Bonds and Risk Parity

February 13, 2013

I had risk parity in mind when I noted that a recent article at Financial Advisor quoted long-time awesome bond manager Dan Fuss on the state of the bond market:

Dan Fuss, whose Loomis Sayles Bond Fund beat 98 percent of its peers in the last three years, said the fixed-income market is more “overbought” than at any time in his 55-year career as he prepares to open a fund to British individual investors.

“This is the most overbought market I have ever seen in my life in the business,” Fuss, 79, who oversees $66 billion in fixed-income assets as vice chairman of Boston-based Loomis Sayles & Co., said in an interview in London. “What I tell my clients is, ‘It’s not the end of the world, but for heaven’s sakes don’t go out and borrow money to buy bonds right now.’”

The reason this intrigues me is the strong institutional interest in “risk parity” portfolios at the moment. The base idea behind risk parity is that in a typical investment portfolio, equities provide most of the volatility. A risk parity portfolio typically tries to equalize the volatility contribution of different asset classes, which often means reducing the equity allocation—and also often leveraging the bond allocation. (Equating volatility with risk is a whole different discussion.) In other words, risk parity portfolios often borrow money to buy bonds, just the thing Dan Fuss is urging his clients to avoid right now.

To me, the marker of a bubble is irrational behavior. By that standard, bonds are in a bubble. Consider that at the end of last week the 10-year Treasury could be purchased with a yield of about 2.00%. Yet, the 10-year breakeven yield was about 2.57%, indicating that a buyer of 10-year Treasurys expected a negative real return.

Is it rational to buy something with the expectation of a negative return? Think about it this way: Imagine telling a prospective client, “If you buy this stock portfolio, we expect that you’ll lose about a half percent a year for the next decade.” Think you would have any buyers? Would people bid at auction to get a piece of the action?

Expectations, of course, could be wrong. Maybe bonds will continue to do well for an extended period of time, or maybe buying with the expectation of a slight negative return will turn out to be a genius move because every other asset class does much worse.

The problem with bubbles is not really that they exist. Bubbles are great for investors and for the economy on the way up. Bubbles often have an evolutionary financial purpose as well—probably the foundation for many later businesses was laid during the internet bubble. Much of the first internet generation might have died off, but their offspring populate Silicon Valley now. We’ll always have bubbles, human nature being what it is.

The more specific problem with bubbles concerns the investors trapped in them as they deflate—and the absolute impossibility of determining when that might happen. It’s way easier to identify a bubble than to guess when it will pop. Trends of all types, including bubbles, can go on for a lot longer than people think.

The most practical way to handle bubbles, I think, is to use some type of trend following tactical approach. You’ll never be out at the top, of course, but you might be able to be along for much of the ride and be able to exit without extensive damage. If you’re a bond market investor today that might be one way to think about your exposure. Committing to bonds as a permanent part of a risk parity strategy, especially with leverage, is a different animal.

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Legendary Investors

December 13, 2012

Certain kinds of investment and certain investors have been accorded legendary status in the investment community. Most of the time, this amounts to worshipping a false idol. Either that or legendary investors are just exceptionally good at public relations. Here are some stories about legendary investors you might find illuminating.

 

Ben Graham, the father of Value Investing (from the Psy-Fi blog)

Following the Wall Street Crash he geared up, borrowing money to invest in the huge range of cheap value stocks that were available in the market. Not being psychic he failed to divine that the recovery in ’30 was the prelude to the even greater drop in ’31.

Faced with ruination for himself and his clients he was lucky enough to be recapitalised by his partner’s father-in-law and restored his and their wealth over the next few years, as the markets stabilised and some sort of normality took hold again.

Yep, Ben Graham blew up and needed a bailout.

 

John Maynard Keynes, the father of Keynesian economics and manager of the King’s College, Cambridge endowment (from the Psy-Fi blog)

For Keynes investing was about figuring out what everyone else would want to buy and buying it ahead of them. Back in the Roaring Twenties he expressed this approach through currency speculation. Prior to the First World War this would have been an exercise in futility as major currencies were all pegged to the immovable Gold Standard: exchange rates didn’t move. However, the disruption to major economies caused by the conflict forced countries off gold and into a world of strangely shifting valuations.

In this new world Keynes saw the opportunity to apply his animal spirits philosophy and rapidly managed to generate a small fortune, by trading heavily on margin, as the German economy collapsed into hyperinflation, France struggled with an accelerating rate of change of governments and financial scandals, Britain failed to recognise its new place in the world order and the USA lapsed into protectionism. And then, as is the way of the investing world, there was a sudden and inexplicable reversal in the trajectory of exchange rates and Keynes found himself and his fellow investors suddenly short of the cash needed to make good their positions.

As Ben Graham found, when you’re in dire need the best thing to have handy is a wealthy friend. In this case it was Keynes’ father who bailed him out.

Yep, Keynes blew up and needed a bailout from Dad.

 

Warren Buffett, the King of Buy-and-Hold (from CXO Advisory)

In their July 2010 paper entitled “Overconfidence, Under-Reaction, and Warren Buffett’s Investments”, John Hughes, Jing Liu and Mingshan Zhang investigate how other experts/large traders contribute to market underreaction to Berkshire Hathaway’s moves. Using return, analyst recommendation, insider trading and institutional holdings data for publicly traded stocks listed in Berkshire Hathaway’s quarterly SEC Form 13F filings during 1980-2006 (2,140 quarter-stock observations), they find that:

The median holding period is one year, with approximately 20% (30%) of stocks held for more than two years (less than six months).

Yep, Warren Buffett has 100% turnover. He blew out 30% of his portfolio selections within six months, and held about 20% of his picks for the longer run. That is active trading by any definition.

 

All three of these investors were quite successful over time, but the reality varies from the perception. What can we learn from the actual trading of these legendary investors?

  • Using a lot of leverage probably isn’t a good idea. If you do use leverage, then make sure you have a big pile of cash set aside for when the margin call arrives. Because it will arrive.
  • A variety of investment methods probably work over time, but no method works all the time. All methods have the ability to create a painful drawdown. In other words, there is no magic method and no free lunch.
  • It makes sense to keep a portfolio fresh. In Buffett’s portfolio, about 20% of the holdings make the grade and turn into longer term investments. Things that are not working out should probably be sold. (In passing, I note that relative strength rankings make this upgrading process rather simple.) In Buffett’s portfolio, the bulk of the return obviously comes from the relative strength monsters—those stocks that have performed well for a very long period of time. Those are the stocks he holds on to. That merits some attention as a best practice.

As in most arenas in life, it is usually more productive to pay attention to what people do, not what they say!

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