Why We Like Price

February 10, 2010

Relative strength calculations rely on a single input: price. We like price because it is a known quantity, not an assumption. In this deconstruction of the Price-to-Earnings Growth (PEG) ratio, the author, Tom Brakke, discusses all of the uncertainties when calculating even a simple ratio like PEG. And amidst all of the uncertainties he mentions is this:

In looking at that calculation, only one of the three variables has any precision: We can observe the market price (P) at virtually any time and be assured that we have an accurate number. The E is a different matter entirely. Which earnings? Forward, trailing, smoothed, operating, adjusted, owner? Why? How deep into accounting and the theory of finance do you want to go?

For most investors, not very far. We like our heuristics clean and easy, not hairy. So, in combining the first two variables we get the P/E ratio, the “multiple” upon which most valuation work rests, despite the questionable assumptions that may be baked in at any time. The addition of the third element, growth (G), gives us not the epiphany we seek, but even more confusion.

The emphasis is mine. This isn’t a knock on fundamental analysis. It can be valuable, but there is an inherent squishiness to it. The only precision is found in price. And price is dynamic: it adapts in real time as expectations of the asset change. (Fundamental data is often available only on a quarterly schedule.) As a result, systematic models built using relative strength adapt quite nicely as conditions change.


Irrational Loss Aversion

February 10, 2010

It’s well known in behavioral finance that investors experience a loss 2-3x more intensely than a gain of the same magnitude. This loss aversion leads investors to avoid even rational bets, according to a Reuters story on a recent study by a Cal Tech scientist.

Laboratory and field evidence suggests that people often avoid risks with losses even when they might earn a substantially larger gain, a behavioral preference termed ‘loss aversion’,” they wrote.

For instance, people will avoid gambles in which they are equally likely to either lose $10 or win $15, even though the expected value of the gamble is positive ($2.50).

The study indicates that people show fear at even the prospect of a loss. Markets are designed to generate fear, not to mention all of the bearish commentators on CNBC. Fear leads to poor decisions, like selling near the bottom of a correction. Unless you are planning to electrically lesion your amygdala, the fear is going to be there-so what’s the best way to deal with it?

The course we have chosen is to make our investment models systematic. That means the decisions are rules-based, not subject to whatever fear the portfolio managers may be experiencing at any given time. Once in a blue moon, excessive caution pays off, but studies suggest that more errors are made being excessively cautious than overly aggressive. A rules-based method treats risk in a even-handed, mathematical way. In other words, take risks that historically are likely to pay off, and keep taking them regardless of your emotional state. Given enough time, the math is likely to swing things in your favor.


The 80/20 Rule in Action

February 10, 2010

According to a fascinating study discussed in Time Magazine based on 27 million hands of Texas Hold’em, it turns out that the more hands poker players win, the more money they lose! What’s going on here?

I suspect it has to do with investor preferences-gamblers often think the same way. Most people like to have a high percentage of winning trades; they are less happy with a lower percentage of winning trades, even if the occasional winner is a big one. In other words, investors will often prefer a system with 65% winning trades over a system with 45% winning trades, even if the latter method results in much greater overall profits.

People overweigh their frequent small gains vis-à-vis occasional large losses,” Siler says.

In fact, you are generally best off if you cut your losses and let your winners run. This is the way that systematic trend following tends to work. Often this results in a few large trades (the 20% in the 80/20 rule) making up a large part of your profits. Poker players and amateur investors obviously tend to work the other way, preferring lots of small profits-which all tend to be wiped away by a few large losses. Taking lots of small profits is the psychological path of least resistance, but the easy way is the wrong way in this case.


Bill Miller on Bonds

February 10, 2010

Bill Miller opines on investor’s ‘perverse’ affinity for bonds over stocks:

This affinity for bonds over stocks is understandable when looking at the past 10 years, but perverse, we believe, when looking at the likely course of the next 10. Bonds crushed stocks the past 10 years, with riskless Treasuries returning more than 6 per cent per year, while stocks lost money on average each year of the past 10. Ten years ago stocks were expensive; now they are not.

In the next decade, the story is likely to be quite different. As the economy gradually (or quickly) recovers, the Fed will remove the extraordinary monetary accommodation it provided during the crisis, and shrink its balance sheet. A neutral Fed funds rate would be in the 2.5 per cent range or thereabouts, perhaps higher. Long term, the ten-year Treasury ought to yield about the nominal growth rate of GDP, so somewhere in the 4.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent range, leading to substantial losses in Treasuries and probably investment grade corporates as well. High-yield bonds ought to do better, but they had their big move last year, rising over 50 per cent and providing the best returns relative to equities ever. All this, though, assumes benign inflation of 2 per cent to 3 per cent. If the inflation bears are right, bonds will be a disaster. [Emphasis Added]

It is quite possible that asset allocations with inflexible exposure to bond funds could be in big trouble over the next decade.


High RS Diffusion Index

February 10, 2010

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 2/9/10.

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 35% and the one-day reading is 31%. This indicator reached a single-day low of 23% on 2/8/10. Dips in this indicator have often been good opportunities to add to relative strength strategies.