PIMCO: Managing Future Inflation Risk

April 30, 2010

One of the many risks investors have to deal with, especially bond investors, is inflation risk. PIMCO has a paper out entitled “A Diversified Real Asset Approach for Managing Future Inflation Riskthat is worth reading. They discuss one way of dealing with inflation through using real assets, the most liquid of which are:

… inflation-linked bonds (including Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, or TIPS), commodities, real estate investment trusts (REITs) and commodity-related equities.

As a benchmark, the authors suggest a one-third weighting to each of these asset classes, with the exception of commodity-related equities, which they believe are inferior to direct commodities in terms of reducing direct equity risk.

The authors also endorse tactical asset allocation:

This “one-third, one-third, one third” benchmark is also a good starting point for actively managing the mix of asset classes, which can be an important tool for enhancing the overall effectiveness of the diversified real asset strategy.

As the drivers of future inflation risk naturally evolve, relative attractiveness across these three real asset classes will change, since they each respond differently to different inflation drivers. A rigorous asset allocation methodology that can identify macroeconomic and sector-specific risks and opportunities may add value for investors by tilting the real asset mix around the static benchmark weights.

Systematic relative strength provides just such a rigorous approach. It should be a comfort to know that all of these asset classes used to manage inflation risk are included in the investment universe of our global tactical allocation products, such as the Global Macro separate account, the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund, and the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund. The investment universe of those products, however, does not stop at inflation hedges. They are also fully capable of adapting to environments with a strong equity focus, whether domestic or international, or a strong defensive focus, where cash, short-term bonds, or inverse positions (Global Macro and Arrow DWA Tactical Fund) might be in vogue. Whether the world economy faces deflation or inflation in the future, flexible allocation across a broad universe should allow a rigorous tactical process to adapt.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


Sector and Capitalization Performance

April 30, 2010

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong. Performance updated through 4/29/2010.


Podcast #2 From the Gray Haired Money Manager

April 29, 2010

4/28/2010

Podcast #2: Investment Lessons from the Gray Haired Money Manager

Harold Parker and Andy Hyer


One World

April 29, 2010

Most of us probably know more about Greek mythology or about Sparta from watching the movie 300 than we know about modern-day Greece. We might order moussaka when we are at a Greek restaurant, but we really don’t think about Greece the rest of the time.

In fact, the global village is now so closely linked that some economists believe the European debt crisis, emanating from countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, will cause a slowdown in the U.S. economy. Europe is a big market for many American companies and as Europe’s economy slows and the Euro drops in value, U.S. corporate profits could suffer.

Calling it a European debt crisis doesn’t really do it justice. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is now involved, which means the imposition of some kind of austerity program. Once the IMF is on your doorstep, nothing good happens. Harvard professor, former IMF chief economist, and resident genius Ken Rogoff describes it this way:

The Fund does not bestow gifts; it only offers bridge loans to give bankrupt countries time to solve their budget problems. Although countries occasionally can grow their way out of debt problems, as China did with its 1990’s banking crisis, bankrupt countries usually face painful budget arithmetic. Short of default and inflation, most countries are forced to accept big tax hikes and spending cuts, often triggering or deepening a recession.

To be fair, the Fund’s reputation for imposing austerity is mostly an illusion. Countries usually call in the IMF only when they have been jilted by international capital markets, and are faced with desperate tightening measures no matter where they turn. Countries turn to the Fund for help because it is typically a far softer touch than private markets.

But gentleness is relative. It will be very tough – not only for Greece, but for all the other overextended countries of Europe – to tighten fiscal policy in the midst of recession without risking a deepening spiral. Simply put, no one wants to be the next major IMF supplicant.

Nor does the IMF’s arrival mean that bond holders are off the hook. As Qian, Reinhart, and I document, there have been numerous instances in which countries enter IMF programs but end up defaulting anyway. The most famous case is Argentina in 2002, but other recent examples include Indonesia, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic.

The picture is not a happy one. There is a likelihood of recession triggered by spending cuts and tax increases-and there are plenty of case where the country ends up defaulting anyway.

The U.S. is not immune from the European situation, given all of the linkages through foreign trade and currency exchange. And, frankly, the U.S. debt situation is not as different from the European one as we might like to think. Sooner or later, the U.S., too, will be forced by the financial markets to embrace some kind of austerity program-probably not sooner, but one never knows. Congress will try to delay the time of reckoning by raising taxes and/or reducing spending, but that is never an easy political task.

How should investors respond to all of this? At the present time, U.S. markets are much stronger than international markets, largely as a consequence of the stronger dollar. (Six months ago, the situation was totally reversed!) We’ve noticed that real estate has gained a strong footing in our Global Macro account due to its high relative strength. (Six months ago, there was a strong commodities focus.) In other words, an investor’s source of return may not be the same from period to period. As things continue to change rapidly, I think it is imperative that investors have a systematic way to adapt their portfolios to the changes. Trying to guess what might happen next seems like a losing proposition to me-who had any idea about Greece a year ago? A systematic approach eliminates the need to guess and just deals with what is happening now. Given everyone’s inability to forecast what might happen given all of the intricate and sometimes hidden linkages between world economies, a systematic solution incorporating relative strength may be the most practical.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


Fund Flows

April 29, 2010

The Investment Company Institute is the national association of U.S. investment companies, including mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and unit investment trusts (UITs). Members of ICI manage total assets of $11.82 trillion and serve nearly 90 million shareholders. Flow estimates are derived from data collected covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

Taxable bonds still on top for the week ending 4/21/10, but equities also saw some decent inflows.


A Recipe for Success

April 28, 2010

Everyone wants to have a top-performing manager. That’s the whole point of hiring a manager, right? No one intentionally hires a manager that lags. The difficulty comes about when good managers have temporary periods of underperformance. How do you know it’s temporary? Should you fire the manager and switch, or should you stick with them through the period of underperformance?

The traditional method of dealing with this issue has been to terminate managers who underperform over some intermediate time period, say three years, and to then replace them with a manager that outperformed over that time period. As has been shown amply in the research literature, the traditional method doesn’t work. In the inimitable words of the Psy-Fi blog,

What the plan sponsors are doing, like many behaviorally compromised individuals, is chasing returns in the same way a retriever brings back a lit stick of dynamite.

Some resources are provided in this article on the Psy-Fi blog, which deals with behavioral issues in finance. For instance, there is a link to a paper on pension funds hiring and firing practices that shows how poorly this strategy-which is in fact used by most funds-works in actual practice. In fact, doing the opposite tends to work better!

The Brandes Institute has also addressed manager selection and performance chasing. Psy-Fi points out:

…as Death, Taxes and Short-term Underperformance shows, the probability is that even the best managers will go through significant periods of poor returns. Studied over a decade even the top performing funds managed, on average, to underperform the S&P500 by over 8% during at least one three year rolling period. One (unnamed) fund managed to trail the index by over 40% in one year. All of the top five performing funds managed to underperform at some point during the decade. 53 out of 59 funds appeared in the bottom 10% of performers during at least one quarter and 10 of them managed this for a rolling three year period.

This complicates the picture quite a bit. It becomes clear that even very good managers, for whatever reason, have significant periods of underperformance, although that doesn’t stop them from outperforming over the longer term. Psy-Fi equates short-term performance with noise:

Basically firing a fund manager because of a couple of years of poor performance is simply shooting them because you don’t like noise in the system.

We all know that short-term performance may not be indicative of the longer run, but how do we decide? How do we distinguish between signal and noise?

From a practical standpoint, it seems to me that the investor has to rely on some kind of tested return factor. If a return factor has worked in the past, especially for a very long time, it seems more likely that it will continue to work in the future-even if there is enough noise in the system to create short-term underperformance from time to time.

There aren’t a lot of candidates for return factors that have worked over long periods of time. Many studies, both practitioner and academic, suggest that value and relative strength are the main return factors that have outperformed over many decades. Both factors are robust and work in numerous formulations, but both factors also move in and out of favor-essentially creating the noise that Psy-Fi talks about.

Happily, it turns out that value and relative strength as strategies are not very correlated. AQR Capital Management makes a strong case for blending relative strength and value, as the two strategies are largely complementary. From a client standpoint, then, the best recipe for success might be to find a disiplined relative strength manager (us, we hope!) and a disciplined value manager. Apportion the account appropriately and let bake for Warren Buffett’s favorite holding period-forever.


High RS Diffusion Index

April 28, 2010

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 4/27/10.

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 96% and the one-day reading is 88%. This oscillator has shown the tendency to remain overbought for extended periods of time, while oversold measures tend to be much more abrupt.


ETF Investors Shoot Themselves in the Foot

April 27, 2010

Proving that retail investor emotionality is consistent regardless of the investment vehicle, it turns out that ETF investors are no better at timing than mutual fund investors.

In an Index Universe article entitled ETF Investors Are Horrible Market Timers, Olivier Ludwig reports:

“Just do the opposite of what ETF investors do and you’ll do OK,” Vincent Deluard, the author of the study, said in a telephone interview. “The ETF is an inexpensive and relatively efficient way to invest passively. But the problem comes from ETF investors who try to time the market.”

The study found that literally doing the opposite of what retail investors were doing (based on the fund flows) was quite profitable, as opposed to what ETF investors actually did.

The author of the study at TrimTabs had some advice for investors:

“When you don’t know anything about the market, you should buy and hold. But because ETFs are so liquid, they give a false sense of power, especially if you look at the leveraged stuff,” Deluard said. “It’s spectacular how much money people lose in those things.”

Contrast the emotional trading of retail investors with a systematic strategy of asset class rotation. There’s no comparison. According to studies, systematic asset class rotation can lead to outperformance over time, while individual investors just tend to shoot themselves in the foot.


Zhou Xiaochuan?

April 27, 2010

Who? You should probably learn the name of the head of China’s central bank. He addressed the IMF meeting over the weekend and chided developed nations for mucking up the world economy. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal mentioned some of his concerns.

…Zhou said the outlook for the global economy faces many uncertainties, calling for developed countries with “flagging economic recoveries” to put their fiscal houses in order and accelerate reform in both their financial sectors and structural issues in their economies, he said.

They need to “restore fiscal discipline as quickly as possible by formulating and implementing a comprehensive, credible, and transparent fiscal consolidation strategy and adopting measures to contain sovereign risk and avoid cross-border contagion,” said Zhou.

The current issues with Greece certainly highlight his points, but Greece is not the only developed nation to face similar sovereign debt issues. Even the U.S. (eventually) may not be immune.

Even ten years ago, it would have been inconceivable for a developing nation central banker to chide the developed world for their unsustainable fiscal practices! Yet that is what things have come to. We have a new world order, where the source of investment returns may not come from the traditional sources. A global tactical asset allocation strategy may be what is needed to adapt to the new investing environment. If your clients are concerned about instability in global markets, you may want to explore our Global Macro separate account or to look at our global allocation funds with Arrow.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


CXO on Asset Class Rotation

April 27, 2010

We’ve written about this paper by Mebane Faber already, but here is a link to a review of his work from CXO Advisory. Mr. Faber’s paper is about industry and asset class rotation, and CXO’s conclusion is:

In summary, evidence from simple tests indicates that the momentum anomaly is substantial and persistent over long periods for industries/asset classes on a gross return basis.

We are big fans of the words “substantial” and “persistent.”


Relative Strength Spread

April 27, 2010

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 4/26/2010:

The sharp decline in the RS Spread during much of 2009 has transitioned to a flat relative strength spread that may very well be setting the stage for a favorable environment for RS.


The Imprecision of Value

April 26, 2010

One of the reasons that we like to use relative strength as a return factor is its precision, its lack of assumptions, and its universality-basically its ability to rank even very disparate assets.

Although value managers often discuss assets or stocks that are undervalued, there is little agreement on how value works. Take, for example, a Bloomberg story from today, entitled U.S. Stocks Cheapest Since 1990 on Analyst Estimates. With a title like that, you would expect an article that discusses how cheap stocks are relative to earnings. And, indeed, the article cites such a source:

“The stock market is incredibly inexpensive,” said Kevin Rendino, who manages $11 billion in Plainsboro, New Jersey, for BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager. “I don’t know how the bears can argue against how well corporations are doing.”

Not only are stocks cheap, but analysts seem reluctant to buy in, something that strikes me, from a contrary opinion point of view, as unabashedly positive.

While analysts are raising estimates, they’re not boosting investment ratings. Companies ranked “buy” make up 30 percent of all U.S. equities, the data show. That compares with 45 percent in September 2007, a month before the S&P 500 reached its record high of 1,565.15 and began a 17-month plunge that erased $11 trillion from the value U.S. shares.

But hold on a mintue- here is the part I find most fascinating about the article: no one can agree on the valuation. (I guess the tendency to cover both sides of the story in the same article comes from political opinion coverage, where the media thinks they have to give equal time to both sides, whether rational or not.)

David Rosenberg, chief economist of Gluskin Sheff & Associates Inc., says U.S. stocks are poised for losses because they’ve become too expensive. The S&P 500 is valued at 22.1 times annual earnings from the past 10 years, according to inflation-adjusted data since 1871 tracked by Yale University Professor Robert Shiller.

So while you have reputable analysts arguing that the market is cheap, you have equally reputable analysts arguing that the market is expensive! How does that happen? Well, it happens because everyone in the value camp operates from a (sometimes radically) different set of assumptions. Are you using trailing estimates, forward estimates, or 10-year normalized estimates? And, by the way, they are estimates.

Source: DenverPost.com

Relative strength is nice because it is precise. No one argues about what the trailing 6-month or 12-month return was. It’s cut and dried. Although different firms use slightly different relative strength calculations-Dorsey, Wright Money Management has a proprietary method-it is hard to imagine a scenario where there would be much disagreement about the strength or weakness of the same market.

Which is stronger, U.S. stocks or U.S. long-term bonds? Just looking at a comparative chart of the two assets makes it obvious, even to someone not sophisticated in quantitative analysis (SPY vs. TLT).

Click to enlarge. Source: Yahoo! Finance

On the other hand, determining which asset is a better value is quite indeterminate. It all depends on whether you take as your starting point the view that the U.S. stock market is cheap or expensive!

And what happens when you have to value a multi-asset portfolio? How do you determine whether real estate, international stocks, euros, or emerging market bonds are cheaper? The lack of agreed-upon metrics between markets, let alone within an individual market, make this kind of decision a nightmare from a valuation perspective.

Since prior performance is precise, relative strength measurements can be made easily and without argument. Relative strength can easily be used for multi-asset portfolios as well. And finally, the returns from using the relative strength factor are high-as high as the returns from the value factor, and in many studies, higher. Luckily for us, efficient-market types normally decline to use relative strength because theoretically it shouldn’t work! Their loss is our gain.


Weekly RS Recap

April 26, 2010

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and quartile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (4/19/10 – 4/23/10) is as follows:

Why can’t every week be like last week?! High relative strength securities had a great week and are having a very nice year.


Podcast 1 - The New Frontier in Asset Allocation

April 23, 2010

DWAMM’s Podcast 1 - The New Frontier in Asset Allocation: Mixing Strategies, Not Assets Mike Moody and Andy Hyer


Sour Apples, Anyone?

April 23, 2010

Articles like this one from the ROI column in the WSJ never cease to amaze me. In the column, the author makes a 7-point case for why Apple investors should take profits, or at least be wary of the future. I’ll use just one of his quotes to sum up the gist of his entire article. In Seven Reasons Apple Shareholders Should Be Cautious, Brett Arends writes:

And the more it rises, the less attractive it gets.

“Less attractive to whom?” I might ask. To investors participating in Apple’s profits, those higher prices mean more money. To those not participating, perhaps those higher prices are producing sour grapes.

In the capital markets, there are usually going to be two sides to every trade, so it’s a good idea to maintain a degree of respect and good faith for the other party. However, a quick Google search of the author’s name brings up an article dated July 22, 2009, entitled, Despite Profits, Apple Is No Investment Opportunity. Since that bearish article, Apple’s stock price has gained around +73%. What’s interesting is that the author argues many of the same points in both articles – Apple’s competitors dropped the ball, the share price is overvalued, and Steve Jobs has health problems. It’s nearly a reprint of today’s article, plus some iPad commentary and about 7,300 basis points.

My point isn’t to bash a market opinion writer whose unhappy job it is to make predictions. My point is that these predictions more often than not fail. And despite the common knowledge that market prediction is practically impossible, this new bearish Apple article is the 2nd most-read article on the entire WSJ website today-that’s a lot of readers.

Let’s hope all those readers have a systematic process in place to help guide their investment decisions. Because following newspaper opinions probably won’t cut it going forward.

Disclosure: Apple (AAPL) is currently included in the PowerShares DWA Technical Leaders Index (PDP).


Morningstar: What NOT to Do When Investing for Income

April 23, 2010

Maybe Christine Benz, the personal finance specialist at Morningstar, is a regular reader of our blog. Or maybe she just gets it. She wrote a great piece on what income investors should avoid. Here’s a section of it:

Is it even healthy to focus on generating income, particularly if doing so comes at the expense of total return? Is generating a livable yield from a portfolio a vestige of a bygone era? No and yes, I’d say.

It’s easy to see the intuitive appeal of being able to live on the income you earn from clipping bond coupons, yet being too income-focused carries its own set of pitfalls. A key one in today’s low-yield environment is that you have to venture into very risky stuff to generate a livable yield, and that could erode your principal in the process. And by focusing unduly on investments that kick off income, you also risk starving your portfolio of the capital-appreciation potential that comes with stocks. True, stock returns have been no great shakes over the past decade, but bonds may well fight their own uphill battle over the next one.

The bottom line is that most people will have to tap their principal to fund living expenses in retirement, so the key aim for most retirees and pre-retirees should be to grow those retirement kitties as large as they can. If they have to tap their principal, they’ll be tapping a larger base than if they had focused on income without regard to total return. Investments that generate current income aren’t bad, but total return is your real bottom line.

[The emphasis is mine.] This is exactly what we wrote about on 4/16 in a post on investing for income. We made the added point that capital gains can be spent just as easily as income, so there is no reason not to focus on total return. We also had a suggestion for how an income-oriented investor might be persuaded to incorporate growth into the portfolio. I don’t always agree with Morningstar’s orientation on investing-they tend to think that value is the only way to go-but I think their take on investing for income and the dangers of only paying attention to the current yield are right on the money.


Dorsey Wright Sentiment Survey - 4/23/10

April 23, 2010

Here we have Round Four of the Dorsey, Wright Sentiment Survey, the first third-party sentiment poll. As you know, when individuals self-report, they are always taller and more beautiful than when outside observers report their perceptions! Instead of asking individual investors to self-report whether they are bullish or bearish, we’d like financial advisors to weigh in and report on the actual behavior of clients. It’s two simple questions and will take no more than 20 seconds of your time. We’ll construct indicators from the data and report the results regularly on our blog–but we need your help to get a large statistical sample!

Contribute to the greater good! You WILL NOT be directed to another page by clicking the survey. It’s painless, we promise.


Sector and Capitalization Performance

April 23, 2010

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong. Performance updated through 4/22/2010.


Value and Relative Strength Chronicles

April 22, 2010

Of all the different investment factors that have been tested and employed over time, value and relative strength have emerged as “best by test.” In other words, when applied consistently over time, these two factors have proven the ability to generate superior performance over buy-and-hold. What is especially great about these two investment factors is that they tend to have a very low correlation to each other. This low correlation allows them to be very good complements.

If all investors cared about was return, then finding uncorrelated strategies wouldn’t be such a big deal. Simply pick value or relative strength and hold on for the long run. However, in the real world, investors have a preference for more stable returns. Value moves in and out of favor, as does relative strength, which presents a dilemma for the investor. Yet, by mixing the two it is possible to reduce the volatility without sacrificing the return too much (and in some cases it can even be augmented.)

Greg Carlson, of Morningstar, recently wrote These Funds Can Ferret Out Value Across Asset Classes in which he screened for some excellent value funds that have the flexibility to change their allocations to equities and fixed income depending on where they find the best value.

Carlson explained his screening criteria:

We used Morningtar’s Premium Fund Screener to sort through the conservative-allocation, moderate-allocation, and world-allocation categories. We set the screener to identify distinct share classes of funds within these categories that are covered by Morningstar’s fund analysts, require no more than $10,000 as an initial investment (we also excluded those that list a minimum initial investment of zero, as these are institutional share classes), and are open to new investors.

We also wanted funds that held up better than the majority of their category peers in 2008 (when the bulk of the market’s decline occurred) and managed to generate at least a 20% gain in 2009. Because last year’s rally was led by speculative, economically sensitive fare, we didn’t want to exclude funds that lagged their category peers in 2009 yet still posted a sizable absolute return. (World-allocation funds gained an average of 25% in 2009, while moderate-allocation funds gained 24% and conservative -allocation funds gained 20%.) Finally, we wanted funds with managers who had been on board for a minimum of five years, beat at least three fourths of their category peers over that span, and had below-average expense ratios.

This screen yielded six funds as of April 19, 2010.

Of the six funds from this screen, I wanted to see how the two biggest funds do when mixed with our Global Macro strategy (available as a separately managed account and as DWTFX.) Our Global Macro strategy is a global tactical asset allocation strategy in which the allocations are driven by a systematic relative strength process.

Efficient frontiers are shown below:

(Click to Enlarge)

(Click to Enlarge)

Given the assets in these two value-based asset allocation funds ($50 Billion in Vanguard Wellington and $12 Billion in Van Kampen Equity & Income), it is no secret that these funds have been successful. However, I suspect that there are many fewer investors who are aware of the potential volatility reduction and increased performance by mixing it with our Global Macro strategy. The correlation of Global Macro and Vanguard Wellington was only 0.34, and only 0.42 for Global Macro and Van Kampen Equity & Income over this time frame.

The potential benefits of mixing value and relative strength are there for the taking.

VWELX and ACEIX returns are taken from Yahoo! Finance. Please note that the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX) was converted to our Global Macro strategy on 8/3/09.

Click here to visit ArrowFunds.com for a prospectus & disclosures. Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


Theory versus Practice

April 22, 2010

William Sharpe, a Nobel Prize winner in Economics, wrote a recent paper about how the 4% retirement spending rule is inefficient. MarketWatch had a recent feature discussing his paper-and more than anything about the spending rule itself, the piece made me think about how large the gulf in finance is between theory and reality. As Yogi Berra is reported to have quipped, “In theory, there’s no difference between theory and practice. But in practice, there is.” (There’s a link to Mr. Sharpe’s paper in the MarketWatch article.)

The 4% retirement spending rule is clearly a rule of thumb, and I am sure that most practitioners modify it depending on the client’s circumstances. (We prefer a 3% spending rule, and I’ve seen other rules based on the yields available. For example, one paper I read advocated a spending rule of 125% of the yield on the S&P 500, arguing that you can spend more when yields are high than when they are low.) Mr. Sharpe says the 4% spending rule is too simplistic. He’s right-rules of thumb are supposed to be simplistic. But no one using it is really going to mistake it for the be-all-and-end-all.

An extraordinarily complex retirement spending rule that takes many complicated factors into account is just as likely-or maybe even more likely-to fail. The real world is a much messier place than an ivory tower. Things that seem like good ideas in theory, even to Nobel Prize winners (I’m thinking Long-Term Capital Management here), often fail miserably in practice.

The reason that complicated things never work in real life is that there are too many unknowns in the equation. In modern portfolio theory, market returns and correlations between assets are not stable, so the whole thing is essentially unworkable. A perfect retirement spending rule could be made for each client if the practitioner only knew exactly what their investments would earn each year and how long the client would live. That’s not going to happen, so we are left with rules of thumb.

The most important thing about any modeling approach is how robust it is. If you jiggle around the inputs, does it fail miserably or does it continue to work? Is it based on historical inputs which are guaranteed to change, or does it just adapt without making assumptions? We have strong feelings about this. The fewer factors a modeling approach uses, the less likely it is to be knocked down by some unanticipated factor interaction. We use a single-factor model and test rigorously for robustness (you can read our white paper on Bringing Real-World Testing to Relative Strength here). Academic finance would be much more useful to real investors if they kept in mind another saying: it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.


Icelandic Volcano Humor

April 22, 2010

On Wall Street, even natural disasters are turned into fodder for jokes. CNBC.com has a cute article on a few of the quips.


Fund Flows

April 22, 2010

The Investment Company Institute is the national association of U.S. investment companies, including mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and unit investment trusts (UITs). Members of ICI manage total assets of $11.82 trillion and serve nearly 90 million shareholders. Flow estimates are derived from data collected covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

The affinity for taxable bonds continued in the week ending 4/14/10.


Worried The Market Is Overbought?

April 21, 2010

As we frequently point out, diffusion indicators have a tendency to remain overbought while oversold measures tend to reverse off the bottom more quickly. One of the most common ways that diffusion indicators are constructed is to measure the percentage of stocks in a given investment universe that are trading above their 50-day moving average.

Mark Hulbert of MarketWatch, recently wrote about an indicator from Ned Davis Research that measures the percentage of common stocks trading above their 50-day moving average. Using data that goes back to 1967, Ned Davis points out that this indicator has only exceeded 90 percent 12 times, before the current measure.

Hulbert on Ned Davis’ indicator:

Prior to the recent buy signal, there had been only 12 of them since 1967.

And two of those 12 prior buy signals occurred in the last 12 months alone. In other words, between 1967 and March 2009, this indicator gave just 10 buy signals — an average of just one every 4.3 years. Since March 2009, in contrast, they have averaged once every four months or so.

That’s a very friendly trend indeed.

The indicator in question comes from Ned Davis Research, the quantitative research firm. It generates a buy signal whenever the percentage of common stocks trading above their 50-day moving averages rises above 90%. Davis refers to such events as a “breadth thrust.”

The recent buy signal, according to this indicator, occurred on April 5. The other buy signals over the last year occurred on May 4 and Sep. 16 of last year.

How has the stock market performed following past buy signals? Quite well, according to Davis’ calculations.

(Click to Enlarge)

There are plenty of people arguing that the market is due to correct because it is so overbought. Perhaps. However, history suggests that extremely overbought measures have portended good, not bad, returns for the stock market in the subsequent months and year.


High RS Diffusion Index

April 21, 2010

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 4/21/10.

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 97% and the one-day reading is 98%. This oscillator has shown the tendency to remain overbought for extended periods of time, while oversold measures tend to be much more abrupt.


Mebane Faber’s New White Paper

April 20, 2010

Mebane Faber recently released a nice white paper, Relative Strength Strategies for Investing, in which he tested relative strength models consisting of US equity sectors from 1926-2009. He also tested relative strength models consisting of global assets like foreign stocks, domestic stocks, bonds, real estate, and commodities from 1973-2009. The relative strength measures that he used for the studies are publicly-known methods based on trailing returns. Some noteworthy conclusions from the paper:

  • Relative strength models outperformed buy-and-hold in roughly 70% of all years
  • Approximately 300-600 basis points of outperformance per year was achieved
  • His relative strength models outperformed in each of the 8 decades studied

I always enjoy reading white papers on relative strength. It is important to mention that the methods of calculating relative strength that were used in Faber’s white paper are publicly-known and have been pointed to for decades by various academics and practitioners. Yet, they continue to work! Those that argue that relative strength strategies will eventually become so popular that they will cease to work have some explaining to do.