How Yale Makes the Endowment Model Work

April 14, 2010

Justin Fox, the author of The Myth of the Rational Market, has a very provocative blog at Harvard Business Review. In a recent comment he discusses Yale’s endowment model and why it works for Yale.

Mr. Fox discusses the broad idea behind David Swensen’s approach: buy a lot of uncorrelated assets and be willing to go far afield to find them. When you read Swensen’s book, it also becomes clear that Swensen prefers assets that can have equity-like returns. He is happy to own alternative assets if he thinks the returns are there. Another thing Mr. Fox points out is that Swensen’s allocations to various asset classes are not fixed. He is willing to change his asset mix and to let the portfolio adapt over time.

Many managers who have tried to emulate Mr. Swensen–and it has certainly become quite popular in the institutional pension community–are disenchanted with the “Yale Model” because 2008 was an atypically bad year. In classic investor fashion, many of the mini-Swensens are “rethinking their approach.” Mr. Fox points out that many in the institutional community were not really following Mr. Swensen’s approach in the first place, but the major reason that his imitators are having doubts (and Mr. Swensen is not) has to do with a loss of nerve more than anything else. Mr. Fox believes that the Yale endowment model will continue to work for Yale because:

…Swensen is still in charge, and has built up enough political capital through the decades that he’ll be allowed to stick to his guns. That hasn’t been true of the managers of Harvard’s endowment since Meyer left in 2005 (to start a hedge fund and take home bigger paychecks). That hasn’t been true of the managers of California’s CalPERS. And it hasn’t been true of 99% of the other institutions that thought they were following the Yale model.

The real Yale model, then, involves more than just an investing approach. It requires finding a very smart, capable person not motivated chiefly by money (Swensen could have made vastly more on Wall Street than he has at Yale) who is willing to stick with the same job for decades. And it involves an institution that puts enough trust in that person to weather a bad year or two without lots of second guessing. (Tellingly, there are echoes here of the way things work at Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.)

[The emphasis is mine.]

In the end, it gets back to investor behavior, whether the investors are institutional and retail. Did you do your due diligence on the strategy? Do you really understand what the manager is trying to do? If so, buy it and hang on for the long run. Give the strategy time to work. Flipping strategies every time there is a period of adversity (see DALBAR) is not a winning method in the long run.

Ultimately, Mr. Fox’s point is universal. It is applicable to Yale’s endowment model, but also every other disciplined investment strategy, including Warren Buffett’s. You have to first do your homework and then stick to your guns. There will be challenges along the way, but you’re likely to come out ahead if you can stay focused on a winning strategy.

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Investor Indifference to Historic Bull Market

April 14, 2010

Thirteen months into one of the most powerful bull markets in history and investors still don’t believe.

In their April Green Book, The Leuthold Group analyzed the average path of trading volumes in the first two years of all bull markets dating back to 1932. The charts below suggest that one year into a new cyclical bull market, NYSE trading volumes (on a ten-week average basis) should be about 70-80% above the level seen at the prior bear market low. Recent NYSE volumes, however, have been running about 25% below the levels seen at the March 2009 bear market low. In other words, volumes now amount to less than half what they have normally been at this stage of a new bull market.

Charts used by permission from The Leuthold Group.

In reviewing the volume trends in each of the 15 bull markets that were studied, the only pattern even close to the 2009-2010 example occurred in the aftermath of the 1987 crash.

The damage to investor confidence suffered during both the 1987 crash and the 2007-2009 meltdown resulted in similarly depressed trading volume. The impressive gains (76% return) for the S&P; 500 since the March 2009 lows still have not been enough to lure investors back into the market en masse. As we show in our weekly mutual fund flows report, investors are still fighting the last battle and continue to direct money into fixed income at the expense of other categories like domestic equities.

I would like to believe that investors can be persuaded to make investment decisions with greater reliance on logic than emotion, but history teaches us that I shouldn’t hold my breath. However, great gains can be made on low market volume or high. For those investors already “in the game” they can find some comfort in knowing that there are still plentiful amounts of money on the sidelines that can potentially drive the market much higher from here.

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Relative Strength Diffusion Index

April 14, 2010

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 4/13/10.

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 96% and the one-day reading is 97%. This oscillator has shown the tendency to remain overbought for extended periods of time, while oversold measures tend to be much more abrupt.

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