A not so Happy Valentine’s Day

February 17, 2010

What could be more appropriate on Valentine’s Day than an article about being in the red?  Tom Raum of Associated Press published an alarming article Sunday on why US debt will keep growing even with recovery.  It looks like there are some very difficult choices ahead for voters and their representatives.  Current projections have our national debt exceeding our GDP within the next few years.  In addition, the interest on that debt will be 80% of the federal budget within a decade.

Needless to say, if the government does not act on this problem, the financial markets certainly will at some point.  For example, Reuters recently reported that some of China’s generals have called for using our debt as a weapon against us by having their government sell off U.S. Treasury bonds if we sell arms to Taiwan.

We do not profess to know all that is needed to solve this problem, although obviously we need to throttle back the government gravy train.  As responsible voters, we need to contact our representatives to get them to take the budget problem seriously.  But as investors, we need to have enough flexiblity in our investment policy to position our assets to protect them if our representatives don’t act.


Politics 101

February 2, 2010

Last week I read something in the WSJ that made my head spin.

A bill was voted down in the Senate which would have created a bipartisan commission whose job would be to tackle the enormous budget deficit the United States is currently running.  The key words here are bipartisan commissionThis article, taken from the Lawrence Journal, sums up a few of the constraints the commission would have had, which would have kept either party from gaining unchecked authority in balancing the US budget.

The failed bill wasn’t a mandate on how to solve the deficit; it was a bill about setting up a framework of discussion for solving the deficit.  There’s a difference between the two, and the bill would have allowed many paths to a solution.

The deficit clearly needs to be addressed before the U.S. ends up with a forced fiscal austerity program like Greece.  If you want to get a sense for how rapidly our public debt is growing, here’s a website devoted to tallying our nation’s debt: Debt Clock.  (Be sure to hit Refresh a couple times to get a sense of the pace.)  It’s scary and breathtaking.

Anyway, back to the bill voted down in the Senate.  Apparently, six  Senators co-sponsored the writing of the bill, put their name on the bill, and then voted “No” during the roll-call. It might help to repeat the sentence a few times to appreciate the full effect.  The behavior of our elected officials is quite discouraging.  How can anyone justify even one second of the time these six Senators spent working on this bill, only to vote against it during the roll call?  What is the point?  I don’t think there is an easy answer to the deficit problem, but it doesn’t seem like voting against your own bill is part of the solution!

To solve a problem, it seems necessary to first identify the problem’s cause.  If your books are deeply in the red, you must either cut costs, sell assets, or raise revenues.  None of the options is an easy way out; eventually, somebody will have to foot the bill.  It’s not going to be a pleasant process for anybody, but maybe things would be more efficient if our government learned to collaborate a little more effectively.


Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

January 13, 2010

The big news of the day is that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission kicked off proceedings in earnest today.  Apparently they are planning to spank all of the CEOs of the major banks, or at least give them a timeout and take away their milk and cookies.

Both FT Alphaville and The Atlantic had interesting articles about testimony that was heard or should be heard.

The FT Alphaville article is about rethinking the incentives embedded in the system, which seems like a really good idea regardless of one’s political persuasion.  The Atlantic’s article is about the amount of leverage that banks were allowed (and still are) to take on—quite eye-opening.


Bureaucracy–and its Debt–Kills

January 5, 2010

Economic geniuses Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have authored another paper on the pile up of public debt and its effect on economic growth–based on 200 years of data.  (Note to Congress: It’s so refreshing to see actual evidence for economic policy recommendations!)  The Wall Street Journal has a synopsis of their argument here.

One finding: Countries with a gross public debt debt exceeding about 90% of annual economic output tended to grow a lot more slowly. For advanced countries above the 90% threshold, average annual growth was about two percentage points lower than for countries with public debt of less than 30% of GDP.

The results are particularly relevant at a time when debt levels in the U.S. and other countries at the center of the financial crisis are rapidly approaching the 90% threshold. Gross government debt in the U.S., for example, stood at 85% of GDP in 2009 and will reach 108% of GDP by 2014, according to IMF projections.

Unsurprisingly, economies engaged in paying off the cost of massive government bureaucracies and unrestrained public spending have a hard time being productive.  It’s just difficult enough paying off the debt.  With the U.S. projected to hit the 90% threshold shortly, it’s time to diversify your portfolio.


Right on Schedule

December 14, 2009

The Commission on Bedget Reform has come up with a proposal to shrink the Federal deficit.  This article from the Wall Street Journal gives some of the highlights.  Of course, there’s a catch:

They recommend waiting until 2012 to implement policy changes to avoid harming their re-election prospects the economic recovery.

The strike-through is mine, obviously.  But the economic recovery is a pretty good cover story. 

In other words, balance the budget–just not now.


We Are All Bankers Now

November 10, 2009

Back in May, the WSJ ran a piece about the “vanishing millionaires” of Maryland.  In a nutshell, the state government of Maryland mandated an additional tax on households in the highest tax brackets, in an effort to raise state tax revenues. Surprise! There were a few thousand LESS millionaires living in the state come tax time, and tax revenues fell drastically.

And today we have “Praying for Big Bank Bonuses.”

File this under “I” for Irony.  All those big, bad bonuses are actually good for something…tax revenues for state governments running massive deficits. The article approximates that “one in five New York state tax dollars come from Wall Street.”  In New Jersey, the incumbent governor was just booted out, in part because of his inability to wrestle a deficit projected to reach $5 Billion by the next year.  The numbers just aren’t adding up.

There are plenty of ways to spin this story. Here’s mine!

From Wikipedia: “Sometimes unintended consequences can far outweigh the intended effect.”


Chaotic Evolution

November 4, 2009

John Kay of the Financial Times has recently written a nice article explaining why the chaos of free markets leads to significantly better results than centrally-planned economies, as has been tried and failed in the Soviet Union, East Germany, Nigeria,  and Haiti (and periodically makes inroads in economies found in Great Britain, the United States, and others.)

Kay explains that free markets generate superior results because:

Prices act as signals – the price mechanism is a guide to resource allocation rather than central planning. Markets are a process of discovery – an economy adapts to change through a chaotic process of experimentation. The third element is the capacity of the market to bring about diffusion of political and economic power. This is the most effective way to protect society from rent-seeking – a culture in which the principal route to wealth is not creating wealth, but attaching oneself to wealth created by others…

… Centralized systems experiment too little. They find reasons why new proposals will fail – and mostly they are right. But market economies thrive on a continued supply of unreasonable optimism. And when, occasionally, experiments succeed, they are quickly imitated.

If market economies are better at originating and diffusing new ideas, they are also better at disposing of failed ones. Honest feedback is not welcome in large bureaucracies, as the UK government’s drug advisers can testify. In authoritarian regimes, such reporting can be fatal to the person who delivers it.

Disruptive innovations most often come to market through new entrants. The health of the market economy depends on constant replenishment of ideas, often from unpredicted sources. If you had been planning the future of the computer industry in the 1970s, would you have asked Bill Gates and Paul Allen? If you had been planning the future of European aviation in the 1980s, would you have asked Michael O’Leary or Stelios Haji-Ioannou? If you had been planning the future of retailing in the 1990s would you have asked Jeff Bezos? Of course not: members of the politburo, cabinet or large company board would have consulted grey men in suits like themselves.

I wholeheartedly agree with Kay’s macro-economic analysis.

Furthermore, this line of logic also underpins the process that we employ to manage money.  Price (specifically relative price performance) acts as a signal to guide portfolio allocation.  We rely on rules-based relative strength models to sort out the winners from the losers from a given investment universe.  We buy any security that meets our criteria and sell every security out of the portfolio that fails to maintain strong relative strength.  There are no committee meetings where the portfolio managers debate the merits of the stocks before making a decision.  There is no emotional attachment to current holdings.  Rather, the models, which we have designed,  execute a plan that is based on a method with a track record of generating superior investment results over time.  A large percentage of our trades turn out to be either losers or just market performers.  To the uninitiated, the process can indeed appear to be chaotic.  It certainly leads to inferior investment results over certain periods of time (just like free-market economies periodically experience difficulty.)  It is only a minority of our trades that turn out to be the big long-term winners.  Frequently, the trades that end up generating the biggest gains are trades that made us scratch our heads when they were added to the portfolio.

It turns out that perceived chaos, on both the macro-economic level and on the portfolio management level, leads to very desirable outcomes over time.


Rethinking the 401k

October 22, 2009

Time recently carried a long article that, depending on your point of view, is an expose of the problems with 401k plans or a hatchet job.  The article relates the problems with 401ks by telling the stories of a number of retirees from Occidental Petroleum, which was one of the first large corporations to adopt this type of defined contribution plan.  The writers contend that in most cases, the employee would have been better off in a traditional defined benefit pension plan.  So let’s take a look at their criticisms of the 401k.

The first retiree case study is Robert Shively.  He is now age 68 and holds a part-time job.  The article suggests that he would have been better off with a fixed $1308/month pension than his current pension of $405/month plus his $70,000 remaining 401k balance.  A lot of information is missing, so it’s hard to tell what the deal is.  We don’t know when Mr. Shively retired, what his original 401k balance was, what percentage of his income he was saving in his 401k while he was working, and how much he is spending.  So despite the article’s contention, I think the information here is inadequate to make a reasonable judgement.

The second retiree case study is Ernie Lucantonio.  He retired in 2005 at age 57 with $350,000 in his 401k.  The article implies that he would have been better off with a pension of $3,100/month.  Ernie, too, took a part-time job.  Elsewhere in the article, it states that Mr. Lucantonio was saving 6% of his salary in his 401k.  So what is the culprit here?  Is it the 401k or is it the fact that the client a) needed to save much more than 6%, probably 10-15%, b) retired early, and c) retired with inadequate savings?  It’s also not clear what Mr. Lucantonio’s spending habits are like because it does indicate that he bought a tricked-out vacation cabin after he retired.  Score: 401k 1, client’s financial planning and acumen 0.

The third retiree case study is Dennis O’Neil.  He also retired early, but the article does not say when.  He is now age 63 and has $500,000 left in his 401k.  The article suggests he would have been better off to have a defined benefit pension payment of $2,200/month.  Mr. O’Neil is worried about running through his 401k in the next decade, and no wonder!  The article says he spends $75,000 per year.  Somehow, no matter how I do the math, the great pension of $2,200/month comes to only $26,400 annually, which would still not even come close to supporting Mr. O’Neil’s spending habits.  (Mr. O’Neil is trying to play the market to stay in the clover–always a clever idea for retirees.)  Again, what is the culprit here?  Is it the 401k or is it the fact that the client a) retired early, b) with inadequate savings, and c) is overspending to an enormous degree?  Score: 401k 2, client’s financial planning and acumen 0.

The article cites the biggest problem with 401ks as the fact that they could drop a lot in the year you decide to retire.  Apparently, risk management and asset allocation do not enter the equation–like maybe it would be a good idea to scale back your risk level in the few years before you retire.  The proposed solution to the 401k crisis is to pay into a plan that will give you a guaranteed income–you put in 6% of your salary and get a guaranteed 26% of your salary in retirement.  Wait a minute here!  Didn’t Mr. Lucantonio save 6% of his salary in his 401k?  If he had had the miracle income guarantee plan suggested by Time, with his pre-retirement salary of “nearly $80,000,” he would be able to draw a guaranteed income of $20,800 ($80,000 x .26) or $1,733/month.  Or alternatively, Mr. Lucantonio could take his stated $350,000 401k balance when he retired and buy an immediate annuity.  I went on to an immediate annuity website to calculate what a joint annuity would be.  Guess what–$1,735/month!  Of course, interest rates were a little higher in 2005 when Mr. Lucantonio actually retired, which likely would have made for a larger payout.  If the annuity did not cover a spouse, the payout is also higher by $200/month or so.  Son of a gun!  The miracle program is apparently already in existence, disguised as an immediate annuity.

Certainly a lot can be done to improve client’s retirement readiness with a 401k.  Help with investment decision-making, counseling on the appropriate savings level, and assistance with asset allocation and risk management are all needed.  And let’s not forget why individuals clamored for 401k plans in the first place: the age of lifetime employment was over and workers were tired of forfeiting pensions with 5-year or 10-year cliff vesting when they changed jobs.  401k plans are portable and always fully vested.

After reading the article carefully, almost every problem these retirees are having has little to do with the structure of the 401k plan.  Almost every problem stems from:

1. inadequate savings rate

2. overspending

3. lack of risk management and/or poor asset allocation decisions as client nears retirement

4. lack of knowledge of other retirement income products

I find it hard to believe that any competent financial advisor would have  suggested retirement, let alone early retirement, to any of these individuals.  And let’s face it: math is math.  If you don’t save enough while you are working, you won’t have enough when you retire.  There’s no magic income guarantee plan that doesn’t exist already.  You might want to read this article, because investors are reading it and they need answers.


Skin in the Game

October 8, 2009

Most organizations or societies function appropriately when everyone has skin in the game.  Mutual dependence is what makes the world go around.  In tribal societies, the rule is very simple: pitch in and help or we will ban you and you can go hunt on your own.  NFL quarterbacks don’t usually trash their offensive linemen in the media no matter how many times they got sacked on Sunday.  Mutual dependence: one of those scorned linemen might miss a block accidentally on purpose in a later game.  Prior to 1970, investment banks were required to be private partnerships.  Capital was handled carefully because the capital belonged to the partners.  When it is OPM (other people’s money) far less care may be exercised.  Anyone remember 2008?  Even in investment management, Morningstar wants to know how much portfolio managers have invested in their own funds.  Hedge fund managers are often required by prospective investors to have significant investments in their own funds.  The whole point is to discourage abusive behavior on the part of a few members of the organization or society.

The United States is perhaps close to a tipping point in this regard.  According to the latest tax data, 47% of Americans pay no federal income tax.  Those of us who do are effectively subsidizing most of the nation’s spending.  If you have no stake in the system,   it’s much easier to feel good about taking advantage of it.  Wouldn’t everyone be in favor of massive federal bailouts that benefited them if they weren’t paying for any of it?  Doesn’t it make sense to make everyone have some kind of stake in the system, no matter how small?  After all, as Margaret Thacher famously quipped, “The problem with socialism is that eventually you run out of other people’s money.”


Burning Down the House

August 3, 2009

Watch out! You might get what you’re after.    Talking Heads, Burning Down the House

I was in a bookstore over the weekend where I saw no fewer than six books suggesting that capitalism and our economic system had failed.  The prescription in most cases was more government and more income redistribution.  They system might be broken, but with the way our business and economic incentives are currently structured, I suspect the prescription of more government intervention will not help at all.  The underlying incentives need to be fixed.

Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is a useful economic concept.  For a moment, let’s strip away all of the idealogy surrounding the invisible hand and get down to the base assumption: people act in their own self-interest.

Market theorists contend that with everyone acting in their own self-interest that markets run economies much better than bureaucrats.  This is stupid.  Bureaucrats contend that markets favor some groups and disadvantage others, so they should be able to step in and fix things.  This is equally stupid.

The only thing the invisible hand guarantees is that people will act in their own self-interest.  That makes the ultimate outcome mainly a matter of creating the proper incentives.  If you have dumb incentives, the invisible hand will run the economy like a moron.  If you have smart incentives, the invisible hand will run the economy like a genius.

Let’s look at a couple of examples.  Let’s say that you have a private investment partnership, like Goldman Sachs or Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham used to be.  On the one hand, the partners are incentivized to maximize their earnings through trading and underwriting.  On the other hand, since the capital in the partnership is their own money, they are also incentivized not to blow up the firm.  This prevents all manner of lousy underwriting deals and insures that trading leverage is managed carefully.  The result is a company that tries to make as much money as possible without destroying the firm.  This is the invisible hand at work with proper incentives.  Everyone is working in their own self-interest, but those interests are balanced.

Now, think for a moment about a modern institution we will call Megabank.  It is public, not private.  Acting in their own self-interest, the traders and investment bankers are still incentivized to maximize their own compensation.  However, the money the trading desk is using does not belong to the traders–it is other people’s money (OPM).  What are the odds that they will overleverage in an attempt to make a huge bonus?  Likewise, what incentive does an investment banker have to underwrite only good deals?  (In fact, the bad deals usually come with bigger fees—bring it on.)  Plenty of employees will act responsibly, of course, but moral hazard has been introduced.  With everyone acting in their own self-interest, the invisible hand has this firm headed for the emergency room.

Think about AIG’s incentives: if they are allowed to underwrite insurance (credit default swaps) that is incredibly profitable because no reserves are required, is it likely they will underwrite a little or a lot?  Think about a homebuyer’s incentive:  tell the truth and stay in your apartment, lie a little (or a lot) and move into a nice house.  Think about a sub-prime lender’s incentive: if they are allowed to offload all of the bad loans through securitization, are they likely to underwrite a little or a lot?  Are they likely to care about the ultimate credit quality or default rates?  With these sorts of incentives in place, what did policy makers think was going to happen?  Now, what would happen if instead they had to eat their own cooking and retain a significant portion of the sub-prime loans on their balance sheet?  Might that change their behavior?  What if, instead of doing same-day exercise and sale of their stock options, executives had to exercise and hold the company stock for three years after their affiliation with the company ended?  Would their stewardship change in any way? 

The problem with the invisible hand is not that it doesn’t work—the problem is that it works incredibly well.  This puts an enormous burden on policy makers to think carefully about how incentives are structured–and about what the ultimate consequences might be.   Congress appears to have a very limited understanding of either the invisible hand or the consequences of incentives.  It’s safe to say that most parents, who have to deal with kids and behavioral incentives all the time, are doing a better job, since most of their children live and become productive members of society. 

I don’t know whether you think this is a brilliant piece of political economy or something so obvious that a fifth-grader could figure it out.  But we, as a society, have apparently not figured it out.  If we decide we want vast national savings, lots of capital formation and innovation, and a clean environment—all of that is probably achievable with properly thought out incentives.  There are always trade-offs, and incentives usually have to include a lot of carrots and a few sticks.  The invisible hand can’t give us everything, but with thoughtful incentives, we can do a lot better than we are doing now.  We don’t have to let the invisible hand sucker punch us.