Commodities: Where We Differ

October 5, 2011

Liam Pleven of the WSJ writes the following:

For much of the past decade, investing in raw materials has looked like a slam-dunk, as rising prices held out the prospect of big gains and the proliferation of exchange-traded funds made placing bets easier. The trend of rising commodity prices in recent years helped fuel a belief that is now common among financial advisers and pension managers: that ordinary investors should have some slice of their long-term money parked in commodities.

Where we differ from the consensus is that investors should have a slice of their long-term money parked in commodities. ”Parked” implies passive allocation. One of the potential problems with such an approach is the fact that individual commodities can fall out of favor. Consider the example of whale oil and rye:

Examples of commodities getting pushed aside aren’t hard to come by. Petroleum production, for example, killed off the 19th-century market for whale oil as lamp fuel; a long whaling voyage might yield 4,000 barrels, according to historians, but a well could pump out 3,000 barrels a day.

More recently, there’s the case of rye. As recently as 1986, rye was a widely grown grain and a featured component of the CRB commodity index, which measured inflationary pressures. But rising demand for other crops pushed rye aside, and global production has fallen by half in the past quarter-century, just as corn production nearly doubled. As prices for many crops soared in the past decade, rye rose, too. But while average U.S. corn prices nearly tripled between 2000 and 2010, rye prices barely doubled.

Or even consider the example of natural gas:

Perhaps the most persistent threat to commodities investors isn’t that a commodity will be pushed aside, but rather that better technology will make it possible to produce the same materials more cheaply or in greater volume, which could in turn slam prices.

One stark, recent example comes from the growing use of hydraulic fracturing to tap U.S. supplies of so-called shale gas—natural gas previously considered impractical to access. The potential environmental impact of the technique is controversial, but shale gas has transformed the domestic energy picture. U.S. government estimates of the nation’s technically recoverable natural-gas reserves have nearly doubled in just four years.

The sudden change from a looming shortage into a growing glut has sharply reduced the cost of natural gas. Futures prices have typically hovered around $4 per million British thermal units this year, after averaging nearly $7 in the years before the practice became widespread.

Rather than a passive allocation to commodities, I would suggest taking a tactical approach to commodity exposure. There are stretches of time when it makes sense to have exposure to commodities (i.e. when they have strong relative strength) and there are times to be completely out. Relative strength can provide the means of making those tactical decisions.

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Expert Forecasts

October 5, 2011

We’ve written about this topic a lot, but it was recently taken up by Larry Swedroe at Wise Investing. Although I have some philosophical differences about how to construct a portfolio, I completely agree with his take on the uselessness of forecasts. He summarizes from a book by William Sherden, The Fortune Sellers:

Sherden reviewed the leading research on forecasting accuracy from 1979 to 1995 and covering forecasts made from 1970 to 1995. He concluded that:

  • Economists cannot predict the turning points in the economy. He found that of the 48 predictions made by economists, 46 missed the turning points.
  • Economists’ forecasting skill is about as good as guessing. Even the economists who directly or indirectly run the economy (such as the Fed, the Council of Economic Advisors and the Congressional Budget Office) had forecasting records that were worse than pure chance.
  • There are no economic forecasters who consistently lead the pack in forecasting accuracy.
  • There are no economic ideologies that produce superior forecasts.
  • Increased sophistication provided no improvement in forecasting accuracy.
  • Consensus forecasts don’t improve accuracy.
  • Forecasts may be affected by psychological bias. Some economists are perpetually optimistic and others perpetually pessimistic.

In other words, pay no attention to the man behind the curtain. It doesn’t matter whether an expert is predicting a Greek default, a bear market, or a rally in commodities—they really have no idea. About the best you can do is determine what the market is actually doing right now.

Instead of wasting our time on forecasts, we pay attention to relative performance. When an asset strengthens, we are interested in owning it. If it is performing poorly, not so much. Relative strength allows supply and demand, as reflected in market pricing, to make the decision about what is valuable or not at any given time. It allows the portfolio to change as conditions change, without requiring useless forecasting.

crystal ball2 Expert Forecasts

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From the Archives: Rethinking

October 5, 2011

On the topic of asset allocation, there is a lot of rethinking going on these days as evidenced by this article in the WSJ. The article highlights the differing views that exist in the industry. Some think bonds should have much more weight, some think alternatives should have more weight, and others think that it still makes the most sense to gives stocks the biggest weighting for portfolios with long-time horizons.

For us, we choose not to be painted into a corner. History makes it clear that it can be advantageous to favor different asset classes for long stretches of time, which is why our Global Macro product is designed to be as adaptive as it is.

Click here for disclosures from Dorsey Wright Money Management.

—-this articel originally appeared 9/3/2009. Given the tremendous worldwide turmoil of the past couple of years, I think it would have been impossible to figure out the correct long-term asset allocation. An adaptive policy still makes a lot of sense.

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High RS Diffusion Index

October 5, 2011

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 10/5/11.

The 10-day moving average of this index is 41%, but the single-day measure has fallen back to 22%. Dips in this index have often provided good opportunities to add to relative strength strategies.

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