Investors Say Cash Is King For Long-Term Goals

July 31, 2013

Still think that investors don’t need a financial advisor?

Ask the average person for the best investment for a long-term goal, and you’ll get an answer that will stupefy a financial planner: cash.

Cash was king for long-term investment goals, according to a survey by Bankrate.com — despite the fact that the average money market mutual fund yields 0.01%, and the average five-year bank CD yields 0.78%.

More than a quarter — 26% — of those asked said they favor cash as the best long-term investment, the Bankrate.com survey said. Other favorites, in descending order:

• Real estate, 23%

• Gold, 16%

• Bonds, 8%

Just 14% chose stocks, a sign of how deeply scarred the 2007-2009 bear market left investors. “It highlights how risk-averse investors continue to be five years after the financial crisis,” says Greg McBride, senior financial analyst for Bankrate.com.

The Bankrate survey covered 1,005 adults in the U.S., and has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.6 percentage points. The survey was conducted July 3-7.

HT: USA Today

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Correlation and Expected Returns

July 31, 2013

Modern portfolio theory imagines that you can construct an optimal portfolio, especially if you can find investments that are uncorrelated. There’s a problem from the correlation standpoint, though. As James Picerno of The Capital Spectator points out, correlations are rising:

A new study from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) raises doubts about the value of commodities as a tool for enhancing portfolio diversification. The paper’s smoking gun, so to speak, is that “the correlation between commodity and equity returns has substantially increased after the onset of the recent financial crisis.”

Correlations are a key factor in the design and management of asset allocation, but they’re not the only factor. And even if we can find assets and strategies with reliably low/negative correlations with, say, equities, that alone isn’t enough, as I discussed last week. You also need to consider other factors, starting with expected return. It may be tempting to focus on one pair of assets and consider how the trailing correlation stacks up today. But that’s hardly the last word on making intelligent decisions on how to build a diversified portfolio.

As more investors pile into commodities, REITs, hedge funds, and other formerly obscure corners, the historical diversification benefits will likely fade. Granted, the outlook for expected diversification benefits fluctuates through time, and so what looks unattractive today may look considerably more compelling tomorrow (and vice versa). But as a general proposition, it’s reasonable to assume that correlations generally will inch closer to 1.0. That doesn’t mean that diversifying across asset classes is destined to become worthless, but the expected payoff is likely to dim with the passage of time.

Mathematically, any two items that are not 100% correlated will reduce volatility when combined. But that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a good addition to your portfolio—or that modern portfolio theory is a very good way to construct a portfolio. (We will set aside for now the MPT idea that volatility is necessarily a bad thing.) The article includes a nice graphic, reproduced below, that shows how highly correlated many asset classes are with the US market, especially if you keep in mind that these are 36-month rolling correlations. Many asset classes may not reduce portfolio volatility much at all.

correlations36month zpsef265698 Correlation and Expected Returns

Source: The Capital Spectator (click on image to enlarge)

As Mr. Picerno points out, optimal allocations are far more sensitive to returns than to correlations or volatility. So even if you find a wonderfully uncorrelated investment, if it has a lousy return it may not help the overall portfolio much. It would reduce volatility, but quite possibly at a big cost to overall returns. The biggest determinant of your returns, of course, is what assets you actually hold and when. The author puts this a slightly different way:

Your investment results also rely heavily on how and when you rebalance the mix.

Indeed they do. If you hold equities when they are doing well and switch to other assets when equities tail off, your returns will be quite different than an investor holding a static mix. And your returns will be way different than a scared investor that holds cash when stocks or other assets are doing well.

In other words, the return of your asset mix is what impacts your performance, not correlations or volatility. This seems obvious, but in the fog of equations about optimal portfolio construction, this simple fact is often overlooked. Since momentum (relative strength) is generally one of the best-performing and most reliable return factors, that’s what we use to drive our global tactical allocation process. The idea is to own asset classes as long as they are strong—and to replace them with a stronger asset class when they begin to weaken. In this context, diversification can be useful for reducing volatility, if you are comfortable with the potential reduction in return that it might entail. (We generally advocate diversifying by volatility, by asset class, and by strategy, although the specific portfolio mix might change with the preference of the individual investor.) If volatility is well-tolerated, maybe the only issue is trying to generate the strongest returns.

Portfolio construction can’t really be reduced to some “optimal” set of tradeoffs. It’s complicated because correlations change over time, and because investor preferences between return and volatility are in constant flux. There is nothing stable about the portfolio construction process because none of the variables can be definitively known; it’s always an educated approximation. Every investor gets to decide—on an ongoing basis—what is truly important: returns (real money you can spend) or volatility (potential emotional turmoil). I always figure I can afford Maalox with the extra returns, but you can easily see why portfolio management is overwhelming to so many individual investors. It can be torture.

Portfolio reality, with all of its messy approximations, bears little resemblance to the seeming exactitude of Modern Portfolio Theory.

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High RS Diffusion Index

July 31, 2013

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 7/30/13.

diffusion 07.31.13 High RS Diffusion Index

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 89% and the one-day reading is 88%.

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Factor Performance and Factor Failure

July 30, 2013

Advisor Perspectives recently carried an article by Michael Nairne of Tacita Capital about factor investing. The article discussed a number of aspects of factor investing, including factor performance and periods of factor underperformance (factor failure). The remarkable thing about relative strength (termed momentum in his article) is the nice combination of strong performance and relatively short periods of underperformance that it affords the investor seeking alpha.

Mr. Nairne discusses a variety of factors that have been shown to generate excess returns over time. He includes a chart showing their performance versus the broad market.

factorperformance zps037b7505 Factor Performance and Factor Failure

Source: Advisor Perspectives/Tacita Capital (click on image to enlarge)

Yep, the one at the top is momentum.

All factors, even very successful ones, underperform from time to time. In fact, the author points out that these periods of underperformance might even contribute to their factor returns.

No one can guarantee that the return premia originating from these dimensions of the market will persist in the future. But, the enduring nature of the underlying causes – cognitive biases hardwired into the human psyche, the impact of social influences and incremental risk – suggests that higher expected returns should be available from these factor-based strategies.

There is another reason to believe that these strategies offer the prospect of future return premia for patient, long-term investors. These premia are very volatile and can disappear or go negative for many years. The chart on the following page highlights the percentage of 36-month rolling periods where the factor-based portfolios – high quality, momentum, small cap, small cap value and value – underperformed the broad market.

To many investors, three years of under-performance is almost an eternity. Yet, these factor portfolios underperformed the broad market anywhere from almost 15% to over 50% of the 36-month periods from 1982 to 2012. If one were to include the higher transaction costs of the factor-based portfolios due to their higher turnover, the incidence of underperformance would be more frequent. One of the reasons that these premia will likely persist is that many investors are simply not patient enough to stay invested to earn them.

The bold is mine, but I think Mr. Nairne has a good point. Many investors seem to believe in magic and want their portfolio to significantly outperform—all the time.

That’s just not going to happen with any factor. Not surprisingly, though, momentum has tended to have shorter stretches of underperformance than many other factors, a consideration that might have been partially responsible for its good performance over time. Mr. Nairne’s excellent graphic on periods of factor failure is reproduced below.

factorfailure zps55a7cd1c Factor Performance and Factor Failure

Source: Advisor Perspectives/Tacita Capital (click on image to enlarge)

Once again, whether you choose to try to harvest returns from relative strength or from one of the other factors, patience is an underrated component of actually receiving those returns. The market can be a discouraging place, but in order to reap good factor performance you have to stay with it during the inevitable periods of factor failure.

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Relative Strength Spread

July 30, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 7/29/2013:

RS Spread 07.30.13 Relative Strength Spread

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Weekly RS Recap

July 29, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and quartile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (7/22/13 – 7/26/13) is as follows:

ranks 07.29.13 Weekly RS Recap

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Client Sentiment Survey - 7/26/13

July 26, 2013

Here we have the next round of the Dorsey, Wright Sentiment Survey, the first third-party sentiment poll. Participate to learn more about our Dorsey, Wright Polo Shirt raffle! Just follow the instructions after taking the poll, and we’ll enter you in the contest. Thanks to all our participants from last round.

As you know, when individuals self-report, they are always taller and more beautiful than when outside observers report their perceptions! Instead of asking individual investors to self-report whether they are bullish or bearish, we’d like financial advisors to weigh in and report on the actual behavior of clients. It’s two simple questions and will take no more than 20 seconds of your time. We’ll construct indicators from the data and report the results regularly on our blog–but we need your help to get a large statistical sample!

Click here to take Dorsey, Wright’s Client Sentiment Survey.

Contribute to the greater good! It’s painless, we promise.

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Sector and Capitalization Performance

July 26, 2013

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Performance updated through 7/25/2013.

s c 07.26.13 Sector and Capitalization Performance

Numbers shown are price returns only and are not inclusive of transaction costs. Source: iShares

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Fund Flows

July 25, 2013

Mutual fund flow estimates are derived from data collected by The Investment Company Institute covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

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DWAS (PowerShares DWA SmallCap TL Index) Passes One-Year Mark

July 24, 2013

And what a year it was:

CHICAGO, IL-(Marketwired - Jul 24, 2013) - Invesco PowerShares Capital Management LLC, a leading global provider of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), today celebrates the one-year anniversary of the PowerShares DWA SmallCap Technical Leaders™ Portfolio (DWAS). Listed July 19, 2012, the PowerShares DWA SmallCap Technical Leaders Portfolio is part of the broad suite of DWA Technical Leaders™ ETFs covering US, developed and emerging market segments.

Since inception, the PowerShares DWA SmallCap Technical Leaders Portfolio (DWAS) has outperformed the Russell 2000 Index market-cap weighted benchmark by a margin of 9.44%. For the one-year period ending July 19, 2013, DWAS achieved a total return of 41.84% based on NAV, outperforming the Russell 2000 Index which had a total return of 32.40% during the same period. (Note:total return figures include all dividends).1

“The PowerShares DWA SmallCap Technical Leaders Portfolio (DWAS) is the small-cap complement to the PowerShares DWA Technical Leaders Portfolio (PDP),” said Andrew Schlossberg, head of global ETFs. “Together with the PowerShares DWA Emerging Markets Technical Leaders Portfolio (PIE), and PowerShares DWA Developed Markets Technical Leaders Portfolio (PIZ) investors can efficiently tap the alpha-seeking potential of momentum factor-based ETFs globally.2As the leading provider in smart beta ETFs,3 we see a lot of potential for focused factor-based strategies to help investors achieve their goals, whether it’s seeking to enhance returns, reduce risk, or both.”

“We are proud to partner with Invesco PowerShares on momentum factor-based ETFs, and look forward to a long lasting relationship as we expand our global presence,” said Tom Dorsey, president and CEO of Dorsey, Wright & Associates, LLC.

See www.powershares.com for more information. The Dorsey Wright SmallCap Technical Leaders Index is calculated by Dow Jones, the marketing name and a licensed trademark of CME Group Index Services LLC (“CME Indexes”). “Dow Jones Indexes” is a service mark of Dow Jones Trademark Holdings LLC (“Dow Jones”). Products based on the Dorsey Wright SmallCap Technical Leaders IndexSM, are not sponsored, endorsed, sold or promoted by CME Indexes, Dow Jones and their respective affiliates make no representation regarding the advisability of investing in such product(s). Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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Relative Strength Spread

July 23, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 7/22/2013:

Capture5 Relative Strength Spread

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212 Years of Price Momentum

July 23, 2013

Christopher Geczy, University of Pennsylvania, and Mikhail Samonov, Octoquant.com, recently published the world’s longest backtest on momentum (1801 - 2012). This is a truly fascinating white paper. So much of the testing on momentum has been done on the CRSP database of U.S. Securities which goes back to 1926. Now, we can get a much longer-term perspective on the performance of momentum investing.

Abstract:

We assemble a dataset of U.S. security prices between 1801 and 1926, and create an out-of-sample test of the price momentum strategy, discovered in the post-1927 data. The pre-1927 momentum profits remain positive and statistically significant. Additional time series data strengthens the evidence that momentum is dynamically exposed to market beta, conditional on the sign and duration of the tailing market state. In the beginning of each market state, momentum’s beta is opposite from the new market direction, generating a negative contribution to momentum profits around market turning points. A dynamically hedged momentum strategy significantly outperforms the un-hedged strategy.

Yep, momentum worked then too! As pointed out in the white paper, those looking for a return factor that outperforms every single year will not find it with price momentum (or any other factor), but momentum has a long track record of generating excess returns.

So much for the theory that ideas in investing tend to streak, get overinvested, then die. Some, like momentum (or value), go in an out of favor, but they have generated very robust returns over long periods of time.

HT: Abnormal Returns and Turnkey Analyst

Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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How to Pick a Winner

July 23, 2013

Scientific American takes a look at the best way to select a winner:

Given the prevalence of betting and the money at stake, it is worth considering how we pick sides. What is the best method for predicting a winner? One might expect that, for the average person, an accurate forecast depends on the careful analysis of specific, detailed information. For example, focusing on the nitty-gritty knowledge about competing teams (e.g., batting averages, recent player injuries, coaching staff) should allow one to predict the winner of a game more effectively than relying on global impressions (e.g., overall performance of the teams in recent years). But it doesn’t.

In fact, recent research by Song-Oh Yoon and colleagues at the Korea University Business School suggests that when you zero in on the details of a team or event (e.g., RBIs, unforced errors, home runs), you may weigh one of those details too heavily. For example, you might consider the number of games won by a team in a recent streak, and lose sight of the total games won this season. As a result, your judgment of the likely winner of the game is skewed, and you are less accurate in predicting the outcome of the game than someone who takes a big picture approach. In other words, it is easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees.

So often people that consider employing relative strength strategies, which measure overall relative price performance of securities rather than delving into the weeds with various accounting level details, feel like they must not be doing an adequate job of analyzing the merits of a given security. As pointed out in this research, the best results came from focusing on less data, not more.

Whether trying to select a winner in sports or in the stock market, it is important to remember that “detailed analysis fog the future.”

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Alternative Beta

July 22, 2013

…has been discovered by the Wall Street Journal. Recently, they wrote an article about better ways to index—alternative beta—and referenced a study by Cass Business School. (We wrote about this study here in April.)

Here’s the WSJ’s take on the Cass Business School study:

The Cass Business School researchers examined how 13 alternative index methodologies would have performed for the 1,000 largest U.S. stocks from 1968 to 2011.

All 13 of the alternative indexes produced higher returns than a theoretical market-cap index the researchers created. While the market-cap index generated a 9.4% annualized return over the full period, the other indexes delivered between 9.8% and 11.4%. The market-cap-weighted index was the weakest performer in every decade except the 1990s.

The most interesting part of the article, to me, was the discussion of the growing acceptance of alternative beta. This is truly exciting.

Indeed, a bevy of funds tracking alternative indexes have been launched in recent years. And their popularity is soaring: 43% of inflows into U.S.-listed equity exchange-traded products in the first five months of 2013 went to products that aren’t weighted by market capitalization, up from 20% for all of last year, according to asset manager BlackRock Inc.

And then there was one mystifying thing: although one of the best-performing alternative beta measures is relative strength (“momentum” to academics), relative strength was not mentioned in the WSJ article at all!

Instead there was significant championing of fundamental indexes. Fundamental indexes are obviously a valid form of alternative beta, but I am always amazed how relative strength flies under the radar. (See The #1 Investment Return Factor No One Wants to Talk About.) Indeed, as you can see from the graphic below, the returns of two representative ETFs, PRF and PDP are virtually indistinguishable. One can only hope that relative strength will eventually gets its due.

PDPvPRF zps323d99f1 Alternative Beta

The performance numbers above are pure price returns, based on the applicable index not inclusive of dividends, fees, commissions, or other expenses. Past performance not indicative of future results. Potential for profits accompanied by possibility of loss. See www.powershares.com for more information.

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Relative Strength Dividend Investing

July 22, 2013

Dividend investing is all the rage these days. It can be a valuable investment strategy if it is done well—and a very negative experience if it is done poorly. The editor of Morningstar’s DividendInvestor, Josh Peters, recently penned a great column after his model portfolio collected its 1000th dividend payment. The article involves the lessons he learned in his foray into dividend investing. It is a must-read for all dividend investors.

One interesting thing, to me, was that many of the dividend investing problems that he experienced could have been avoided with a relative strength screen. (We use just such a screeen for the First Trust dividend UITs we specify the portfolios for.) Allow me to explain what I mean.

Morningstar’s first lesson was that quality was important in dividend investing. Mr. Peters writes:

The dividend cutters occupy a land of agony: We lost money on 13 of the 16 portfolio holdings that cut their dividends, and the 3 that have been profitable-General Electric (GE), U.S. Bancorp (USB), and Wells Fargo (WFC)-only pulled into the black long after their dividends began to recover.

One of the first things we noticed when screening the dividend investing universe by relative strength was this: companies that cut their dividends overwhelmingly had negative relative strength. In fact, when I looked through the list of S&P Dividend Aristocrats that cut their dividends in the middle of the Great Recession, I discovered that all but two of them had negative relative strength before the dividend cut. Some had had poor relative strength for many years. Pitney Bowes (PBI) is just the most recent example. You can see from Morningstar’s chart below that most of their losses came from dividend cutters.

dividendactions zpsc07ff596 Relative Strength Dividend Investing

Source: Morningstar (click on image to enlarge)

In other words, screening for good relative strength is a pretty good insurance policy to avoid the land of agony.

Morningstar’s second lesson was that many of the best dividend stocks were not fundamentally cheap.

I’ve always believed dividends were the most important aspect of our investment strategy, but I’ve always been something of a cheapskate, too. I don’t like paying full price for anything if I can help it. In the first year or two of DividendInvestor’s run, I brought this impulse to my stock-picking, but I was often disappointed. In the banking industry, for example, I originally passed on top performers like M&T (MTB) and gravitated toward statistically cheaper names like National City and First Horizon (FHN).

Guess what top performers have in common? You guessed it—good relative strength. A relative strength screen is also a useful way to avoid slugs that are cheap and never perform well.

The third lesson is just that time is important. If you are doing dividend investing, a lot of the benefit can come from compounding over time, or perhaps from reinvesting all of the yield.

If you choose to use the Dorsey Wright-managed First Trust UITs, we always recommend that you buy a series of four UITs and just keep rolling them over time. That way you always have a current portfolio of strong performers, screened to try to avoid some of the dividend cutters. If the portfolio appreciates over the holding period—beyond just paying out the dividend yield—it might make sense when you roll it over to use the capital gains to buy additional units, in an effort to have the payout level increase over time.

Even if you never use our products, you might want to consider some basic relative strength screening of your dividend stock purchases.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. Potential for profits is accompanied by possibility of loss. See http://www.ftportfolios.com for more information.

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Weekly RS Recap

July 22, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (7/15/13 – 7/19/13) is as follows:

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Fund Flows

July 18, 2013

Mutual fund flow estimates are derived from data collected by The Investment Company Institute covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

Capture3 Fund Flows

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Factor Investing

July 18, 2013

Factor investing is one of the new frontiers in portfolio construction. We love this trend because relative strength (known as momentum to academics) is one of the premier factors typically used when constructing portfolios. The Technical Leaders ETFs that we construct for Powershares have really benefited from the movement toward factor investing.

Larry Swedroe recently wrote a glowing article on factor investing for Index Universe that serves as a good introduction. His article is full of great points distilled from a paper in the Journal of Index Investing. (The link to the journal paper is included in his article if you want to read the original source.)

The basic idea is that you can generate superior performance by building a portfolio of return factors. A corollary benefit is that because some of the factors are negatively correlated, you can often reduce the portfolio volatility as well. A couple of excerpts from his article should give you the flavor:

The evidence keeps piling up that investors can benefit from building portfolios that diversify across factors that not only explain stock market returns but that also generate superior returns.

The authors found that investors benefited not only from the exposure to each of the factors individually, but also from the low or negative correlations across these factors. The result was more efficient portfolios than ones that were concentrated in a market portfolio or in single factors.

They concluded: “The fact that momentum and value independently deliver market outperformance, with negatively correlated active returns and a low probability of simultaneous market underperformance, provides the motivation for pursuing a momentum and value diversification strategy.”

We concur with the research that shows momentum and value make a great pairing in a portfolio. The table included in the article showed that these two factors were negatively correlated over the period of the study, 1979-2011.

What brought a smile is that Mr. Swedroe is a well-known and passionate advocate for “passive” investing. Factor investing is about as far from passive investing as you can get.

Think about how a value index or relative strength index is constructed—you have to build it actively, picking and choosing to get the focused factor exposure you want. What is a value stock at the beginning of one period may not be a value stock after an extended run-up in price, so activity is also required to reconstitute and rebalance the index on a regular basis. Stocks that lose their high relative strength ranking similarly need to be actively replaced at every rebalance. Whether the picking and choosing is done in a systematic, rules-based fashion or some other way is immaterial.

Market capitalization-weighted indexes, as a broad generality, might be able to “kinda sorta” claim the passive investing label because they don’t generally have to be constantly rebalanced—although the index component changes are active. A factor index, on the other hand, might require a lot of activity to reconstitute and rebalance it on a regular schedule. But that’s the point—the end result of the activity is focused factor exposure designed to generate superior performance and volatility characteristics.

And spare me the argument that indexing is passive investing. Take a look at the historical level of turnover in indexes like the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400, the S&P Smallcap 600, or the Russell 2000 and then try to make the argument that nothing active is going on. I don’t think you can do it. The only real difference is that you have hired the S&P index committee to manage your portfolio instead of some registered investment advisor. (In fact, the index committees typically incorporate some element of relative strength in their decisions as they dump out poor performers and add up-and-coming stocks. Look at the list of additions and deletions if you don’t believe me.) Certainly the level of turnover in a value or momentum index belies the passive label as well.

Index investing is active investing.

I think where passive investing advocates get confused is on the question of cost. Index investing is often low-cost investing—and cost is an important consideration for investors. I suspect that many fans of passive investing are more properly described as fans of low-cost investing. I’m not sure they are really even fans of indexing, since research shows that many so-called actively managed funds are really closet index funds. Presumably their objection is the big fee charged for indexing while masquerading as an active fund, not the indexing itself. (But the same research suggests that an active fund that is truly active—one with high active share—is not necessarily a bad deal.)

Even a factor index is active by definition, but if it is well-constructed and low cost to boot, it might worth taking a close look at.

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High RS Diffusion Index

July 17, 2013

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 7/16/13.

Capture2 High RS Diffusion Index

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 82% and the one-day reading is 89%.

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The World According to Investors

July 17, 2013

A funny and clever graphic from Josh Brown’s blog, The Reformed Broker. Good for a laugh or two.

world investors JoshBrown zps7e2a11d5 The World According to Investors

Source: The Reformed Broker (click to enlarge to full size)

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Relative Strength Spread

July 16, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 7/15/2013:

Capture1 Relative Strength Spread

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The Yield Curve Speaks

July 16, 2013

The yield curve is a measurement of the relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates. When long-term rates are high relative to short-term rates, the economy is typically strong. The opposite case is not so rosy—when short-term rates are higher than long-term rates, a recession is often in the offing.

Mark Hulbert of Marketwatch makes this point about the yield curve in a recent column. He writes:

You’re wrong if you think that interest rate increases over the last month are bad for the stock market.

That’s because not all rate hikes are created equal. And the kind that we’ve seen over the last month is not the type that typically kills a bull market.

In fact, a strong argument can be made that the last month’s rate increases are actually good news for the stock market: Because the greatest increases have come at the longer end of the maturity spectrum, the yield curve in recent weeks has become steeper — just the opposite of the direction it would be heading if the odds of a recession were growing.

Later in the article, Mr. Hulbert quantifies the chances of a recession based on the yield curve indicator.

It’s a shame that because of concern that the yield curve might be manipulated, many in recent years have tended to dismiss its utility as a leading economic indicator. Its record, in fact, has been creditable — if not impressive.

Consider one famous econometric model based on the slope of the yield curve that was introduced more than a decade ago by Arturo Estrella, currently an economics professor at Rensselaer Polytechnic and, from 1996 through 2008, senior VP of the New York Federal Reserve Bank’s Research and Statistics Group, and Frederic
Mishkin, a Columbia University professor who was a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors from 2006 to 2008. The model last spiked upward in late 2007 and 2008, when it gauged the odds of a recession at more than 40% — just before the Great Recession. Click here to go to the page of the NY Fed’s website devoted to this model.

Today, in contrast, the model is reporting the odds of a recession in the next 12 months at a minuscule 2.5%.

Now, I have no way of knowing or even guessing if the yield curve will be accurate this time around, but it’s worth noting in the sea of bearishness surrounding the recent increase in long-term interest rates. When pundits are nearly unanimous, it’s always worth considering if the opposite might in fact be the case.

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Weekly RS Recap

July 15, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (7/8/13 – 7/12/13) is as follows:

7 15 2013 1 47 28 PM Weekly RS Recap

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Market Breadth

July 15, 2013

Measurements of market breadth are a staple for technical analysts. Market breadth refers to measures of participation. Common market breadth indicators would include things like advance-decline lines or the NYSE Bullish Percent.

This has got to be one of the more hated rallies I can remember, possibly because so few people have been on board for it. But some measures of market breadth are confirming the move to new all-time highs.

Josh Brown of The Reformed Broker highlighted a chart of market breadth recently, as you can see below.

breadth1 JoshBrown zps67456d54 Market Breadth

Source: The Reformed Broker, Bloomberg (click on image to enlarge)

This breadth breakout appeared on July 9 and the S&P 500 powered higher from there.

The typical take on market breadth from market technicians is that negative divergences in breadth will normally appear prior to a drop in the market. That’s not what’s happening now—in fact, just the opposite is the case. Market breadth expanded this time prior to the stock market moving to an all-time high.

Bulls and bears can both be articulate. It’s easy to listen to a well-spoken commentator who presents just one side of the story and have it feel very convincing. It’s useful to look at market-generated data as a check; sometimes the data has a very different picture of the issue.

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Sector and Capitalization Performance

July 12, 2013

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Performance updated through 7/11/2013.

Capture Sector and Capitalization Performance

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