Bureaucracy-and its Debt-Kills

January 5, 2010

Economic geniuses Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have authored another paper on the pile up of public debt and its effect on economic growth-based on 200 years of data. (Note to Congress: It’s so refreshing to see actual evidence for economic policy recommendations!) The Wall Street Journal has a synopsis of their argument here.

One finding: Countries with a gross public debt debt exceeding about 90% of annual economic output tended to grow a lot more slowly. For advanced countries above the 90% threshold, average annual growth was about two percentage points lower than for countries with public debt of less than 30% of GDP.

The results are particularly relevant at a time when debt levels in the U.S. and other countries at the center of the financial crisis are rapidly approaching the 90% threshold. Gross government debt in the U.S., for example, stood at 85% of GDP in 2009 and will reach 108% of GDP by 2014, according to IMF projections.

Unsurprisingly, economies engaged in paying off the cost of massive government bureaucracies and unrestrained public spending have a hard time being productive. It’s just difficult enough paying off the debt. With the U.S. projected to hit the 90% threshold shortly, it’s time to diversify your portfolio.


Your Home is a Terrible Investment

January 5, 2010

From Eddie Elfenbein’s Crossing Wall Street blog, a succinct accounting of all of the problems of home investment—and by way of elimination, a good argument for financial assets. Portfolios of financial assets have none of the problems associated with personal real estate.


Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon

January 5, 2010

An absolutely mind-blowing review by Joseph Kahn of Martin Jacques’ new book, When China Rules the World, can be found here. Kudos to Mr. Kahn for such a fascinating summary of the book.

Jacques has an interesting perspective. In the developed West, we tend to have Western-centric thinking. Jacques suggests that we look at things differently.

China was the wealthiest, most unified and most technologically advanced civilization until well into the 18th century, Jacques points out. It lost that position some 200 years ago as the industrial revolution got under way in Europe. Scholars once viewed China as having crippling social, cultural and political defects that underscored the superiority of the West. But given the speed and strength of China’s recent growth, those defects have begun to look more like anomalies. It is the West’s run of dominance, not China’s period of malaise, that could end up being the fluke, Jacques writes.

If we expect the status quo to be largely unchanged, we could be quite disappointed or even shocked, according to the author:

…Jacques argues that the country’s cultural core resembles ancient China far more than it does modern Europe or the United States. It is accumulating wealth much faster than it is absorbing foreign ideas. The result, he says, is that China is nearly certain to become a major power in its own mold, not the “status quo” power accepting of Western norms and institutions that many policy makers in Washington hope and expect it will be.

The boldface is my emphasis. Jacques makes a good point that China is acquiring wealth and influence much more rapidly than it is acquiring Western ideas. Chinese ideals of democracy and political economy are also radically different than in the West.

What will happen in the future? No one knows-but it could quite possibly be something entirely different from what anyone is expecting. Just as very few moderate Westerners can imagine what motivates a jihadist to perform a suicide bombing, so too may we be missing an understanding of Chinese culture. We may think they have the same motivations that we do-and they might-but we could also be completely wrong in that belief. To deal with a much less certain future, investor portfolios of tomorrow are going to need to be globally allocated across all sorts of asset classes. There are no “givens” any longer.


Memo to US Investors

January 5, 2010

Yesterday, an article in the Financial Times shed light on the global implications of President Obama’s recent trip to Copenhagen for the climate summit. President Obama arrived for a meeting on global climate change (check that debate at the door), and instead, became a spectator of the global economy at work. The FT article focuses specifically on four developing nations that are emerging as dominant global forces – India, South Africa, Brazil and Turkey.

Mr Obama must have felt something of a chump when he arrived for a last-minute meeting with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, only to find him already deep in negotiations with the leaders of none other than Brazil, South Africa and India. Symbolically, the leaders had to squeeze up to make space for the American president around the table.

Let’s skip over the political implications of this scenario to examine what this means for US investors. As a US-based investor, we are presented with 2 options: we can participate in a global economy or we can shut ourselves off from it. Andy’s article from last week highlights exactly this point. Only 3% of assets managed by US fund managers are exposed to emerging markets.

Luckily for us, and unlike President Obama, we have no political ties that bind us. We are free to put our money to work where we want to, and this economic freedom allows us to participate in developing and emerging markets as we see fit. The Systematic Global Macro Account and the Arrow Tactical Fund both have the flexibility to invest in the global market without restraints. Don’t let yourself be shouldered off the table.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.


Markets Act Like Real People

January 5, 2010

Critics of the Efficient Market Hypothesis continue to get more press. Newsweek’s Barrett Sheridan recently wrote an article that discusses the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) versus the adaptive-markets hypothesis (AMH). He mentions one of the key flaws in EMH: that market participants are rational.

He goes on to focus on MIT professor Andrew Lo and his AMH work. Lo does not share the EMH tenet that the financial markets consist of cool, calm, and rational investors. He suggests that investors will behave differently depending on their psychology at any given moment. (Some of the old brokers I knew called it the fear-greed pendulum.) It follows that any investment rule based on a fixed measurement of value for the market such as yield, P/E ratio, etc. will work only sporadically over time if the AMH is valid. Nothing is set in stone because investors continually change and adapt to the market ecosystem.

Our Systematic RS portfolios use relative measurements. We believe in an adaptive approach to investing that recognizes that since markets are controlled by real people, they act like real people.