean is some RS formulations are doing fine right now, but others are doing very poorly. Longer term RS, which generally tests much more favorably than shorter term RS, has lagged the market by a wide margin. But some of the shorter term models are doing much better. Go figure. It’s something I can’t remember seeing to this magnitude before.

A couple of months ago I looked at the returns of different RS factors over a YTD time horizon. At that time the 1 Month RS factor was performing exceptionally well, and most of the other factors were lagging the market. We were picking up the initial stages of the laggard rally. It seems the 1 Month Factor, which has traditionally been a better mean-reversion factor than RS factor, seems to have reverted to form. Now the 3 Month Factor is performing well, but the longer term stuff is still lagging. Ford’s interpretation is in the graphic below:

In the “Best” category you find a bunch of Value factors and the 3 Month Momentum factor. In the “Worst” category you have factors on either side of the 3 Month (1 Month, 12 Month) and some growth factors. Very strange indeed.

It just goes to show how difficult it is right now to define a “strong” stock. Using different RS factors can lead to dramatically different results. We run several different types of accounts using different RS factors. This week, for example, some of the styles outperformed the market by a good margin, and others were way behind. Same philosophy, different measurement period with a dramatically different end product. I wouldn’t expect this type of thing to continue, but a disjointed market like this can leave you scratching your head sometimes.


Where Do We Go From Here?

August 6, 2009

It seems like this is always the question on everyone’s lips, but, of course, no one knows what the market will do. It might be a wise idea to maintain some flexibility. A recent article in Fortune makes the case for global allocation funds during uncertain times. Mina Kimes writes, “Under conditions like these, world allocation funds may have a distinct advantage. Rather than focusing on one type of investment, they are free to search the globe for opportunities and move nimbly in and out of different types of assets.”

The Systematic RS Global Macro portfolio, the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund, and the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund all use slightly different relative strength mechanisms, but all of them are global allocation funds. Right now, global allocation is a relatively fresh concept with U.S. investors, but I suspect the trend of globalisation may bring it more to the forefront in future years.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.


Trend Following for Economists

August 6, 2009

In this article, British economist Samuel Brittan steps out of line to tell the truth about economic forecasting. He says, “The popular view of economists is that they exist to make forecasts and do so badly. One of the more basic rules of the subject is that where a demand exists some people will come forward to supply it. The economists who have done so for forecasts have accordingly fallen flat on their faces. Their usual response is that most of the time they get it reasonably right. But what matters is whether they can identify significant turning points and systemic failures in good time. They cannot.” (my emphasis)

Forecasters in financial markets all face the same problem. No one can identify significant turning points in advance, yet plenty of people still seeming willing to fall flat on their faces trying. Financial media is populated with gurus with answers, although it takes only about 20 minutes of watching CNBC to find commentators on opposite sides of the same issue.

Instead of making a forecast and then feeling beholden to it, we think it is more sensible to keep a flexible, trend-following perspective. As trends change, move along with them rather than trying to guess when the turns will occur.


Decide on a Process and Stick To It

August 4, 2009

Jonathan Hirtle is CEO of the investment consulting firm Hirtle, Callaghan. In this article, he points out that investment policy committees made all of the same errors as individual investors over the last 18 months. He has five policy prescriptions to solve the problem, but a couple of them really resonated with me.

First, he says, “decide on a fact-based decision process and stick to it.” I think this very strongly favors managers that have done extensive research and can demonstrate that they have an edge over time. So much of what we “know” in the investment business amount to unsupported assertions. It’s important to quantify your work. He adds, “unless the macro-decision process has been measured and proven to add value, the rest becomes little more than a social exercise.” If the process becomes an exercise in group think, little good will come of it. And it’s difficult to improve a process until you measure it. Once again, quantification is very important.

One of his prescriptions seems a little off the wall, but I think may have a great deal of value. He suggests that investors and advisors form support groups. That might sound unusual, but he explains, “it has been widely demonstrated that we humans act destructively around money. When we encounter destructive behavior in other aspects of our lives, we form a support group. We encourage our client investment committees to think of their outside advisers and themselves as a support group whose aim is to help each other stay on the wagon of enlightened investing.” We’ve written many times on this blog that most investment errors turn out to be, at their core, behavioral errors. So I think his suggestion has a lot of merit. Clients and advisors need to stick together and help one another out.

One of the things we hope to encourage with this blog, besides being able to explain our thought process and investment discipline, is interaction among our readers. We love questions that might spur research on a new idea or comments that could get a lively discussion going on a topic that is relevant to client portfolios in a turbulent time like this. We hope that you enjoy the content, but we also encourage you to contribute your voice to the discussion.


Sugar, Sugar

August 4, 2009

Tom Dorsey often points out that supply and demand is the one concept from economics that really resonates with him. This article, about the sugar crop in India, shows how clearly supply and demand works all over the globe. In India’s case, the government has gotten involved in trying to fine tune sugar production and prices, which unfortunately has made the boom and bust cycles worse.

Relative strength, because it is purely price-based, is also a measure of supply and demand—in this case, relative supply and demand. We want to own the assets where demand is strong and avoid the assets that are overwhelmed by supply. There will always be big swings in supply and demand from cyclical factors like those described in the article, not to mention government intervention, so opportunities for trend followers will always be plentiful.


Arrow DWA Tactical Fund Update

August 4, 2009

The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund has completed conversion to a global macro style. For more information, you should go directly to Arrow Advisors. This fund might be especially useful if you are interested in our Systematic RS Global Macro strategy and it is not available on your firm’s platform, or if you have a smaller account that does not qualify for our separate account minimum.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.


More Proof

August 4, 2009

In his book What Works on Wall Street, James O’Shaughnessy examined literally hundreds of strategies to see which really outperformed. He discovered that relative strength worked, as did some value strategies. Eventually, he settled on two strategies, Cornerstone Growth, which married value and relative strength, and Cornerstone Value, which used both value and high dividend yield. Since the book came out originally in the 1990s (the copyright on my copy is 1997), the skeptical folks at CXO Advisory recently examined how the strategies have performed since then.

The relative strength strategy has continued to shine. Cornerstone Growth has outperformed the market by about 5% per year over the 12-year period. This speaks to how adaptive and robust relative strength is. Cornerstone Value, on the other hand, has had a fall from grace. Even though it outperformed during the test period, in real life it has lagged the market by about 2% annually.

Third-party studies like this are quite important in separating fact from fiction in the investment world, and it is just more proof of the inefficiencies in the financial markets and the value of relative strength.


Burning Down the House

August 3, 2009

Watch out! You might get what you’re after. Talking Heads, Burning Down the House

I was in a bookstore over the weekend where I saw no fewer than six books suggesting that capitalism and our economic system had failed. The prescription in most cases was more government and more income redistribution. They system might be broken, but with the way our business and economic incentives are currently structured, I suspect the prescription of more government intervention will not help at all. The underlying incentives need to be fixed.

Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is a useful economic concept. For a moment, let’s strip away all of the idealogy surrounding the invisible hand and get down to the base assumption: people act in their own self-interest.

Market theorists contend that with everyone acting in their own self-interest that markets run economies much better than bureaucrats. This is stupid. Bureaucrats contend that markets favor some groups and disadvantage others, so they should be able to step in and fix things. This is equally stupid.

The only thing the invisible hand guarantees is that people will act in their own self-interest. That makes the ultimate outcome mainly a matter of creating the proper incentives. If you have dumb incentives, the invisible hand will run the economy like a moron. If you have smart incentives, the invisible hand will run the economy like a genius.

Let’s look at a couple of examples. Let’s say that you have a private investment partnership, like Goldman Sachs or Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham used to be. On the one hand, the partners are incentivized to maximize their earnings through trading and underwriting. On the other hand, since the capital in the partnership is their own money, they are also incentivized not to blow up the firm. This prevents all manner of lousy underwriting deals and insures that trading leverage is managed carefully. The result is a company that tries to make as much money as possible without destroying the firm. This is the invisible hand at work with proper incentives. Everyone is working in their own self-interest, but those interests are balanced.

Now, think for a moment about a modern institution we will call Megabank. It is public, not private. Acting in their own self-interest, the traders and investment bankers are still incentivized to maximize their own compensation. However, the money the trading desk is using does not belong to the traders-it is other people’s money (OPM). What are the odds that they will overleverage in an attempt to make a huge bonus? Likewise, what incentive does an investment banker have to underwrite only good deals? (In fact, the bad deals usually come with bigger fees—bring it on.) Plenty of employees will act responsibly, of course, but moral hazard has been introduced. With everyone acting in their own self-interest, the invisible hand has this firm headed for the emergency room.

Think about AIG’s incentives: if they are allowed to underwrite insurance (credit default swaps) that is incredibly profitable because no reserves are required, is it likely they will underwrite a little or a lot? Think about a homebuyer’s incentive: tell the truth and stay in your apartment, lie a little (or a lot) and move into a nice house. Think about a sub-prime lender’s incentive: if they are allowed to offload all of the bad loans through securitization, are they likely to underwrite a little or a lot? Are they likely to care about the ultimate credit quality or default rates? With these sorts of incentives in place, what did policy makers think was going to happen? Now, what would happen if instead they had to eat their own cooking and retain a significant portion of the sub-prime loans on their balance sheet? Might that change their behavior? What if, instead of doing same-day exercise and sale of their stock options, executives had to exercise and hold the company stock for three years after their affiliation with the company ended? Would their stewardship change in any way?

The problem with the invisible hand is not that it doesn’t work—the problem is that it works incredibly well. This puts an enormous burden on policy makers to think carefully about how incentives are structured-and about what the ultimate consequences might be. Congress appears to have a very limited understanding of either the invisible hand or the consequences of incentives. It’s safe to say that most parents, who have to deal with kids and behavioral incentives all the time, are doing a better job, since most of their children live and become productive members of society.

I don’t know whether you think this is a brilliant piece of political economy or something so obvious that a fifth-grader could figure it out. But we, as a society, have apparently not figured it out. If we decide we want vast national savings, lots of capital formation and innovation, and a clean environment—all of that is probably achievable with properly thought out incentives. There are always trade-offs, and incentives usually have to include a lot of carrots and a few sticks. The invisible hand can’t give us everything, but with thoughtful incentives, we can do a lot better than we are doing now. We don’t have to let the invisible hand sucker punch us.