The Juggernaut Destroying the Efficient Market Hypothesis

January 7, 2011

There’s a big article on momentum in stock markets in The Economist. Momentum is otherwise known by its original name, relative strength, if you are a stock market historian. Like all articles that actually examine relative strength as a return factor, it results in nearly unqualified gushing:

Since the 1980s academic studies have repeatedly shown that, on average, shares that have performed well in the recent past continue to do so for some time. Longer-term studies have confirmed that this “momentum” effect has been observable for much of the past century. Nor is the phenomenon confined to the stockmarket. Commodity prices and currencies are remarkably persistent, rising or falling for long periods.

Actually, stock market traders noticed this tendency by 1900, so it must have been apparent even in the 1800s. And the first computerized test that I know of dates to the late 1960s, even earlier than the mid-1980s mentioned in the article.

The momentum effect drives a juggernaut through one of the tenets of finance theory, the efficient-market hypothesis. In its strongest form this states that past price movements should give no useful information about the future. Investors should have no logical reason to have preferred the winners of 2009 to the losers; both should be fairly priced already.

Markets do throw up occasional anomalies—for instance, the outperformance of shares in January or their poor performance in the summer months—that may be too small or unreliable to exploit. But the momentum effect is huge.

I’ve underlined my favorite parts. The article goes on to cite a study done on the British market from 1900 by chaps at the London Business School. Not surprisingly, buying the relative strength leaders was tremendous, earning more than 10% a year above the return on the laggards. You can see the magnitude of the effect in the chart below. $1 turned into $49 buying the laggards, but turned into $2.3 million buying the relative strength leaders. (They used British pounds, but the unit equivalency is the same.) As they say, the momentum effect is huge.

 The Juggernaut Destroying the Efficient Market Hypothesis

Source: The Economist

The article points out one other thing that I believe is very, very important.

Even the high priests of efficient-market theory have acknowledged the momentum effect.

This is true: even academics have been forced to acknowledge the power of relative strength as a return factor. It’s impossible not to; it’s in the data. Since there is really no way to deny it, even hard-core efficient market types have admitted its existence. The part that always makes me scratch my head is that they follow up their admission by telling investors it’s impossible to outperform and that they should just buy index funds!

Is relative strength magic? No. Does it work all of the time? No. But its power is undeniable, which is why our investment process rests on systematic application of relative strength as a return factor. We think this gives us an excellent chance of outperformance across equity markets and global asset classes over time.

Posted by:


The Cost of Blindly Chasing Dividend Yield

January 7, 2011

Dividends are great. I like them just as much as the next guy. However, the plethora of dividend products coming out should at least make you stop and think about the old Wall Street adage “more money has been lost chasing yield than at the point of a gun.” After all, capital gains can be spent just as easily as dividends. There’s nothing inherently special about dividends.

The irrational appeal of dividends is easy to understand. Behavioral finance will tell you that investors always prefer a bird in hand, because outcomes are always uncertain. The dividend is tangible and capital gains are not assured. However, investors sometimes completely miss the boat because of this bias.

As an example, let’s look at two PowerShares ETFs, one for dividend achievers (PFM) and one for buyback achievers (PKW). The dividend achievers are great companies that have all raised dividends at least ten years in a row. They have exemplary consistency and they are returning capital to shareholders. The current yield is 2.4%, which must be somewhat attractive to investors as the fund has approximately $200 million in it.

The buyback achievers fund consists of companies that have bought back 5% of their shares over the past year. This is another way to returning capital to the shareholders by shrinking the float and increasing earnings per share-but, alas, the shareholders don’t get much in the way of cash in their pockets. You could argue that returning capital through buybacks is also more tax-efficient for investors, but they don’t care. The yield on PKW is only about 0.3%. Investors are not so enamored with this concept and have put only about $35 million in this fund.

If you look at performance over the last two years, PFM investors have netted an extra 4.2% in dividends (2.1% differential yield x 2 years), while PKW investors have been rewarded with an additional 30% total return.

 The Cost of Blindly Chasing Dividend Yield

Click to enlarge. Source: Yahoo! Finance

It’s not that dividends are a bad thing-it’s just a trade off. There is often a cost to the bird in hand-academics have found evidence that dividend-paying stocks are often priced at a premium to non-dividend payers. Yield stocks certainly have a place in portfolio construction, but don’t put blinders on when you buy them. The underlying price performance-relative strength-needs to be considered just as much as the dividend.

Our Systematic RS accounts are designed to achieve good total returns over time without regard to the dividend income. When we find a stock with powerful relative strength and a good dividend, great. We’re happy to own it-but we own it for its total return performance, not only for the dividend.

Posted by:


Cast A Wide Net

January 7, 2011

Ben Inker at GMO makes a good point about valuations:

There are a few things that people tend to get wrong. One of them is an obsession with comparing stocks to bonds. So if you are in a situation like today, where bond yields are very low, people say, “Well, that makes stocks look cheap.” It doesn’t make stocks cheap. It is possible for stocks and bonds to be simultaneously cheap or simultaneously expensive.

If you’re using a strategic asset allocation optimized on past returns, you might have a problem. There probably is some asset that is working, but it doesn’t have to be anything in your “core” allocation. Flexibility to go looking among commodities, currencies, real estate, and other alternative asset classes might be critical to earning good returns. Don’t ignore them.

Posted by:


Sector and Capitalization Performance

January 7, 2011

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong. Performance updated through 1/6/2011.

ranks 10 Sector and Capitalization Performance

Posted by: