The New Death of Equities

May 21, 2012

From AdvisorOne, yet another article about how much investors hate the market these days:

Despite strong U.S. equity market returns in early 2012 that sent the Dow back above 13,000 by the end of February, indications are that many Americans remain investment spectators, reluctant to participate in the equity market rally, a Franklin Templeton global poll has found.

Investor skepticism appears to be tied to the extreme volatility witnessed in 2011, in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average had 104 days of triple-digit swings-representing a significant portion of the 252 total trading days last year. Indeed, when asked about the importance of various market scenarios when deciding to purchase an equity investment, market stability was most frequently identified by U.S. respondents as an important factor.

“The market volatility that has persisted since 2008 is keeping many investors on the sidelines, and their ability to view positive equity market performance constructively has been thwarted by the market ups and downs that are at odds with the stability they are seeking,” John Greer, executive vice president of corporate marketing and advertising at Franklin Templeton Investments, said in a statement. “But the reality is that investors who have been waiting for ‘the right time’ to get back into the equity market have been missing out on the market rally we’ve witnessed over the past few years.”

This is sadly typical of retail investors.  Volatility tends to be greatest at market bottoms, and volatility tends to be what investors most avoid.  As a result, investors often avoid returns as well!

This period strikes me as psychologically reminiscent of the late 1970s, when Business Week famously published a cover announcing the death of equities.  Consider what investors had been through: in the late 1960s, the speculative names had gotten torched.  By 1973-74 even the bluest of the blue chips had gotten ripped.  By the late 1970s, 20% annual corrections were the norm.  The economy was a mess and investors simply opted out.  The Business Week cover just reflected the spirit of the time.

The late 1970s are not so different from now.  The speculative names collapsed in 2000-2002, followed by a bear market in 2008-2009 that got everything.  The last couple of summers have been punctuated by scary 15-20% corrections.  The economy is still a mess.  Psychologically, investors are in the same spot they were when the original cover came out.  Based on fund flows, “anything but stocks” seems to be the battle cry.

Yet, consider how things unfolded subsequently.  Only a few years later both the market and the economy were booming.  (High relative strength stocks began to perform very well several years ahead of the 1982 bottom, by the way.)  The Business Week cover is now famous as a contrary indicator.  It wouldn’t shock me if the current investor disdain for stocks has a similar outcome down the road.

Business Week: the famous "Death of Equities" cover

 


People First

May 18, 2012

Financial advisors often become enamored with new whiz-bang products and new and improved methodologies.  Sometimes they really are new and improved, so we always need to check them out.  But the bedrock of the business is really the relationship with the client.  You need to care about the client’s well-being and they need to know you care.  You need to go the extra mile.

I was thinking about this in relation to this article about customer service in the retail world from PandoDaily.

There is simply no such thing as a shortcut when it comes to customer service. You can provide an alternate service, if you don’t want to invest in a local call center of friendly competent people armed with helpful databases of customer information. But don’t call this customer service, because it isn’t. To call a person reading from a script a customer-service representative is like calling a middle school play Broadway. You might as well not have an 800 number.

Zappos, GoDaddy, Qualtrics and Braintree have proven that spending money on customer service isn’t throwing money away — it’s investing in the business. Done well, good customer service is the difference between a mediocre business and a great one. You can get shoes anywhere, and Zappos’ site design has never been that amazing; its entire success is wrapped up in treating people well. GoDaddy doesn’t view its call center as a “cost center,” arguing it has actually generated more than $100 million in annual revenues.

If anything, client service is even more important in wealth management because the product itself is intangible.  How can you put a price on financial security and peace of mind?  And, as GoDaddy shows, good client service can generate revenues, not just add to costs.  People come first.


Beanbag Economics and Relative Strength

May 17, 2012

By now, it’s pretty apparent that the Euro is eventually going to be toast, just like the ERM imploded before it.  (Perhaps it was never logical to assume that one currency and one central bank would be able to satisfy many different cultures and political regimes?)  Of course there is a lot of hand-wringing going on about all of the bad things that will happen, but no one is talking about the offsetting good things that will happen.

We’ve written before about beanbag economics, the essence of which is that when you smush in one part of a beanbag, it just poofs out somewhere else.  Relative strength is a simple and effective way to see where trends are underway.

Consider a typical bad news lead in this Reuters article:

Worries about a run on Greek banks has rattled Athens this week, after savers withdrew at least 700 million euros on Monday alone…

That sounds quite scary.  However, buried deep in the article, at the very end, is the beanbag economics section:

Deposits shifted around Europe dramatically last year, analysis of data from more than 120 listed European banks show.

More than 120 billion euros was taken from two banks in Belgium alone, including an exodus of customer deposits from Dexia (DEXI.BR) which had to be bailed out and restructured. KBC (KBC.BR) also saw a big outflow.

Some 90 billion euros was taken from France’s banks, including around 30 billion each from Credit Agricole (CAGR.PA) and BNP Paribas (BNPP.PA). French banks were hit last year by their heavy exposure to Greece and concerns about their liquidity that forced them to accelerate plans to shrink.

Worries the euro zone crisis would spread also saw about 30 billion euros in deposits leave Italian banks, although inflows to BBVA (BBVA.MC) helped limit the net outflow from Spain.

Cash flooded into Britain; more than 140 billion euros was deposited in four big banks alone. The UK benefits from its position outside the euro zone and its Asia-focused banks HSBC (HSBA.L) and Standard Chartered (STAN.L) are seen as particular safe-havens.

Other banks to see big inflows included Barclays (BARC.L), Germany’s Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE), Switzerland’s Credit Suisse (CSGN.VX) and UBS (UBSN.VX) and Russia’s Sberbank (SBER.MM) and VTB (VTBR.MM).

Banks that were in trouble had deposits leave, but they didn’t vanish into thin air.  Other banks saw massive inflows at their expense.  And—think about it—the Greek and French banks had the money in the first place because depositors saw them as relatively more attractive than European stocks or their mattresses, or whatever, at the time.  Times have now changed and the flow of money is being directed somewhere else.  It’s not the end of the world when some asset class implodes, unless, of course, you have 100% of your assets in it.  That implosion works to the benefit of another asset class somewhere else.

There are always relative winners and losers; things are rarely completely one-sided.  This is the primary attraction of using relative strength for tactical asset allocation.  It is able to identify shifts in supply and demand by measuring what assets are strong and what assets are weak.   Markets all over the world operate and interact in this same way.

Beanbag Economist: Someone has to get those asset flows!

Source: www.indyagenda.com


Relative Strength Still Off the Radar

May 16, 2012

The Big Picture has a thumbnail summary of the annual Merrill Lynch US Equity and US Quant Strategy pieces, where they interview 100 large institutional managers.  Of particular interest to me was the top ten return factors by popularity.

via The Big Picture  (click on image to enlarge)

You can see that relative strength did not crack the top ten.  On the bigger chart, which you can see in the article, relative strength came in at #11.  Of course, there are many formulations of relative strength, so even that ranking probably covers a lot of different methods.

A number of the popular factors are value-related and some are based on profitability.  All of these factors ultimately interact in complicated ways, but you don’t have to worry about a crowded trade in relative strength.

Value, quality, and risk-related factors are all much more popular than relative strength.

via The Big Picture     (click on image to enlarge)


The Not-So-Normal Bell Curve

May 16, 2012

Matt Koppenheffer nicely makes the case for holding on to your winners and cutting out your losers (exactly what relative strength is designed to do):

When it comes to investing, there’s no shortage of bad advice floating around out there. Among the worst, though, is the old saw, “You can’t go broke by taking a profit.”

The saying refers to the belief that if you have a stock that’s gone up in value, it’s hard to go wrong selling that stock and “locking in” the gains. But while the saying is technically true — it’s hard to picture a scenario where an investor is suddenly bankrupt after selling a stock at a profit — it’s a dangerous platitude for investors to follow.

There’s a name for that
The practice of selling winning stocks and hanging on to losing ones is a practice that’s familiar to behavioral-finance experts. It’s a behavioral bias known as the disposition effect and has been revealed to be quite harmful for investors. A number of academic papers have shed light on the subject, including Berkeley professor Terrance Odean’s 1998 study that concluded that individual investors’ “preference for selling winners and holding losers … leads, in fact, to lower returns.”

A possible explanation
If the long-term returns from stocks were distributed normally — that is, they formed the familiar bell-shaped curve and most stocks’ returns clustered around the average — selling winners and holding losers might actually work. If the returns from most individual stocks were likely to be right around the average for all stocks, then a big winner would be more likely to stall out after its winning streak than continue climbing. At the other end, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect a stock that’s been a big loser to climb back closer to the average.

But that’s not how it works.

I was reminded of this by a recent report by Shankar Vedantam for NPR, called “Put Away the Bell Curve: Most of Us Aren’t Average.  Vedantam reviewed the research and work of Ernest O’Boyle Jr. and Herman Aguinis, who studied the performance of 633,263 people involved in academia, sports, politics, and entertainment.

In short, the pair’s finding was that the performance distribution in these groups wasn’t bell-shaped. Instead, many participants clustered below the mathematical average, while a group of superstars produced results far above the average and pulled the overall average up.

Stock returns have a similar distaste for fitting to a bell curve. Over the past 10 years, 63% of the S&P 500 companies underperformed the average. Meanwhile, a large group of significant outperformers delivered returns that were well above the average.

As compared with the bell curve in the background, the data plotted here is a mess. And it should be. Stock returns are not normally distributed — which is what produces that nice bell-shaped curve. And though stats-stars who are much smarter than me often try to describe stock returns as “lognormal” — a mathematical transformation of the returns that gets them to more closely fit a bell curve — they’re not that, either. Stocks are typified by “fat tails” on either end — that is, more seriously outperforming and underperforming stocks than is easily captured by streamlined mathematical models.

So no matter how you look at stock returns, a surprising number of stocks end up returning far more and far less than the average. Practically, this means that the practice of “locking in gains” and hanging on to losers is a good way to miss out on the market’s huge outperformers, stay stuck with poor performers, and earn lackluster overall returns.

HT: iShares


Morningstar Fair Value

May 16, 2012

We use relative strength, not fundamentals, but that doesn’t mean we ignore it.  Now that we have powered through another earnings season and we’re having another Greek crisis moment in Europe, it’s interesting to see that the good folks at Morningstar calculate that the market is about as undervalued as it has been all year.  I know it’s trendy to hate stocks and love alternatives, but analysts who follow these companies—and don’t have an axe to grind—don’t think they are expensive.

Stocks still undervalued according to Morningstar

Source: Morningstar  (click on image to enlarge)


Dimon: “We Have The Royal Straight Flush”

May 10, 2012

Great words of wisdom from Jamie Dimon.


Quote of the Week

May 10, 2012

Looking at portfolios, think deeply about process over outcome. If you do something the right way enough times, you’ll win.—-Dan Loeb, founder of Third Point hedge fund

In a nutshell, this is the entire reason for a systematic process.  Yes, I know we’ve featured this quote before, but it’s just so darn good.

Dan Loeb

Source: Business Insider

via Abnormal Returns


Warren Buffett vs. Gold

May 9, 2012

Warren Buffett reiterated at his recent “Woodstock for Capitalists,” otherwise known as Berkshire Hathaway’s annual meeting, that he much preferred productive assets to gold.  Charlie Munger agreed.  For the record, I’ve got nothing against productive assets.  They produce earnings and sometimes dividends and that’s nice.  However, a global tactical asset allocator should not be too eager to count out gold.

Gold has had good relative strength for much of the last decade—and as a result it has dramatically outperformed Warren Buffett.  Bespoke took up this exact issue and had this to say:

Given the fact that BRK/A does not pay a dividend, no matter how much a holder ‘fondles’ or looks at their holdings, one share of BRK/A stock purchased twelve years ago is still one share today.  Sure, you can sell it for more now than you bought it then, but the same is true of gold.  In fact, your gain on gold is considerably more than your gain would be on BRK/A.  Looking at the performance of the two assets since the start of 2000 shows that the value of gold has increased considerably more than the value of Berkshire Hathaway.  In fact, with a gain of 466% since the start of 2000, gold’s gain has been nearly four times the return of BKR/A (466% vs 120%).

Their nifty graphic follows:

Source: Bespoke   (click on image to enlarge)

Relative strength has no axe to grind.  One of the great benefits of using relative strength to drive tactical asset allocation is that it is objective and adaptive.  Relative strength does not have a philosophical bias in favor of, or against, gold.  If relative strength is high, perhaps it should be included in the portfolio.  If relative strength is low, it’s out—period.

The point of investing is not to serve our biases, but to own the best-performing assets that we can identify.


It’s Hard Out There for a Bear

May 9, 2012

I’m not trying to pick on Paul Farrell, really.  He’s one of the most read columnists on Marketwatch.  From time to time, however, I archive articles that are wildly optimistic or wildly pessimistic to demonstrate how difficult it is not to be carried away with emotion.  This article just happened to fall into that category.

This particular article appeared August 17, 2010.  The market had just gone through a near 20% decline, as well as the flash crash a few months before.  Here is the front end of the article:

Yes, it’s going to get worse, a whole lot worse … Bill Gross warns this is the “New Normal. Forget 10% returns. Think 5%”. … Economist Larry Kotlikoff, author of The Coming Generational Storm, warns: “Let’s get real. The U.S. is bankrupt. Neither spending nor taxing will help the country pay its bills” … Economist Peter Morici warns: “Unemployment is stuck near 10%. Deflation coming. Stock market threatens collapse. The Federal Reserve and Barack Obama are out of bullets. Near zero federal funds rates, central bank purchases, a $1.6 trillion deficit have failed to revive the economy.” … Simon Johnson, co-author of 13 Bankers, warns: “We came close to another Great Depression, next time we may not be so lucky.” Why? Because Wall Street’s already well into the next bubble/bust cycle — the “doom cycle.”

The doom cycle sounds pretty bad and we are warned that things are going to get a whole lot worse.  I’m not exaggerating.  The whole paragraph was in heavy bold type.

Since then, we’ve gone through another 20% correction.  And the market is more than 25% higher.  Yes, higher.

Before you smirk and think you are immune from getting carried away, think again.  We are all susceptible to emotion—it’s just part of our wiring.  And it’s not just on the downside.  It’s equally easy to get carried away with “new era” thinking on the upside.

Sentiment swings, I think, demonstrate one of the very best reasons to use a systematic investment process.  Our happens to be an adaptive one driven by relative strength, but I’m sure other styles could also be successful.  The important thing is to define a profitable process and then stick to it through thick and thin.


Factor Investing

May 8, 2012

Diversification, risk management, and returns are all important in investing.  Increasingly, factor exposure is being used to accomplish these goals.  A Wall Street Journal article covered the issue very well (may be behind a pay wall, sorry).

By changing the way you spread out your stock holdings, you can reduce risk and boost returns—even in a highly correlated market like today’s.

The trick? A concept known as “factor investing,” which originated in academia two decades ago and now is finding favor among institutional investors and high-end financial advisers.

Factor investing replaces traditional asset allocation—such as a portfolio with 30% in U.S. stocks, 20% in developed international markets, 10% in emerging markets and 40% in bonds—by focusing on specific attributes that researchers say drive returns. These “risk factors” include the familiar—like small versus large-size companies or growth versus value stocks—as well as more esoteric measures such as volatility, momentum, dividend yield, economic sensitivity and the health of a company’s balance sheet.

As a reader of this blog, you’re probably already familiar with factor investing through relative strength—something that academics call momentum.  Using factors rather than style boxes has some advantages.

“There are a lot of nuances you may be missing by focusing only on style and size,” says Savita Subramanian, head of equity and quantitative strategy at BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research. “You may be missing a whole layer of outperformance you could have gotten.”

Some fairly high-end investors are converting portfolios to focus on factor exposures.  By converting to factor exposure, investors are trying to drill down to the actual return drivers.

Big investors are taking heed. In 2009, researchers assigned to analyze the Norwegian Government Pension Fund recommended it reorient its portfolio around risk factors. And the California Public Employees’ Retirement System underwent a similar change in approach in 2010.

After 2008, big investors discovered that they had factor exposure anyway—it was just exposure they were not aware of and hadn’t controlled.  There’s a lot less potential for surprise if the factor exposures are constructed deliberately!

New products are becoming available to feed the demand for factor exposure as well.

Until recently, it was hard for small investors to dabble in factor investing. But that is changing.

In the past year at least six firms—BlackRock’s iShares, Russell Investments, Invesco PowerShares, Factor Advisors, QuantShares and State Street Global Advisors—have launched factor-based exchange-traded funds, or have filed paperwork to do so.

Of course, overlooked among the rush of big firms racing to create factor exposure is the grand-daddy of relative strength, the Powershares DWA Technical Leaders Index (PDP).  It’s actually been around more than five years and has performed nicely over that time, beating the S&P 500 despite a market environment that has been hostile to relative strength strategies.  (We’re looking forward to seeing how it performs in a better RS market!)

One of the big advantages of factor exposure is that some factors offset one another beautifullyWe’ve written before about the nice efficient frontier that is created by combining relative strength and low volatility.  (You can see the chart below.)  These factors work well together because the excess returns are uncorrelated.

Source: Dorsey Wright    (click to enlarge to full size)

In short, there’s more to portfolio construction than asset allocation and style boxes.  Factor exposure should be considered as well if the result is a better portfolio for the client.

See www.powershares.com for more information about PDP.  Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.  A list of all holdings for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.


Avoiding The Next Nortel

May 4, 2012

The last thing that any investor wants to experience is one of their holdings going bankrupt.  Yet, it happens–Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Refco, WorldCom, Enron, Kodak, and the list goes on.  In fact, during the 20-year period from 1989 to 2008, 21% of of all stocks listed in US stock markets became bankrupt (Phys.org).  But, how can you identify those companies that may be on their way to going under?  That was the topic of a recent study by physicists, from Boston University in Boston, Massachusetts, and Fudan University in Shanghai, China.  Their study attempted to “develop a statistical-analysis-based early warning system to forecast the time of bankruptcy.”   Among their findings:

For all stocks, there is a correlation between volatility and volume. However, the closer a stock is to bankruptcy, the stronger the correlation, since both volatility and volume increase as bankruptcy approaches.

Maybe they’re on to something.  However, here’s a more straightforward approach to identifying danger stocks: avoid declining trends!

It’s easy to get hooked on the story of a company…why the market is making a mistake…how it’s becoming a better value…how it’s about ready to turn around (and some certainly do), but I would suggest that the best approach to avoiding stocks that are on their way to bankruptcy is to simply listen to the chart (or, even better, let your model listen to the chart!).

BTW, the chart above is that of Nortel Networks (currently being liquidated in bankruptcy).

A list of all Dorsey Wright holdings for the trailing 12 months is available upon request.

HT: Abnormal Returns


Real Wages: Big Mac Edition

May 4, 2012

Global investing is becoming extremely important, as so much dynamic growth is located overseas.  In the last decade, it seems like China has grown tremendously.  In fact, if you listen to Congress, they see China as a threat to take American jobs.  Maybe this article from the Wall Street Journal will surprise you like it did me.  It’s a genius way to look at real wages.

Comparing wages across countries can be difficult, but one economist has come up with a way to track people doing identical jobs to make an identical product all across the world: McDonald’s employees.

Just comparing how much money workers make across countries is too simplistic. A better guide can come from taking a wage rate and dividing it by a good, which allows economists to see how much of that product an hour of work buys — a so-called real wage.

In order to calculate a real wage across countries Orley C. Ashenfelter of Princeton University found an excellent example using McDonald’s employees. In his paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ashenfelter notes that McDonald’s workers across the globe by design are asked to perform the same tasks to build the same product: a Big Mac. By calculating how many hours of work it takes an employee to earn enough to afford a Big Mac, he can show how wages change across countries.

You’ve got to admit that’s pretty clever.  (But Mr. Ashenfelter has been pretty clever in other areas as well.)  The graphic that goes along with it is the surprise.

McWages

Source: Wall Street Journal

Western Europe, the US, and Canada are all high wage areas.  China is significantly cheaper—but look at Latin America and India.  They are another magnitude lower in wage rates than China.  Usually other factors, including political stability and the rule of law, come into play before a company decides to locate jobs offshore.  This suggests that other low-wage areas could boom if they develop political structures that are conducive to business.  Maybe China will export jobs to India!

“Real wage rates seem to have been remarkably similar across countries before the industrial revolution,” Ashenfelter says. Since then “real wage rates have diverged across countries, with catch up taking place in different countries at different points in time.”

How can any individual investor keep up with all of this information?  No one person is going to be able to synthesize information about so many central banks, political administrations, and legal systems.  But guess what—asset prices do that all the time.  If prices in Mexico or Columbia or India start to rise, maybe the market is expecting some positive changes.  If the price change persists and results in a high degree of relative strength, that becomes notable.

This is just another way of pointing out that money goes where it is treated best.  Global tactical asset allocation using relative strength is one way to track these changes as they occur—and to create the opportunity to profit from them.


Managing Volatility

May 4, 2012

Articles like this one in Investment News just confuse me.  Apparently the latest trend among pension plan sponsors is to target volatility.  I guess it is a human desire to eliminate volatility, but at the end of the day, you have to pay your pension benefits from your returns.  Not risk-adjusted returns.  Not volatility or standard deviation.  Focusing primarily on volatility is completely missing the boat.  From the article:

“There’s a big shift in terms of how plan sponsors are defining risk,” said Michael Thomas, chief investment officer for the institutional business in the Americas at Russell. “During the last 10 years, our industry has developed an unhealthy obsession with tracking error, but managing tracking error isn’t managing risk.”

He’s right—tracking error is not the same thing as risk.  Nor is volatility the same thing as risk, I might add.  Volatility management is just another unhealthy obsession.  Besides, the source of all of the evil volatility is readily apparent.

So far, most of the target volatility asset allocation strategies focus on equity exposure, which is, “by far, the biggest contributor of [portfolio] volatility,” Russell’s Mr. Thomas said.

Equity exposure = volatility.  To reduce it, just add some Treasury bills or bonds to the portfolio.  Duh.  That seems like a simpler solution if you really are concerned about reducing volatility.

I don’t think that investors are going to be any more successful targeting volatility than they are trying to target returns. We have no idea year to year what returns are going to be, even though we know exactly what they have been historically.  We can’t forecast it or target it–we just put up with whatever returns we get.  I don’t think volatility is going to be any more tractable.


Household Formation

May 3, 2012

This isn’t something I normally worry about since I am not an economist (thank goodness).  However, I was struck by this Washington Post article that pointed out how drastically the recovery has been impacted by the lack of household formation.

The recession reduced the rate at which Americans set up new homes or apartments by at least half. Although the number of new households has begun to recover over the past year, its growth rate continues to lag behind its historic pace, according to Census Bureau statistics.

More than one in five adults between ages 25 and 34 live with their parents or in other “multi-generational” living arrangements, the highest level since the 1950s, according to the Pew Research Center.

Analysts estimate that there are more than 2 million fewer occupied homes than there would have been had Americans continued moving into new homes and apartments at the  rate they did before the recession.

Household formation is important because it is usually a period of much higher than normal consumer spending.  Once you move out, you end up acquiring some of your own furniture, dishes, and so on.  If the recovery ever gets going, there will probably be extraordinary demand for housing—not just the regular demand, but also all of the pent-up demand from adults now living with their parents—and a really big burst of consumer spending.

Source: goodenoughmother.com  (click on image to enlarge)

 


Job Growth Surges

April 30, 2012

According to the Wall Street Journal, job growth at US multinationals has been surging for the last two years…overseas.

Thirty-five big U.S.-based multinational companies added jobs much faster than other U.S. employers in the past two years, but nearly three-fourths of those jobs were overseas, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.

Those companies, which include Wal-Mart Stores Inc., WMT +0.12%  International Paper Co., Honeywell International Inc. and United Parcel Service Inc., boosted their employment at home by 3.1%, or 113,000 jobs, between 2009 and 2011, the same rate of increase as the nation’s other employers. But they also added more than 333,000 jobs in their far-flung—and faster-growing— foreign operations.

Economists who study global labor patterns say companies are creating jobs outside the U.S. mostly to pursue sales there, and not to cut costs by shifting work previously performed in the U.S., as has sometimes been the case.

The reason is simple—there is more growth overseas than in the US.  Companies naturally desire to be close to their customers, so they put operations nearby to serve them.  If you decide to distribute Pepsi in Mongolia, that has to be done by Mongolians.  It’s not a matter of evil corporations exporting jobs overseas—there’s just no way for that job to be done in the US.

When I read articles like this, it makes the argument that some type of global macro strategy needs to be part of a core portfolio.  We no longer have the investment luxury of staying completely within our borders, figuring that the best returns available can be captured here.  The world is changing and global is the new core.


A Fundamental Analysts’ Search for Meaning

April 28, 2012

I had to laugh when I came across this rant by a fellow who was fed up with the search for symbolism in his college literature class:

When I was a junior in college, my entire class was assigned to read To Kill A Mockingbird by Harper Lee. After we read it and discussed it in class, including many of our instructors urging us to find and discuss the symbolism in it, Harper Lee came to our college and addressed an assembly of our entire class. After her remarks, she took questions. Many were asking her about the symbolism of various things in the book.

She denied there was any symbolism. As the questions persisted, she became testier and said she was just trying to write a book that a publisher would buy and publish and hopefully sell the movie rights as well. She was a starving writer trying to make a buck, she explained. Starving writers have no time for symbolism and are darned sure not going to risk getting rejected to put hidden meanings into a book. She was just trying to write a good, salable story, she insisted.

That’s the kind of admission that I’m sure causes literature teachers all over to feel a little weak in the knees!

Kind of like fundamental analysts, don’t you think?  Many a fundamental analyst seem to think that they earn extra credit for showing off their creative thinking skills!  That good earnings report is really not good…in fact it is down right bad when you consider it in the context of (enter the creative thinking…).  Like the literature teacher, the fundamental analyst often becomes convinced that they are on to something when reality might disagree with them.

I like to think that relative strength succeeds because it is affected only by the big things–only the things that move the needle.


Wrong Way Corrigans

April 27, 2012

Professionals are no good at forecasting the market, something that numerous studies have made clear.  CXO Advisory shows that bloggers are no better.  This isn’t really a surprise, but I like their graphic that shows when bloggers are most bullish, the market performs most poorly—and vice versa.  (Unlike Douglas Corrigan, bloggers probably aren’t going the wrong way on purpose.)

Source: CXO Advisory    (click on image to enlarge)

This is a good bit of what makes financial markets so frustrating for the retail investor.  Just when they are feeling most bullish…wham!  Then, they watch helplessly as the market rises, paralyzed by fear and unable to bring themselves to participate.  (This has been going on for three years now, if you’re paying attention to the Funds Flow report.)

Advisors often complain about the amount of hand-holding they need to do during adverse market conditions, but this may be their most critical function.  If investors want a chance at the returns, they have no alternative but to get in the game.  For may investors, guidance from a trusted advisor  could be the difference between success and failure.


Why Countries Succeed and Fail

April 27, 2012

Ray Dalio of Bridgewater is an interesting character and an independent thinker.  He’s also been immensely successful as an investor.  If you are interested in economic history and think it might have some relevance to the way things might evolve in the future, you’ll want to read his paper on why countries succeed and fail.

This is also a wake-up call that you need to consider a flexible, global investment policy.  You need to go where the returns are, and that can change from cycle to cycle.


Normalized Relative Strength?

April 26, 2012

A Dash of Insight carried a funny commentary on normalized earnings:

There is a simple solution if you do not like the reality of strong corporate earnings:

Talk about “normalized earnings.”

This has a wonderful scientific feel to it, lending an air of credibility to those who have not studied the subject.  After all, don’t we want our estimates to be “normal?”

If the current strong earnings reports do not fit your forecast, you can just say that you want to “normalize” earnings without offering any clue about your method or how it has worked in the past.

If you don’t want to deal with reality, you can “normalize” things to make them more to your liking.  Relative strength forces you to deal with reality.  Price is price and it can’t be faked or subsequently revised.  What is, is.

HT to Abnormal Returns


The Patience Problem

April 25, 2012

Jeremy Grantham of GMO posits a tension between doing the right thing for the client and getting terminated as a manager.  Much of this, he believes, is a function of the client’s patience.  He writes in Advisor Perspectives:

Ridiculous as our market volatility might seem to an intelligent Martian, it is our reality and everyone loves to trot out the “quote” attributed to Keynes (but never documented): “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent.” For us agents, he might better have said “The market can stay irrational longer than the client can stay patient.” Over the years, our estimate of “standard client patience time,” to coin a phrase, has been 3.0 years in normal conditions. Patience can be up to a year shorter than that in extreme cases where relationships and the timing of their start-ups have proven to be unfortunate. For example, 2.5 years of bad performance after 5 good ones is usually tolerable, but 2.5 bad years from start-up, even though your previous 5 good years are well known but helped someone else, is absolutely not the same thing! With good luck on starting time, good personal relationships, and decent relative performance, a client’s patience can be a year longer than 3.0 years, or even 2 years longer in exceptional cases. I like to say that good client management is about earning your firm an incremental year of patience.

On the one hand, this is kind of funny from a manager’s point of view because it is something we can all relate to.  DALBAR has documented that a client’s average holding period is about three years, and that is exactly the conclusion that Mr. Grantham comes to also.  (The bold is mine; I think Mr. Grantham’s twist on Keynes may become a classic.)

On another level, this is very sad.  It’s sad that good client management is required to earn an extra year of patience.  As an industry, we apparently do a poor job of educating our clients about realistic expectations.  If we start a relationship promising sunshine and rainbows, of course the client will be disappointed when the first dark clouds appear.  On the other hand, if we warn clients about the inevitability of rain, and the possibility or likelihood of hail, tornadoes, and earthquakes, they are likely to sign up with our sunshine-and-rainbows competitor.

And, honestly, part of the blame may lie with the clients.  Many clients want to hear about sunshine and rainbows, not rain and hail.  If both are mentioned, they tend to remember the sunshine and rainbows and have only a hazy recollection of anything else.

Here’s the problem: return factors, even historically reliable ones like relative strength or value, tend to play out over periods longer than three years.  This is why there is such a disconnect between manager returns (NAV returns) and client returns (dollar-weighted returns).  I guess if return factors were so uber-reliable that they worked every year, there would be no patience problem.  Clients would be happy to sit on their hands and collect the premium.

Unfortunately, collecting on return premiums is a lumpy business.  In extreme cases, you can have situations where there are a number of years that go nowhere, followed by all of the excess return in a six-month period.  Clients ideally would like to be invested just for those six months, but no one ever knows at what point in the cycle the excess return will occur.  This makes it really tough for clients, as they essentially have to make a leap of faith.

The ideal client is one whose “standard client patience time” is infinite.  We have a few very long-term clients here that have been with us since 1994, almost twenty years.  They’ve moved from capital accumulation mode when they first joined us to distribution mode some years ago.  In a couple of cases, they’ve already withdrawn more money than they started with—and still have balances in excess of their original deposit.  Every money manager would clone clients like these if they could.

Here’s an interesting thing that Mr. Grantham doesn’t mention: if you talk to any number of advisors, you will find that, inevitably, the clients with infinite patience tend to be the clients with the best performance!  I don’t know what twist of karma makes it so, but advisors all know this phenomenon.  Clients who can make that courageous leap of faith tend to be rewarded.  It’s our job as advisors to allow the clients to feel comfortable doing something that is inherently uncomfortable for them.


Momentum Applied to Home Values

April 25, 2012

One of the characteristics of relative strength that makes it so valuable is that it is nearly universal in its applicability.  We use it to manage domestic equity portfolios, international equity portfolios, commodity portfolios, and multi-asset class portfolios.

EconomPicData Blog proved that relative strength can also be applied to home values:

How well would an investor have done applying momentum to the various cities that make up the Case Shiller Home Price Index, pretending (of course) that each city index was investable and liquid (i.e. things they aren’t).

First, a quick update on the Case Shiller Home Price Index.  The Huffington Post:

The Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller home-price index shows that prices dripped in February from January in 16 of the 20 cities it tracks.

The steady price declines have brought the nationwide index to its late 2002 level.  Home prices have fallen 35 percent since the housing bust.

Prices in nine cities fell to their lowest levels since the housing bust.  The average price in Atlanta fell 17.3 percent in February compared with a year earlier.  That’s the biggest annual drop in the history of the index for any city.

Yikes…let’s see what momentum can do with this mess.

Rules…

1) Take the 6-month rolling return for each city

2) Allocate the next month to the city that had the highest six month return

How well would we have done?

The chart below outlines the performance of this relative strength allocation, the composite-10, andPortland(which happened to be the best performing city over this time frame… who knew).

For those keeping track at home, that’s a 12.7% annualized return for the relative strength index vs. 3.3% for the composite-10 and 4.8% for Portland, despite there being no rule that an investor get out of the market.

Not too bad.

This demonstrates again that the best way to find future winners is to buy current winners and stay with them as long as they remain strong.

HT: Abnormal Returns


More on 294 Chances to Screw Up

April 24, 2012

From MarketSci, a article with a graphic representation of all of the corrections!


Investor Self-Defense

April 20, 2012

Index Universe ran an article about the five worst ETF investments.  All of these ETFs have declined more than 90% in price, and some of them have had gross inflows of more than $4 billion over their lifespan.  (See below for a typical example)  That is a lot of money going up in smoke!

Source: Yahoo! Finance    (click on image to enlarge)

Here’s something to think about: a simple relative strength chart would have kept you away from all of these things when they were nosediving.  We use relative strength because it’s been shown to be highly profitable to own the strongest securities or asset classes, but it’s equally useful for avoiding the dogs and cats.

Relative strength should be your first line of self-defense from bombs like these.


The Largest Market Inefficiency

April 20, 2012

Jeremy Grantham on “the largest market inefficiency”:

The central truth of the investment business is that investment behavior is driven by career risk.  In the professional investment business we are all agents, managing other peoples’ money.  The prime directive, as Keynes knew so well, is first and last to keep your job.  To do this, he explained that you must never, ever be wrong on your own.  To prevent this calamity, professional investors pay ruthless attention to what other investors in general are doing.  The great majority “go with the flow,” either completely or partially.  This creates herding, or momentum, which drives prices far above or far below fair price.  There are many other inefficiencies in market pricing, but this is by far the largest.

Going with the flow in an unsystematic way is likely to lead to poor results, but capitalizing on this market inefficiency in a systematic manner has demonstrated the ability to provide superior performance over time.