April Arrow DWA Funds Review

May 10, 2013

4/30/2013

The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX)

At the end of April, the fund had approximately 45% in U.S. Equities, 25% in Fixed Income, 17% in International Equities, and 13% in Alternatives.  The U.S. equity markets continue to power higher led by Healthcare, Financials, and Consumer Cyclicals—all sectors that we own in the fund.  While broad economic growth remains tepid, corporate profits have been impressive and this is surely a large reason why equities have been so strong.  Much of our best performance for the fund in April also came from our Alternatives sleeve which has exposure to real estate, which has been the best performing asset class so far this year, and our currency carry trade, which includes a short position in the Japanese Yen.  In recent months, the Japanese have embraced aggressive monetary policy in an attempt to stimulate their economy and to raise inflation.  Their currency has dropped sharply so far this year.  Real estate continues to benefit from the low interest rate environment and the economic recovery.  International equities also had a strong month in April and are among the best performers for the year.  Our exposure to fixed income can range from 25-65 percent of the fund, but for now the exposure is at the lower end of its band.

DWAFX gained 1.56% in April and is up 8% through 4/30/13.

We believe that a real strength of this strategy is its balance between remaining diversified, while also adapting to market leadership.  When an asset class is weak its exposure will tend to be towards the lower end of the exposure constraints, and when an asset class is strong its exposure in the fund will trend toward the upper end of its exposure constraints.  Relative strength provides an effective means of determining the appropriate weights of the strategy.

dwafx April Arrow DWA Funds Review

The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX)

At the end of April, the fund had approximately 78% in U.S. Equities, 10% in International Equities, and 9% in Real Estate.  Over the course of the month, we reduced our exposure to international equities—specifically to European equities and Pacific ex-Japan—and increased our exposure to U.S. equities.  We also added a position to Japanese equities.  Japanese equities have responded strongly to the aggressive monetary policy being employed in Japan in an attempt to stimulate their economy.  This is noteworthy because Japanese equities have had poor relative strength for much of the past several decades.  We are also capitalizing on the improvement in Japan by our position in international real estate as the largest position in that ETF is to Japanese real estate.  Among our best performing positions for the year are our U.S. sector positions in Health Care, Consumer Discretionary, and Financials.  Stable leadership in those sectors has been very helpful for the performance of the overall fund.

DWTFX was up 2.63% in April and has gained 9.79% through 4/30/13.

This strategy is a go-anywhere strategy with very few constraints in terms of exposure to different asset classes.  The strategy can invest in domestic equities, international equities, inverse equities, currencies, commodities, real estate, and fixed income.  Market history clearly shows that asset classes go through secular bull and bear markets and we believe this strategy is ideally designed to capitalize on those trends.  Additionally, we believe that this strategy can provide important risk diversification for a client’s overall portfolio.

DWTFX1 April Arrow DWA Funds Review

 

See www.arrowfunds.com for more information.

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DWTFX Leading the Pack YTD

May 1, 2013

According to Morningstar, The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX) is now outperforming 95% of its peers in the World Allocation category YTD.  Through April, the fund is up 9.79%

DWTFX DWTFX Leading the Pack YTD

 

You can access the fact sheet for the fund by clicking below:

fact sheet DWTFX Leading the Pack YTD

 

See www.arrowfunds.com for more information.  Past performance is not indicative of future results.  Potential for profits is accompanied by possibility of loss.

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Financial Repression Primer

May 1, 2013

Research Affliliates published a very nice primer on financial repression on Advisor Perspectives.  It’s well worth reading to get the lay of the land.  Here’s how they define financial repression:

Financial repression refers to a set of governmental policies that keep real interest rates low or negative and regulate or manipulate a captive audience into investing in government debt. This results in cheap funding and will be a prime tool used by governments in highly indebted developed market economies to improve their balance sheets over the coming decades.

When you hear talk about “the new normal,” this is one of the features.  Most of us have not had to deal with financial repression during our investment careers.  In fact, for advisors in the 1970s and early 1980s, the problem was that interest rates were too high, not too low!

There are disparate views on the endgame from financial repression.  Some are expecting Japanese-style deflation, while others are looking for Weimar Republic inflation.  Maybe we will just muddle through.  In truth, there are many possible outcomes depending on the myriad of policy decisions that will be made in coming years.

In our view, guessing at the outcome of the political and economic process is hazardous.  We think it makes much more sense to be alert to the possibilities embedded in tactical asset allocation.  That allows you to pursue returns wherever they can be found at the time, without having to have a strong opinion on the eventual outcome.  Relative strength can often be a very useful guide in that process.

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Gold: Getting Personal

April 15, 2013

Interesting chart of the S&P vs. gold going back a few decades:

SP Gold Gold: Getting Personal

Joe Weisenthal’s take:

You can see that even with the recent upturn in stocks, relative to gold, gold has crushed stocks since 2000.

Arguably, 2000 represented a peak in belief in the capabilities of humans. The internet inspired all kinds of crazy optimism about how humans would re-shape the world for the better. The ebullience spread beyond the net. There was, for example, optimism about newways of transporting humans: Fuel cells! Segway!

Of course, the bubble crashed. Then we had 9/11. Then we had two wars. Then we had the housing implosion. Then we had the financial crisis. Then the horrible recession. Then the European crisis and the debt ceiling and everything else.

In other words, we had a series of a events that, for good reason, shook our faith in humanity. During this time, people thought about history on a large scale. And gold, having been used as a money for thousands of years, did pretty well, especially relative to stocks, which represent companies made up of humans.

So ultimately, the decline of gold and the rise of stocks is a big trend that everyone should cheer.

The huge corpus of economic research, which has informed the US’ efforts to stimulate the economy, is not a pile of garbage. You can do a lot without blowing things up, as the goldbugs claimed would happen.

And more broadly, this represents a breaking of the fever, and perhaps a return to thinking that humans aren’t such a horrible disappointment.

With gold’s recent declines, analysis such as that written by Weisenthal is all over the place.  Gold really gets personal with people.  For many, its strength or weakness has the ability to validate their economic and political views.

From a strictly trend following perspective, the S&P vs. gold relative strength relationship is potentially significant because of its history of providing long-term trends favoring one or the other.  If this ultimately does result in a major inflection point for the S&P vs. gold relationship, there will be important implications for those of us employing tactical asset allocation strategies in the years ahead.  Admittedly, simply observing the relative strength relationship between the two provides much less intrigue than can be found on talk radio or any number of other sources (but that can be a very good thing for investors who are just looking to make money).

HT: Business Insider

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Evaluating the “Siegel Constant”

April 11, 2013

From Eddie Elfenbein comes what I consider to be among the biggest reasons for employing a tactical approach to asset allocation—an approach that seeks to overweight or underweight U.S. equities depending on their relative strength.

I want to revisit the Ibbotson data again to look at the often-cited claim that the stock market has historically returned (capital gains and dividends) 7% per year greater than inflation. This claim has been repeated so much by Jeremy Siegel that some have called it Siegel’s Constant.

Here’s the long-term real return in blue, with a 6.9% trendline in black.

image1327 Evaluating the Siegel Constant

I think this is a dangerous idea for several reason. For one, the long-term real return of stocks is no longer 7%. Thanks to two giant market crashes in less than a decade, the long-term number has fallen to 6.67% (that’s since 1925). Furthermore, much of that gained comes from the post-war boom. Over that last 50 years, that real return has been a much more reasonable 5.45%.

Another problem is that this data series is highly volatile. Too volatile to call the results a constant. There have been long periods when investors haven’t made a dime from the stock market in real terms.

Looking at the data, there seems to be periods of 15 to 20 years when stocks boom, or when they bust. Notice how the blue line runs above or below the black line for long periods at a time. Still, I would say that we don’t have enough data to make the claim that the stock market does this regularly.

During those 15-20 year periods when stocks boom it makes sense to seek to overweight them and during the extended periods when stocks are out of favor it is quite likely that an investors will benefit by seeking to overweight other asset classes.  This theory of tactically allocating among different asset classes was put to the test here in a white paper published by John Lewis.  It doesn’t work every year, but over time the results speak for themselves.

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March Arrow DWA Funds Review

April 8, 2013

3/31/2013

The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX)

At the end of March, the fund had approximately 46% in U.S. Equities, 25% in Fixed Income, 17% in International Equities, and 12% in Alternatives.  This is little changed from the allocations to the different asset classes as of the end of February.  Our biggest overweight continues to be U.S. equities.  Within the U.S. equity sleeve, we have exposure to Healthcare, Financial, and Consumer Services sector funds.  These three sectors have maintained fairly stable leadership for some time now.  We also have exposure to U.S. small and mid-cap value funds.  Value has generally had much better relative strength than Growth style funds.

DWAFX gained 2.52% in March and is up 6.34% through 3/31/13.  Although our best performing holdings in March came from our exposure to U.S. equities, we also had some strong performance from International equities—Mexico in particular.  Fixed income was relatively flat in March.  Our exposure to fixed income can range from 25-65 percent of the fund, but for now the exposure is at the lower end of its band.

We believe that a real strength of this strategy is its balance between remaining diversified, while also adapting to market leadership.  When an asset class is weak its exposure will tend to be towards the lower end of the exposure constraints, and when an asset class is strong its exposure in the fund will trend toward the upper end of its exposure constraints.  Relative strength provides an effective means of determining the appropriate weights of the strategy.

dwafx March Arrow DWA Funds Review

The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX)

At the end of March, the fund had approximately 63% in U.S. Equities, 27% in International Equities, and 9% in Real Estate.  As part of our U.S. equity exposure, we own Healthcare, Financial, and Consumer Services sector funds.  These three funds have maintained fairly stable market leadership.  We also have exposure to U.S. small and mid-cap value funds.  Value has generally had much better relative strength than Growth style funds.

DWTFX was up 3.07% in March and has gained 6.98% through 3/31/13.  Much of the best performance for the month came from our exposure to domestic equities and real estate, while our exposure to International equities was relatively flat over the course of the month.

This strategy is a go-anywhere strategy with very few constraints in terms of exposure to different asset classes.  The strategy can invest in domestic equities, international equities, inverse equities, currencies, commodities, real estate, and fixed income.  Market history clearly shows that asset classes go through secular bull and bear markets and we believe this strategy is ideally designed to capitalize on those trends.  Additionally, we believe that this strategy can provide important risk diversification for a client’s overall portfolio.

dwtfx March Arrow DWA Funds Review

 

See www.arrowfunds.com for more details.

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February Arrow DWA Funds Review

March 7, 2013

February 28, 2013

The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX)

At the end of February, the fund had approximately 44% in U.S. Equities, 25% in Fixed Income, 17% in International Equities, and 12% in Alternatives.  This is little changed from the allocations to the different asset classes as of the end of January.  However, we did have some changes within the Alternative asset class: Our position in gold was removed and replaced with real estate.  The balance of the Alternative exposure is to the currency carry trade.  Our biggest overweight continues to be U.S. equities.

DWAFX gained 0.23% in February and is up 3.72% through 2/28/13.  Much of the best performance for the month came from our exposure to domestic equities (small and mid caps in particular), while international equities pulled back over the course of the month.  Our fixed income exposure also modestly advanced in February.  Although interest rates declined in February, the overall trend of rates has been higher since the middle of last year.  Our exposure to fixed income can range from approximately 25 to 65 percent and right now it is at its lower limit.

We believe that a real strength of this strategy is its balance between remaining diversified, while also adapting to market leadership.  When an asset class is weak its exposure will tend to be towards the lower end of the exposure constraints, and when an asset class is strong its exposure in the fund will trend toward the upper end of its exposure constraints.  Relative strength provides an effective means of determining the appropriate weights of the strategy.

dwafx February Arrow DWA Funds Review

The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX)

At the end of February, the fund had approximately 62% in U.S. Equities, 28% in International Equities, and 9% in Real Estate.  Over the course of February, we added to our U.S. Equity exposure, and reduced our exposure to International Real Estate.  When this bull market in U.S. equities began nearly four years ago, there were not many who projected the impressive gains that we have ultimately seen.  In fact, without a disciplined approach to following trends, it may have been psychologically difficult to overweight this asset class.  However, this continues to be our biggest overweight.  Our U.S. equity exposure remains in areas that have shown some fairly stable leadership, such as Consumer Discretionary, Financials, and Healthcare.  Stable leadership is very helpful for trend following strategies and Consumer Discretionary stocks have been fairly persistent leaders for the last 5 years.  Notably absent from our exposure is commodities, which have been particularly weak for the last couple of years.  Commodities were among the best performing asset classes over the past decade, but that strength has not so far carried over to this decade.  Again, we see the benefits of being adaptive.

DWTFX was flat in February and is up 3.79% through 2/28/13.  Much of the best performance for the month came from our exposure to domestic equities, while our exposure to European equities pulled back over the course of the month.

This strategy is a go-anywhere strategy with very few constraints in terms of exposure to different asset classes.  The strategy can invest in domestic equities, international equities, inverse equities, currencies, commodities, real estate, and fixed income.  Market history clearly shows that asset classes go through secular bull and bear markets and we believe this strategy is ideally designed to capitalize on those trends.  Additionally, we believe that this strategy can provide important risk diversification for a client’s overall portfolio.

DWTFX February Arrow DWA Funds Review

Of interest to Wells Fargo Advisors: The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund is currently among the funds on the Wells Fargo Advisors Mutual Fund Recommended List.

Please see www.arrowfunds.com for more information about The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund and The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund.  Holding for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.  Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

 

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Target Date Fund Follies

March 7, 2013

Target date and lifecycle funds have taken off since 2006, when they were deemed qualified default investment alternatives in the Pension Protection Act.  I’m sure it seemed like a good idea at the time.  Unfortunately, it planted the idea that a glidepath that moved toward bonds as the investor moved toward retirement was a good idea.  Assets in target date funds were nearly $400 billion at the end of 2011—and they have continued to grow rapidly.

In fact, bonds will prove to be a good idea if they perform well and a lousy idea if they perform poorly.  Since 10-year future returns correlate closely with the current coupon yield, prospects for bonds going forward aren’t particularly promising at the moment.  I’ve argued before that tactical asset allocation may provide an alternative method of accumulating capital, as opposed to a restrictive target-date glidepath.

A new research paper by Javier Estrada, The Glidepath Illusion: An International Perspective, makes a much broader claim.  He looks at typical glidepaths that move toward bonds over time, and then at a wide variety of alternatives, ranging from inverse glidepaths that move toward stocks over time to balanced funds.  His findings are stunning.

This lifecycle strategy implies that investors are aggressive with little capital and conservative with much more capital, which may not be optimal in terms of wealth accumulation. This article evaluates three alternative types of strategies, including contrarian strategies that follow a glidepath opposite to that of target-date funds; that is, they become more aggressive as retirement approaches. The results from a comprehensive sample that spans over 19 countries, two regions, and 110 years suggest that, relative to lifecycle strategies, the alternative strategies considered here provide investors with higher expected terminal wealth, higher upside potential, more limited downside potential, and higher uncertainty but limited to how much better, not how much worse, investors are expected to do with these strategies.

In other words, the only real question was how much better the alternative strategies performed.  (I added the bold.)

Every strategy option they considered performed better than the traditional glidepath!  True, if they were more focused on equities, they were more volatile.  But, for the cost of the volatility, you ended up with more money—sometimes appreciably more money.  This data sample was worldwide and extended over 110 years, so it wasn’t a fluke.  Staying equity-focused didn’t work occasionally in some markets—it worked consistently in every time frame in every region.  Certainly the future won’t be exactly like the past, so there is no way to know if these results will hold going forward.  However, bonds have had terrific performance over the last 30 years and the glidepath favoring them still didn’t beat alternative strategies over an investing lifetime.

Bonds, to me, make sense to reduce volatility.  Some clients simply must have a reduced-volatility portfolio to sleep at night, and I get that.  But Mr. Estrada’s study shows that the typical glidepath is outperformed even by a 60/40-type balanced fund.  (Balanced funds, by the way, are also designated QDIAs in the Pension Protection Act.)   Tactical asset allocation, where bonds are held temporarily for defensive purposes, might also allow clients to sleep at night while retaining a growth orientation.  The bottom line is that it makes sense to reduce volatility just enough to keep the client comfortable, but no more.

I’d urge you to read this paper carefully.  Maybe your conclusions will be different than mine.  But my take-away is this: Over the course of an investing lifetime, it is very important to stay focused on growth.

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From the Archives: Was It Really a Lost Decade?

February 28, 2013

Index Universe has a provocative article by Rob Arnott and John West of Research Affiliates.  Their contention is that 2000-2009 was not really a lost decade.  Perhaps if your only asset was U.S. equities it would seem that way, but they point out that other, more exotic assets actually had respectable returns.

The table below shows total returns for some of the asset classes they examined.

 From the Archives: Was It Really a Lost Decade?

click to enlarge

What are the commonalities of the best performing assets? 1) Lots of them are highly volatile like emerging markets equities and debt, 2) lots of them are international and thus were a play on the weaker dollar, 3) lots of them were alternative assets like commodities, TIPs, and REITs.

In other words, they were all asset classes that would tend to be marginalized in a traditional strategic asset allocation, where the typical pie would primarily consist of domestic stocks and bonds, with only small allocations to very volatile, international, or alternative assets.

In an interesting way, I think this makes a nice case for tactical asset allocation.  While it is true that most investors–just from a risk and volatility perspective–would be unwilling to have a large allocation to emerging markets for an entire decade, they might find that periodic significant exposure to emerging markets during strong trends would be quite acceptable.  And even assets near the bottom of the return table like U.S. Treasury bills would have been very welcome in a portfolio during parts of 2008, for example.  You can cover the waterfront and just own an equal-weighted piece of everything, but I don’t know if that is the most effective way to do things.

What’s really needed is a systematic method for determining which asset classes to own, and when.  Our Systematic Relative Strength process does this pretty effectively, even for asset classes that might be difficult or impossible to grade from a valuation perspective.  (How do you determine whether the Euro is cheaper than energy stocks, or whether emerging market debt is cheaper than silver or agricultural commodities?)  Once a systematic process is in place, the investor can be slightly more comfortable with perhaps a higher exposure to high volatility or alternative assets, knowing that in a tactical approach the exposures would be adjusted if trends change.

—-this article originally appeared 2/17/2010.  There is no telling what the weak or strong assets will be for the coming decade, but I think global tactical asset allocation still represents a reasonable way to deal with that uncertainty.

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Assessing Fixed Income

February 27, 2013

Interesting perspective via ETF Trends on the potential risks in the fixed income markets—high-yield bonds in particular:

Michael Holland, chairman of Holland & Co., told Bloomberg that bond prices are acting like dot-com stocks during the Internet craze. “I’ve been in the business for 40 years, and the reality is that we’ve never had a situation like this because this is totally manufactured by the Fed,” he said.

“The interest-rate risk is just a law of nature,” said Craig Packer, head of Americas leveraged finance for Goldman Sachs, referring to junk bonds.

“I don’t know if it will be this year, but five years from now we’re going to look back and realize that investors were taking on real interest-rate risk when they were buying any of these products and that risk came to fruition,” Packer said in the Bloomberg story. “I feel pretty comfortable predicting that. It’s not the 2006-2007 credit risk. It’s the 2013 interest-rate risk.”

Will this prediction be any different than the countless other bearish predictions over the last couple years for fixed income?  Who knows.  However, at some point I do think it is highly likely that interest rates rise—perhaps substantially so.   There are many different factors at work here, including Fed policy and the strength of the economic recovery.  If and when rates do rise, there are going to be a lot of investors asking questions not only about yield, but also about risk management.

Right now, we do hold high-yield bonds in some of our investment strategies, due to their strong relative strength.  However, I take comfort in the fact that we approach our exposure tactically.  In other words, we are not married to any one position.

Dorsey Wright even introduced a Tactical Fixed Income strategy earlier this year (financial professionals can click here to view a video presentation on the strategy) that we believe may prove very valuable in the years ahead.

Dorsey Wright currently owns HYG.  A list of all holdings for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.  Please click here for disclosures.

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Tame Inflation: Will It Last?

February 25, 2013

Brian Westbury and Bob Stein, Chief Economists for First Trust, have an interesting view of what may be in store for inflation in the coming years:

Inflation is tame. For now. The CPI (consumer price inflation) was flat in January and is up only 1.6% from a year ago. The PPI (producer prices) rose a small 0.2% in January and is up just 1.4% from a year ago.

And even though energy prices spiked in February, the year ago comparisons are likely to stay tame. The consensus expects the February CPI to rise 0.6% – the largest in 44 months. Nonetheless, it would still show just 1.9% inflation in the past year, which is still below the Federal Reserve’s target of 2%.

This won’t last. With the Fed loose; we expect consumer prices to rise toward 3% during 2013. Then rise to 4% in 2014 on its way to 5% gains, maybe even higher, in the next few years. In theory, the Fed has said that 6.5% unemployment and 2.5% or greater inflation would force it to tighten policy.

However, we believe the Fed will remain in denial about inflation. Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and Bill Dudley – the power-elite – don’t believe inflation can head higher, so when it does, they will either ignore it or blame it on temporary, one-off shocks as the Fed did in the 1970s.

The first excuse will be that higher inflation is due to commodities, and they are just not that large a part of the economy. Moreover, “core” inflation remains tame.

But when rising housing prices (and rents) push “core” inflation above the 2% target, the Fed will resort to its second excuse: housing prices are just bouncing back to normal…and that this is just a temporary phenomenon.

The third excuse will be that “it is not actual inflation that matters, but what the Fed forecasts future inflation will be” over the next year or two. And, as long as the Fed is forecasting a return to 2% or lower, then there’s nothing to worry about.

If we are right and inflation persists above 2% and continues to rise, that excuse won’t work anymore, either.

Enter excuse number four: this is when the troika of Bernanke, Yellen and Dudley will argue that “it’s OK for inflation to exceed a 2% target because it has to make up for when inflation averaged below target during past years.”

Finally, the Fed will resort to excuse number five, which will blame increasing price pressures, not on loose money, but on things like temporary weakness in the dollar or a temporary increase in velocity or the money multiplier.

The fact that CPI has been so tame over the last couple years of this recovery has surprised many, but Wesbury and Stein may well be correct about inflation (and the Fed’s response to it) going forward.  For those approaching asset allocation from a tactical perspective, this doesn’t necessarily have to be a bad thing.  In fact, a portfolio that has the ability to make meaningful allocations to commodities and real estate, among other asset classes, may even thrive in that environment.

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From the Archives: Rob Arnott and the Key to Better Returns

February 21, 2013

Rob Arnott is a thought leader in tactical asset allocation, currently well-known for his RAFI Fundamental Indexes.  In his recent piece, Lessons from the Naughties, he discusses how investors will need to find return going forward.

The key to better returns will be to respond tactically to the shifting spectrum of opportunity, especially expanding and contracting one’s overall risk budget.

It’s a different way to view tactical asset allocation–looking at it from a risk budget point of view.  The general concept is to own risk assets in good markets and safe assets in bad markets.

It turns out that systematic application of relative strength accomplishes this very well.  The good folks at Arrow Funds recently asked us to take a look at how the beta in a tactically managed portfolio changed over time.  When we examined that issue, it showed that as markets became risky, relative strength reduced the beta of the portfolio by moving toward low volatility (strong) assets.  When markets were strong, allocating with relative strength pushed up the beta in the portfolio, thus taking good advantage of the market strength.

 From the Archives: Rob Arnott and the Key to Better Returns

click to enlarge

Using relative strength to do tactical asset allocation, the investor was not only able to earn an acceptable rate of return over time, but was able to have some risk mitigation going on the side.  That’s a pretty tasty combination in today’s markets.

—-this article originally appeared on 2/26/2010.  Amid all of the publicity given recently to risk parity, Arnott’s approach, which is to vary the risk budget over time depending on the opportunities available, has been largely ignored.  I think this is unfortunate.  His approach, although perhaps not easy, has merit.  Tactical asset allocation driven by relative strength is one way to do that.

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From the Archives: Getting Torched By Expert Opinion

January 29, 2013

Barry Ritholtz has posted a 5 minute clip of some of Ben Bernanke’s public comments between 2005-2007 on the housing market and the broader economy.  The point of me posting this is not to say that Bernanke is a complete moron because I have little doubt that he is one of the brightest financial minds in the country.  However, talk about being dead wrong!  If you relied on these opinions in order to make investment decisions, you likely got torched.  If you can’t rely on expert opinion when making investment decisions, then what options do you have?

This highlights the value of trend-following systems.   Trend following requires zero reliance on expert opinion; it simply allows the investor to adapt to whatever trends the market offers, whether or not experts expected things to play out in a given way.  With trend following, you’ll have plenty of losing trades, but you’ll also avoid sitting in losing trades for long periods of time.  Furthermore, systematic trend-following has an excellent track record (see here and here.)  Trend following allows you to cut your losses short and to hold on to your winners.  Frequently, the strongest trends end up being very different from what even the brightest experts predicted.

—-this article originally appeared 2/11/2010.  Well, heck, if you can’t trust Ben Bernanke, who can you trust?  The answer should be obvious: follow the price trend and forget about the random guessing of experts.

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Dealing With Financial Repression

January 28, 2013

James Montier, the investment strategist at GMO, published a long piece on financial repression in Advisor Perspectives in November 2012.  It’s taken me almost that long to read it—and I’m still not sure I completely understand its implications.  Financial repression itself is pretty easy to understand though.  Along with a humorous description of Fed policy, Montier describes it like this:

Put another way, QE sets the short-term rate to zero, and then tries to persuade everyone to spend rather than save by driving down the rates of return on all other assets (by direct purchase and indirect effects) towards zero, until there is nothing left to hold savings in. Essentially, Bernanke’s first commandment to investors goes something like this: Go forth and speculate. I don’t care what you do as long as you do something irresponsible.

Not all of Bernanke’s predecessors would have necessarily shared his enthusiasm for recklessness. William McChesney Martin was the longest-serving Federal Reserve Governor of all time. He seriously considered training as a Presbyterian minister before deciding that his vocation lay elsewhere, a trait that earned him the beautifully oxymoronic moniker of “the happy puritan.” He is probably most famous for his observation that the central bank’s role was to “take away the punch bowl just when the party is getting started.” In contrast, Bernanke’s Fed is acting like teenage boys on prom night: spiking the punch, handing out free drinks, hoping to get lucky, and encouraging everyone to view the market through beer goggles.

So why is the Fed pursuing this policy? The answer, I think, is that the Fed is worried about the “initial condition” or starting point (if you prefer) of the economy, a position of over-indebtedness. When one starts from this position there are really only four ways out:

i. Growth is obviously the most “popular” but hardest route.

ii. Austerity is pretty much doomed to failure as it tends to lead to falling tax revenues, wider deficits, and public unrest. 2

iii. Abrogation runs the spectrum from default (entirely at the borrower’s discretion) to restructuring (a combination of borrower and lender) right out to the oft-forgotten forgiveness (entirely at the lender’s discretion).

iv. Inflation erodes the real value of the debt and transfers wealth from savers to borrowers. Inflating away debt can be delivered by two different routes: (a) sudden bursts of inflation, which catch participants off guard, or (b) financial repression.

Financial repression can be defined (somewhat loosely, admittedly) as a policy that results in consistent negative real interest rates. Keynes poetically called this the “euthanasia of the rentier.”3  The tools available to engineer this outcome are many and varied, ranging from explicit (or implicit) caps on interest rates to directed lending to the government by captive domestic audiences (think the postal saving system in Japan over the last two decades) to capital controls (favoured by emerging markets in days gone by).

The effects of financial repression are easy to see:  very low yields in debt instruments, and the consequent temptation to reach for yield elsewhere.  Advisors see the effects in clients every day.

If you are feeling jovial, I highly recommend reading Montier’s whole piece as an antidote to your good mood.  His forecast is rather bleak—poor long-term returns in most all asset classes for a long period of time.  My take-away was a little different.

Let’s assume for a moment that Montier is correct and long-term (they use seven years) equity real returns are approximately equivalent to zero.  In fact, that’s pretty much exactly what we’ve seen during the last decade!  The broad market has made very little progress since 1998, a period going on 15 years now.  Buy-and-hold (we prefer the terminology “sit-and-take-it”) clearly didn’t work in that environment, but tactical asset allocation certainly did.  Using relative strength to drive the process, tactical asset allocation steered you toward asset classes, sectors, and individual securities that were strong (for however long) and then pushed you out of them when they became weak.

I have no idea whether Montier’s forecast will pan out or not, but if it does, tactical asset allocation might end up being one of the few ways to survive.  There’s almost always enough fluctuation around the trend—even if the trend is flat—to get a little traction with tactical asset allocation.

Source: Monty Python/Youtube

[In fact, might I suggest the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund and the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund as considerations?  You can find more information at www.arrowfunds.com.]

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Bond Buyer’s Dilemma

January 9, 2013

Morningstar details the risks facing fixed income investors seeking higher yields:

The ability for even very low-rated, highly leveraged companies to get financing has helped many firms stay afloat when they would otherwise have defaulted in a normal year. The high demand for these speculative issues has caused some investors to discard fundamentals in favor of searching for the highest yield without regard for quality. This strategy has worked so far, but at some point demand will soften, poor business fundamentals will catch up with firms, or the Fed will change its policy.

The article also included this chart showing historical drawdowns in high yield bonds:

High Yield Drawdowns Bond Buyers Dilemma

This is a pretty good argument for being tactical with your fixed income exposure.

To learn about our approach to tactically managing a broad universe of fixed income, including Treasurys, Corporates, High Yield, International, Convertible, and TIPs, click the image below to watch a short video presentation on our Tactical Fixed Income portfolio (financial professionals only).

tfi Bond Buyers Dilemma

Please click here for disclosures.

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Disconnecting from Fundamentals

January 7, 2013

Mohamed El-Erian laments the impact that central banks are having on the markets:

But, critically for both economic prospects and investors, greater relative stability does not guarantee absolute stability. There is a limit to how far central banks can divorce prices from fundamentals. Moreover, as illustrated in the minutes of the latest Fed meeting, there is already discomfort among some policy makers due to the costs and risks of unconventional policies. Also, at some point, and it is hard to tell when exactly, the private sector will increasingly refuse to engage in situations deemed excessively artificial and overly rigged.

This is particularly relevant for asset classes (such as high yield corporate bonds, equities and certain highly leveraged products) outside the direct influence of central banks – an influence that is applied through direct market purchases and forward-looking policy guidance. With the weaker central bank impact, prices need to have greater consistency with the realities of balance sheets and income statements.

In such a world, investors should expect security and sector selections to get repeatedly overwhelmed by macro correlations. Since a growing number of asset classes are now exposed in a material fashion to the belief that central banks will deliver macroeconomic as well as market outcomes, investors have assumed considerable macro-driven correlations across their holdings. Moreover, with seemingly endless liquidity injections, the scaling of such exposure can easily disconnect from the extent to which prices deviate from fundamentals.

The topic of prices deviating from fundamentals is not new.  How much of that deviation between price and fundamentals is a result of investor behavior, central bank policy, or any number of other factors is up for debate.  While there may be a lot of truth to what El-Erian says about the impact of central bank’s policies, it becomes very difficult for an investor to know what actions to take based on those arguments.  What is the correct measure of fundamental value?  If a client places trades based on the expectation that the market will eventually reflect fundamental value, how long should they expect to wait?  Days?  Months? Years?  Decades?  Just how far can prices deviate from fundamental value?

Our approach to investing doesn’t get caught up in normative debates.  Rather, all of our trend-following models focus on one core piece of information that reflects supply and demand– and that is price.   Anything that can possibly affect the price – fundamentally, politically, psychologically, or otherwise – is actually reflected in the price.  Furthermore, relative strength has the advantage of being able to rank trends by their strength.

We are likely to be debating the merits of current central bank policy for many years to come.  In time, conclusions will be able to be drawn about their wisdom.  However, relative strength offers pragmatists a robust and adaptive strategy to employ today.

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Nimble Enough to Adapt?

December 4, 2012

Institutional Investor says that the Australian dollar is no longer a risk-on currency:

currencies Nimble Enough to Adapt?

If true, will investors be nimble enough to adapt?  Certain securities or asset classes can exhibit a given risk profile for an extended period of time…until they don’t.  It can be a very risky proposition to say “this” is a safe asset class, “this” one is risky, “this” one goes up when “this” one goes down…

Alternatively, relative strength approaches asset allocation from the perspective of a meritocracy: Does its relative strength justify inclusion in the portfolio?  If so, it’s in (or overweighted); if not, it’s out (or underweighted).

Dorsey Wright does not currently have a position in the Australian dollar.  A list of all holding for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.  

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Coping With the New Normal

November 28, 2012

The “new normal” is a phrase that strikes fear into the heart of many investors.  It is shorthand for the belief that the US economy will grow very slowly going forward, as opposed to resuming its typical growth rate.  For example, here is the Research Affliliates version of the new normal, as presented in a recent article from AdvisorOne:

Unless the U.S. makes politically difficult changes in immigration, employment and investment policies, Americans should expect a long-term “new normal” rate of growth of just 1%. So says investment management firm Research Affiliates, in a research note that brings a wealth of demographic and historic data to bear on current fiscal projections.

Christopher Brightman, the report’s author and head of investment management for the Newport Beach, Calif. Firm founded by indexing guru Rob Arnott, is critical of White House and Congressional Budget Office growth projections that assume 2.5% long-term growth.

Brightman argues the U.S. will find it nearly impossible to recapture the 3.3% average annual growth that prevailed from 1951 to 2000 as a result of negative trends in the key areas that affect GDP: population growth, employment rate growth and productivity.

PIMCO and other firms have also been exponents of the new normal view, and although the specifics may vary from strategist to strategist, the general outlook for sluggish growth is the same.

Investor response to date has been less than constructive and has mostly resembled curling up into the fetal position.  Although I have no idea how likely it is the new normal theory will pan out, let’s think for a moment about some of the possible implications.

  • if US economic growth is slow, it may slow growth overseas, especially when the US is their primary export market.
  • economies less linked to the US may decouple and retain strong growth characteristics.
  • inflation and interest rates may stay low, leading to better-than-expected bond returns (where default is not an issue).
  • ever more heroic measures to stimulate US economic growth may backfire, creating a debt bomb and high future inflation.
  • growth may be priced at a premium multiple for those stocks and sectors that are demonstrating strong fundamentals.  In other words, if growth is hard to find, investors may be willing to pay up for it.
  • slow economic growth may cause a collapse in multiples, as future growth is discounted at a much lower rate.

In other words, you can still get pretty much any investment scenario out of new normal assumptions.  It’s just about whether a particular strategist is feeling pessimistic or optimistic that day, or more cynically, whether they are talking their book.

To me, this is one of the best arguments in favor of tactical asset allocation driven by relative strength.  Relative strength lets the market decide, based on which assets are strong, what to buy.  At any given time it could be currencies, commodities, stocks, bonds, real estate, or even inverse funds.  And it might change over time, as new perceptions creep into the market or as policy responses and market consequences interact in a feedback loop.  Relative strength doesn’t make any assumptions about what will happen; it treats good performance favorably regardless of the source.  Tactical asset allocation, then, is just an attempt to extract returns from wherever they might be available.  That trait may come in handy in a tough market.

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Never-Ending Bond Bubble Debate

November 20, 2012

In case you haven’t had enough of the debate about whether or not bonds are in a bubble (a debate which has gone on for several years now), see Jim Grant’s take below:

For some additional perspective, consider the chart of 10-year interest rates (which moves inversely to bond prices):

10 year Never Ending Bond Bubble Debate

If you think that there is a chance that Jim Grant may be right about bonds, it probably makes sense to have a game plan for tactically managing your fixed income exposure going forward.

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Quote of the Week

November 14, 2012

Nervous energy is a great destroyer of wealth.—-Fayez Sarofim

This quote was embedded in an article written by Jim Goff, the research director at Janus.  Along with making the case for equities, he talks about how important it is to have a reasonable allocation that you can stick with—and then to leave it alone.

Mr. Goff talks about the way in which many investors undermine their returns:

The average investor is far from contrarian. I remember  vividly when a strategist from a top-tier investment firm in the mid-1990’s  told me that while the S&P 500 had grown at 13% per year over the prior 10  years, the realized equity returns of his firm’s retail client base, on  average, had compounded at only 5% per year. The S&P would have turned  $100,000 into $339,000 during that period, but their average investor ended  with $163,000.

Often this is caused by jumping in and out of an asset class, rather than by making tactical adjustments within the asset class.  There’s nothing wrong with tactical asset allocation as long as it’s done systematically.  Even a lousy version of strategic asset allocation—carried out effectively—will probably beat what most investors are doing!  Either way, undisciplined fiddling often ruins investment results.  Mr. Sarofim’s quote is something to take to heart.

There are a couple of points relevant to portfolio management.

  1. Think about a reasonable asset allocation for your situation, one you can stick with.
  2. Have a systematic process for making portfolio adjustments, not one that is undisciplined and responsive to the news environment.

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Smaller Emerging Markets Soar

November 6, 2012

Words that are like music to the ears of relative strength managers (via Equities in Smaller Emerging Markets Soar, FT):

More broadly, the divergence of emerging markets is a sign that investors are increasingly differentiating between countries and even industries in the developing world, rather than lumping disparate countries into one homogenous group, says Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley’s asset management arm.

“We’re done with the era where all emerging markets do well,” says Mr Sharma, author of a book, Breakout Nations, on the next clutch of promising developing countries. “We’re finally starting to see a wide divergence of performance of these markets.”

 Also noted in the article, is that the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have been among the worst performers in the emerging markets.  As expected, the BRICs are where the Powershares DWA Emerging Markets Technical Leaders ETF (PIE) is most underweight:
PIE 2 Smaller Emerging Markets Soar
See www.powershares.com for more information.  A list of all holdings for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.
HT: Abnormal Returns

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Beanbag Economics

October 31, 2012

We’ve written before about beanbag economics, the tendency of the world to adapt.  When you smush down a beanbag chair in one area, it simply adapts by poofing out somewhere else.  The global economy is no different.

Consider the beanbag economics at work in the following excerpt of an article on the bond market in the Financial Times:

Central bankers around the world have followed the lead of the Fed in forcing down interest rates in the hope of boosting economic recovery.

This has presented a dilemma for income investors, who can maintain previous  levels of yield only by buying riskier or longer dated bonds.

For companies, though, it has been an unalloyed boon. Corporate treasurers  have rushed to sell bonds, refinancing existing loans and expiring bonds with  longer term debt paying low, fixed interest rates.

I put the relevant part in bold.  Sure, low interest rates are tough on savers and bond buyers—but they’ve been great for companies.  The full article points out that new corporate debt issuance has already hit a record this year, with a couple of months still to go.  Some companies have been able to retire old debt and refinance it at very low rates.

From an investment point of view, the upside is that earnings leverage will be much more powerful.  The drag from debt service will be much lower for companies that have been able to reduce their interest costs.

Thinking about global economics in terms of a beanbag can help underscore the idea that opportunities are always present.  In a global economy, one sector’s loss may be another’s gain.  Tracking the relative strength of a broad range of asset classes can help investors identify where those investment opportunities are.

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Oil Demand and the New World Order

October 25, 2012

Ed Yardeni of Dr. Ed’s Blog had an interesting chart of oil demand.  The interesting part was that he segmented the demand between Old World (US, Western Europe, and Japan) and New World (everyone else).  There really is a new world order, something that your portfolio needs to reflect.

oildemand yardeni Oil Demand and the New World Order

Source: Dr. Ed’s Blog  (click on image to enlarge)

In this case, a picture might be worth a few thousand words.  You can see pretty clearly that the growth rate in oil demand is far higher outside the Old World.  Up until 2004, aggregate demand was higher in the Old World, but that has changed too.  The big engine of oil demand is no longer the large developed economies.  The last recession created a downturn in oil demand in the Old World, but created barely a blip on the chart for the New World.  I was surprised when I saw this chart, and I’m probably not the only one.  I think most people in the investment industry would be surprised by this—and certainly many clients would be too.

To me, this is a good argument for global tactical asset allocation.  Yes, the economy is slow—but clearly not everywhere.  Based on oil demand, some economies are growing just fine.  Global tactical asset allocation allows you to go where the returns are, regardless of where they may be.  Relative strength is a good way to locate those returns.

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Invest for the Long Run?

October 18, 2012

“Invest for the long-run” can ring hollow for a recent retiree looking to carefully manage his or her nest egg.  Via an article in the New York Times by Paul Sullivan comes the following example:

How should people do the math to avoid dying broke? The answer depends as much on timing as spending.

Mark A. Cortazzo, senior partner at Macro Consulting Group, tells clients who ask this question about three fictional brothers. Each one retired with $1 million on Jan. 1 but three years apart — in 1997, 2000 and 2003. They all invested that $1 million in the Vanguard 500 Index Investor Fund.

Between when they retired and Aug. 31, 2012, each brother withdrew $5,000 a month. The brother who had been retired the longest had $1.14 million on Aug. 31. The one who retired most recently had $1.15 million left.

But the one in the middle, who began taking his monthly withdrawals in 2000, had only $160,568. The reason? The stock market went down for the first three years he was retired, and then plummeted again in 2008. He had to sell more shares to get $5,000 each month.

“Most clients say, ‘I don’t mind dying broke if I’m bouncing my last check to the undertaker,” Mr. Cortazzo said. “But I don’t want to run out at 80 if I’m going to live to 95.”

I can’t think of a better argument for employing our Global Macro strategy as part of the solution than this.  Global tactical asset allocation seeks to be adaptive enough to respond to these types of adverse market conditions.  The reality is that most recent retirees are in danger of running out of money in one of two ways: losing a substantial amount of money in a bear market or failing to earn enough of a return on their money to keep up with inflation.  I think Global Macro does an effective job of balancing those two risks.

To view a video on our Global Macro strategy, click here.

Click here and here for disclosures.  Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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TINO: Tactical In Name Only

October 16, 2012

RINO (Republican In Name Only) is frequently used to castigate those Republicans who talk a good game, but then do little to follow through on conservative principles.  Perhaps, there is room for another acronym: TINO (Tactical In Name Only).  After highlighting the strong and rising demand for tactical strategies, the WSJ then points out that tactical means many things to many people.  Many investment professionals quickly picked up on the fact that it makes good business sense to talk a good tactical investment game, but the implementation part becomes fuzzy.

The take-away may be that tactical is less a strategy than a philosophy—that markets demand attention and action. But how does an investor know what, exactly, his adviser means by “tactical”? And how can you tell smart tactical trading from trigger-happy market timing?

The Systematic in Systematic Relative Strength is the key.  Relative strength is an effective tool for making tactical investment choices, but if applied haphazardly it is useless.  I always enjoy the reaction from those who actually take the time to read our white papers (here and here).  Those who do read and understand those papers will have a whole new appreciation for the role of disciplined execution when it comes to tactical investing.

For us, tactical is both philosophy and strategy.

Ideas are easy.  It’s the execution of ideas that really separates the sheep from the goats. –Sue Grafton

HT: Abnormal Returns

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