Before There was David Swensen, There was Harry Browne

May 20, 2010

Kudos to Mark Hulbert for his interesting historical article on MarketWatch entitled “A Portfolio for All Seasons.” It was a nice discussion of what I think was one of the intellectual precursors of the Yale endowment portfolio. Harry Browne was a newsletter writer in the 1970s and 1980s. He proposed a permanent portfolio that would never need to be changed, except maybe for periodic rebalancing.

Browne’s idea was to invest in a basket of asset classes, each one of which has a low correlation with the others. As a result, when any one of the asset classes is performing poorly, there is a good chance that the others will at least be holding their own — if not actually appreciating in value.

Hmmm…investing in a basket of uncorrelated asset classes. This sounds familiar from both modern portfolio theory and David Swensen’s work at Yale. Browne had a particular portfolio mix in mind:

The basket that Browne recommended was equally divided between stocks, long-term Treasury bonds, gold and Treasury bills. In his 1987 book, he reported that, over the prior 17 years, back to 1970, this portfolio had produced as 12.0% annualized return. This was better than a buy-and-hold in either stocks or bonds, though behind gold.

Essentially, Browne proposed a mix of stocks, bonds, cash, and alternative investments. In 1987, this was pretty unusual. Most newsletter writers recommending gold were either gold bugs (buy gold and live in a bunker) or strategic asset allocationists (have a 5-10% portfolio allocation to gold as a concession to inflation or global catastrophe). The end-of-the-world crowd would never want to own stocks of corrupt corporations or bonds of currency-debasing governments. The 60/40 policy mix group would blanch at having such a large allocation to alternatives. Yale’s endowment model today is an interesting modification because it is equity-oriented, but also willing to hold significant allocations to unusual asset classes. One of the unique things I learned from the article is that Browne’s approach actually spawned a mutual fund. Hulbert writes:

Browne’s approach in the decades since has continued to perform as advertised. Consider the Permanent Portfolio fund /quotes/comstock/10r!prpfx (PRPFX 39.88, -0.38, -0.94%) , which was created in large part out of Browne’s work. Its current target allocations are 25% in gold and silver, 35% in U.S. Treasurys, 15% in aggressive growth stocks, 15% in real-estate and natural resource stocks, and 10% in Swiss-franc denominated assets.

…You might therefore want to remember Browne’s investment approach as you suffer through yet more of the markets’ frightening volatility. His permanent portfolio serves as a reminder that we don’t have to be constantly betting on the markets’ short-term gyrations, nor suffer from huge losses along the way, in order to produce decent long-term returns.

It sounds like the mutual fund hasn’t quite stuck to Browne’s original guidelines, but it’s clearly in the same spirit. The real point is that an endowment-type portfolio, while perhaps not very sexy, can generate nice long-term returns-and it might be able to keep clients from jumping out of the window. The endowment-type portfolio that we manage, the Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX), is built in the same spirit. There are sleeves for domestic and international equities, fixed income, and alternative assets. Unlike Mr. Browne’s approach which called for equal-weighting, the size of our sleeves varies by relative strength-within boundaries-so that the portfolio can adapt to different environments. The fixed income position tends to act as a volatility buffer, with growth typically coming from the equity portion of the account. The alternative assets often provide an uncorrelated growth component. The approach was sound when Mr. Browne proposed it, sound when Mr. Swensen modified it, and seems to be working today-and there aren’t very many investment approaches that can make that claim.


Next Best Thing to a Crystal Ball

May 20, 2010

Ezra Klein’s recent interview with uber-economist Ken Rogoff included the following interesting exchange:

You said that there are indicators we can watch to predict when we’re vulnerable to a financial crisis, but in general, the problem is that policymakers explain the indicators away. Information, in other words, is not enough, because people create stories to explain the information away.

Start with a really important point: It’s very hard to call the timing of a crisis. You can see that an economy is vulnerable, and maybe even fairly reliably say you’ll have a crisis in 5 to10 years, but until it’s upon you, it’s hard to narrow the window down with any precision. Many of the people who say they predicted the crisis in a precise way had actually been predicting a crisis for years. There’s irreducible uncertainty coming from fragile confidence and political factors. The analogy is someone who’s vulnerable to a heart attack. You can go to the doctor and they can see your cholesterol is high and you have a number of risk factors, but you might go on for 20 years without anything happening. Or it might be 20 hours.

Because the timing is hard to call, policymakers have trouble getting seized by it. Why worry if it is not going to hit on my watch? And if you’re an investor and you’re making great money for five more years and then you have a bad year, you still have a good decade. But policymakers, especially, need to have a longer vision because of the human cost of financial crises, particularly in the hugely elevated level of long-term unemployment.

Investing is always disconcerting because of the real and perceived risks to the capital markets and to the global economy. Professor Rogoff’s point about timing a financial crisis based on known fundamental data is an important one. Risks may be in place to cause a crisis, but if the likely window of time for those risks to actually result in crisis range from the next couple months to the next several decades the investor is left with the decision of how to incorporate those known risks into an investment plan. It is one thing to be aware of great fundamental risks and it is another to be able to translate that knowledge into profitable investment returns.

Again, we see why pragmatists gravitate to tactical asset allocation. The tactical asset allocator accepts the reality that timing market moves based on fundamental data is nearly impossible. Therefore, the tactical asset allocator embraces the concept of reacting to trends in a disciplined fashion. It is the next best thing to having a crystal ball.


Fund Flows

May 20, 2010

The Investment Company Institute is the national association of U.S. investment companies, including mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and unit investment trusts (UITs). Members of ICI manage total assets of $11.82 trillion and serve nearly 90 million shareholders. Flow estimates are derived from data collected covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

Municipal Bond Funds were the only category that saw net inflows in the week ending 5/12/10. Domestic equities were particularly hard hit with redemptions.