DWTFX Leading the Pack in 2013

September 20, 2013

Our partners at Arrow Funds have been making the case for some time now that we are generally in a favorable environment for tactical asset allocation (See Relative Strength Environments and Relative Strength Turns). Stable asset class leadership and widening dispersion in performance between the different asset classes have helped the Arrow DWA Tactical Fund rise to the front of the pack in 2013.

dwtfx DWTFX Leading the Pack in 2013

Source: Dorsey Wright, YTD through 9/19/13

morn dwtfx DWTFX Leading the Pack in 2013

Source: Morningstar

Although this fund has wide flexibility to invest in a number of different asset classes, including domestic equities, inverse equities, international equities, currencies, commodities, real estate, and fixed income, this year the allocation has been dominated by equities.

 

dwtfx hdgs DWTFX Leading the Pack in 2013

 

Source: Arrow Funds

Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. See www.arrowfunds.com for more information.

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Sector Performance

September 20, 2013

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Performance updated through 9/19/2013.

gics 09.20.13 Sector Performance

Numbers shown are price returns only and are not inclusive of transaction costs. Source: iShares

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Fund Flows

September 19, 2013

Mutual fund flow estimates are derived from data collected by The Investment Company Institute covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

ici 09.19.13 Fund Flows

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Tail Risk

September 18, 2013

Tail risk, or sometimes hedging tail risk, has been a hot topic lately. Tail risk is essentially the song of the black swan—it’s what happens when a negative event with a 1% probability happens. Ever since 2008, concern of being caught in another large market decline has caused investors to be very aware of tail risk. Tail risk has also engendered some very interesting exercises in portfolio construction, with all manner of alternative assets.

Consider, however, this from Javier Estrada’s recent paper, Rethinking Risk:

The evidence discussed here, based on a comprehensive sample of 19 countries over 110 years, suggests that investors that focus on uncertainty are likely to view stocks as riskier than bonds, and those that focus on long‐term terminal wealth are likely to view stocks as less risky than bonds even if they are concerned with tail risks. This is the case because, even when tail risks do materialize, investors are more likely to have a higher terminal wealth (that is, more capital at the end of the holding period) by investing in stocks than by investing in bonds.

In other words, a lot of your definition of risk depends on whether you view risk as uncertainty (volatility, standard deviation) or you are focused on terminal wealth—how much money you have at the end of the day.

Here’s another important excerpt:

Obviously, it is for nobody but the investor himself to say what lets him sleep at night. That being said, Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s longtime partner at Berkshire, has some advice for investors in the setting described. In fact, Munger (1994) argues that if “you’re investing for 40 years in some pension fund, what difference does it make if the path from start to finish is a little more bumpy or a little different than everybody else’s so long as it’s all going to work out well in the end? So what if there’s a little extra volatility.”

To be sure, there may be long‐term investors that simply cannot help being concerned with, and react to, the short‐term fluctuations in the value of their portfolios. And if that is the case, short‐term volatility is how they assess risk and little of what is discussed in this article may be relevant to them. That being said, would it not make sense to at least also worry about whether a conservative strategy will, by the end of the holding period, enhance purchasing power or underperform an aggressive strategy by a wide margin?

Granted, an investor may be fully aware that a conservative strategy is likely to underperform an aggressive one and still be happy with choosing the former if he is concerned with tails risks, such as a big loss close to the end of the holding period, or a holding period of very low stock returns, however unlikely they may be. And yet, should not this investor also consider whether he will be better off (that is, end with a higher terminal wealth) by pursuing an aggressive strategy even in the case that tail risks do materialize?

That last part is critical. It is clear that the longer is the holding period the more likely is a riskier strategy to outperform a less risky one; that is, in fact, what theory suggests and what the evidence shows. And yet some investors may stay away from an aggressive strategy simply out of fear of tail risks without grasping that, even if these risks do materialize, their terminal wealth is likely to be higher than with a conservative strategy.

Pretty interesting stuff. The author notes that there are times and conditions when concern with volatility could dominate, but if you are talking about a long investment period, the data shows that being overly conservative can impact terminal wealth more negatively than tail risk. (I added the bold.)

This is just another way to point out that the costs you can measure (volatility, drawdown) are often swamped by the cost you cannot measure directly—opportunity cost.

Despite being embedded into Modern Portfolio Theory, volatility might not be the only kind of risk that matters. (In fact, I’ve pointed out that one handy use of volatility is to add on dips. Volatility can be harnessed productively in certain situations.) I am not suggesting that risk management be tossed aside, but if your primary concern is terminal wealth, you need to think about portfolio construction in a nuanced way.

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Relative Strength Spread

September 17, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 9/16/2013:

RS Spread 09.17.13 Relative Strength Spread

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Weekly RS Recap

September 16, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (9/9/13 – 9/13/13) is as follows:

ranks 09.16.13 Weekly RS Recap

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Hope for the Great Rotation?

September 13, 2013

Numerous market observers over the past few years have wondered about the timing of ”the great rotation,” wherein investors would begin to rotate some of their massive bond holdings into the equity market. When would the great rotation happen, or would it happen at all?

There has been a big return differential in stocks and bonds—much in favor of stocks—since the market bottom in 2009, but that did not convince investors to leave the bond market. Stocks were doing great, but bonds were still going up.

stockbonddifferential zpsd9687824 Hope for the Great Rotation?

Stock-Bond Return Differential since 2009 Bottom

(click on image to enlarge)

It’s only been quite recently that bond total returns have actually been negative. Maybe that will be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

stockbonddifferential2 zpsde0e1aa4 Hope for the Great Rotation?

Stock-Bond Return Differential: Short-term View

(click on image to enlarge)

Dr. Ed Yardeni, an economist both respected and practical (which makes him very rare indeed!), suggests that we may possibly be seeing the beginnings of the great rotation. He writes:

Over the past 13 weeks through the week of August 28, the Investment Company Institute estimates that bond funds had net cash outflows totaling $438 billion at an annual rate. Over the same period, equity funds had net cash inflows of $92 billion at an annual rate. I wouldn’t describe that as a “Great Rotation” just yet, but it could be the start of a big swing by retail investors into equities.

He accompanied his note with a couple of graphics that are interesting.

bondflow zps45dcaf66 Hope for the Great Rotation?

Source: Dr. Ed’s Blog (click on image to enlarge)

equityflow zpsf9bce516 Hope for the Great Rotation?

Source: Dr. Ed’s Blog (click on image to enlarge)

Things could certainly go the other way—all we really have right now are green shoots—but the implications of a great rotation could be significant.

One big reason for that is the difference in relative size of the stock and bond markets. I looked at current SIFMA data on bonds outstanding and found it was about $38.6 trillion. Total market capitalization for the Wilshire 5000, a super-broad stock index, is about $19.9 trillion right now. Stocks are only about 34% of the capital markets. The total US bond market is almost twice as large! Even money that migrates from the margin of the bond market has the potential to move the stock market quite a bit. (Global capital markets are even more lopsided, with the bond market estimated to be about 3 times larger than the equity market.)

I don’t know if we will see the great rotation going forward, but if the markets get even a whiff that we will, it could be pretty fun.

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From the Archives: The Imprecision of Value

September 12, 2013

One of the reasons that we like to use relative strength as a return factor is its precision, its lack of assumptions, and its universality–basically its ability to rank even very disparate assets.

Although value managers often discuss assets or stocks that are undervalued, there is little agreement on how value works. Take, for example, a Bloomberg story from today, entitled U.S. Stocks Cheapest Since 1990 on Analyst Estimates. With a title like that, you would expect an article that discusses how cheap stocks are relative to earnings. And, indeed, the article cites such a source:

“The stock market is incredibly inexpensive,” said Kevin Rendino, who manages $11 billion in Plainsboro, New Jersey, for BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager. “I don’t know how the bears can argue against how well corporations are doing.”

Not only are stocks cheap, but analysts seem reluctant to buy in, something that strikes me, from a contrary opinion point of view, as unabashedly positive.

While analysts are raising estimates, they’re not boosting investment ratings. Companies ranked “buy” make up 30 percent of all U.S. equities, the data show. That compares with 45 percent in September 2007, a month before the S&P 500 reached its record high of 1,565.15 and began a 17-month plunge that erased $11 trillion from the value U.S. shares.

But hold on a mintue– here is the part I find most fascinating about the article: no one can agree on the valuation. (I guess the tendency to cover both sides of the story in the same article comes from political opinion coverage, where the media thinks they have to give equal time to both sides, whether rational or not.)

David Rosenberg, chief economist of Gluskin Sheff & Associates Inc., says U.S. stocks are poised for losses because they’ve become too expensive. The S&P 500 is valued at 22.1 times annual earnings from the past 10 years, according to inflation-adjusted data since 1871 tracked by Yale University Professor Robert Shiller.

So while you have reputable analysts arguing that the market is cheap, you have equally reputable analysts arguing that the market is expensive! How does that happen? Well, it happens because everyone in the value camp operates from a (sometimes radically) different set of assumptions. Are you using trailing estimates, forward estimates, or 10-year normalized estimates? And, by the way, they are estimates.

Source: DenverPost.com

Relative strength is nice because it is precise. No one argues about what the trailing 6-month or 12-month return was. It’s cut and dried. Although different firms use slightly different relative strength calculations–Dorsey, Wright Money Management has a proprietary method–it is hard to imagine a scenario where there would be much disagreement about the strength or weakness of the same market.

Which is stronger, U.S. stocks or U.S. long-term bonds? Just looking at a comparative chart of the two assets makes it obvious, even to someone not sophisticated in quantitative analysis (SPY vs. TLT).

Click to enlarge. Source: Yahoo! Finance

On the other hand, determining which asset is a better value is quite indeterminate. It all depends on whether you take as your starting point the view that the U.S. stock market is cheap or expensive!

And what happens when you have to value a multi-asset portfolio? How do you determine whether real estate, international stocks, euros, or emerging market bonds are cheaper? The lack of agreed-upon metrics between markets, let alone within an individual market, make this kind of decision a nightmare from a valuation perspective.

Since prior performance is precise, relative strength measurements can be made easily and without argument. Relative strength can easily be used for multi-asset portfolios as well. And finally, the returns from using the relative strength factor are high–as high as the returns from the value factor, and in many studies, higher. Luckily for us, efficient-market types normally decline to use relative strength because theoretically it shouldn’t work! Their loss is our gain.

—-this article originally appeared 4/26/2010. The broad market is up about 40% since this article was written and the debate about valuations is still raging! That alone should tell you that trying to figure out who is right—and whether to invest or not—is not a productive use of time. Relative strength simply indicates what the strongest markets are at any given time.

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High RS Diffusion Index

September 11, 2013

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 9/10/13.

diffusion 09.11.13 High RS Diffusion Index

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 62% and the one-day reading is 79%.

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Relative Strength Spread

September 10, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 9/9/2013:

RS Spread 09.10.13 Relative Strength Spread

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Buy and Hold

September 9, 2013

John Rekenthaler at Morningstar launched into a spirited defense of buy and hold investing over the weekend. His argument is essentially that since markets have bounced back since 2009, buy and hold is alive and well, and any arguments to the contrary are flawed. Here’s an excerpt:

There never was any logic behind the “buy-and-hold is dead” argument. Might it have lucked into being useful? Not a chance. Coming off the 2008 downturn, the U.S. stock market has roared to perhaps its best four and a half years in history. It has shone in absolute terms, posting a cumulative gain of 125% since spring 2009. It has been fabulous in real terms, with inflation being almost nonexistent during that time period. It’s been terrific in relative terms, crushing bonds, cash, alternatives, and commodities, and by a more modest amount, beating most international-stock markets as well. This is The Golden Age. We have lived The Golden Age, all the while thinking it was lead.

Critics will respond that mine is a bull-market argument. That’s backward. “Buy-and-hold is dead” is the strategy that owes its existence to market results. It only appears after huge bear markets, and it only looks good after such markets. It is the oddity, while buy-and-hold is the norm.

Generally, I think Morningstar is right about a lot of things—and Rekenthaler is even right about some of the points he makes in this article. But in broad brush, buy and hold has a lot of problems, and always has.

Here’s where Rekenthaler is indisputably correct:

  • “Buy and hold is dead” arguments always pop up in bear markets. (By the way, that says nothing about the accuracy of the argument.) It’s just the time that anti buy-and-holders can pitch their arguments when someone might listen. In the same fashion, buy and hold arguments are typically made after a big recovery or in the midst of a bull market—also when people are most likely to listen. Everyone has an axe to grind.
  • Buy and hold has looked good in the past, compared to forecasters. As he points out in the article, it is entirely possible to get the economic forecast correct and get the stock market part completely wrong.
  • The 2008 market crash gave the S&P 500 its largest calendar year loss in 77 years. No doubt.

The truth about buy and hold, I think, is considerably more nuanced. Here are some things to consider.

  • The argument for buy and hold rests on hindsight bias. Historical returns in the US markets have been among the strongest in history over very long time periods. That’s why US investors think buy and hold works. If buy and hold truly works, what about Germany, Argentina, or Japan at various time periods? The Nikkei peaked in 1989. Almost 25 years later, the market is still down significantly. Is the argument, then, that only the US is special? Is Mr. Rekenthaler willing to guarantee that US returns will always be positive over some time frame? I didn’t think so. If not, then buy and hold is not a slam dunk either.
  • Individual investors have time frames. We only live so long. A buy and hold retiree in 1929 or 1974 might be dead before they got their money back. Same for a Japanese retiree in 1989. Plenty of other equity markets around the world, due to wars or political crises, have gone to zero. Zero. That makes buy and hold a difficult proposition—it’s a little tough mathematically to bounce back from zero. (In fact, the US and the UK are the only two markets that haven’t gone to zero at some point in the last 200 years.) And plenty of individual stocks go to zero. Does buy and hold really make sense with stocks?
  • Rejecting buy and hold does not have the logical consequence of missing returns in the market since 2009. For example, a trend follower would be happily long the stock market as it rose to new highs.
  • Individual investors, maddeningly, have very individual tolerances for volatility in their portfolios. Some investors panic too often, some too late, and a very few not at all. How that works out is completely path dependent—in other words, the quality of our decision all depends on what happens subsequently in the market. And no one knows what the market will do going forward. You don’t know the consequences of your decision until some later date.
  • In our lifetimes, Japan. It’s funny how buy and hold proponents either never mention Japan or try to explain it away. “We are not Japan.” Easy to say, but just exactly how is human nature different because there is an ocean in between? Just how is it that we are superior? (Because in 1989, if you go back that far, there was much hand-wringing and discussions of how the Japanese economy was superior!)

Every strategy, including buy and hold, has risks and opportunity costs. Every transaction is a risk, as well as an implicit bet on what will happen in the future. The outcome of that bet is not known until later. Every transaction, you make your bet and you take your chances. You can’t just assume buy and hold is going to work forever, nor can you assume it will stop working. Arguments about any strategy being correct because it worked over x timeframe is just a good example of hindsight bias. Buy and hold doesn’t promise good returns, just market returns. Going forward, you just don’t know—nobody knows. Yes, ambiguity is uncomfortable, but that’s the way it is.

That’s the true state of knowledge in financial markets: no one knows what will happen going forward, whether they pretend to know or not.

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Weekly RS Recap

September 9, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (9/3/13 – 9/6/13) is as follows:

 

ranks 09.09.13 Weekly RS Recap

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August Arrow DWA Funds Review

September 9, 2013

8/31/2013

The Arrow DWA Balanced Fund (DWAFX)

At the end of August, the fund had approximately 46% in U.S. Equities, 26% in Fixed Income, 17% in International Equities, and 11% in Alternatives. For the year, our biggest gains have come from our U.S. equity positions, including Healthcare, Financials, Consumer Cyclicals, and Small and Mid-Cap Value. Although little has changed in terms of asset class relative strength (U.S. and Developed International equities remain strong and Fixed Income and Alternatives remain weak), August was a month where those relative strength leaders generally underperformed the relative strength laggards. Such “breathers” are common and don’t necessarily represent the beginnings of a change in trend. Of course, we monitor these relative strength rankings daily and will make changes when necessary.

We did have a few trades in August. In our International equity sleeve, Hong Kong was removed and the Netherlands were added. Our International equity exposure is now almost entirely to Europe. Although perhaps surprising to many who are just looking at the weak economic growth in Europe and high unemployment, many European equity markets have been performing relatively well. In our Alternative sleeve, we also had a change. Our currency carry trade was removed and was replaced with MLPs. The U.S. dollar remains one of the strongest currencies, while currencies like the Japanese Yen and Australian dollar have been weak. MLPs have been the one bright spot in the Alternative space this year, while others, especially commodities have generally not performed well. Real estate, which we also own, had a good start to the year, but has been weakening as the move higher in interest rates has picked up stream.

DWAFX lost 3.05% in August, but is up 5.63% through 8/31/13.

We believe that a real strength of this strategy is its balance between remaining diversified, while also adapting to market leadership. When an asset class is weak its exposure will tend to be towards the lower end of the exposure constraints, and when an asset class is strong its exposure in the fund will trend toward the upper end of its exposure constraints. Relative strength provides an effective means of determining the appropriate weights of the strategy.

dwafx 08.31.13 August Arrow DWA Funds Review

The Arrow DWA Tactical Fund (DWTFX)

At the end of August, the fund had approximately 90% in U.S. Equities and 9% in International equities. After breaking out to new all-time highs in July, U.S. equities pulled back in August. All of our holdings had modest losses in August, with positions like Consumer Discretionary holding up relatively well while Financials and our dividend-equity focused position having slightly greater losses. When interest rates were low and trending lower, dividend-paying stocks were in high demand, but now as interest rates have made a strong move higher they have lost some of their appeal. For now, this dividend-focused ETF remains in the fund, but if it continues to lose relative strength it will be sold. The overall trend of the U.S. equity markets remains positive, which is encouraging considering some of the concerns that have dominated the headlines in recent weeks, including Syria and anticipation of Fed tapering in coming months. This fund continues to outperform nearly all of its peers YTD, according to Morningstar, as its flexibility has been a significant advantage this year. The fund has been able to avoid much of the pain that has been felt in the fixed income market and in the alternative space.

 

DWTFX was down 3.73% in August, but has gained 10.65% through 8/31/13.

This strategy is a go-anywhere strategy with very few constraints in terms of exposure to different asset classes. The strategy can invest in domestic equities, international equities, inverse equities, currencies, commodities, real estate, and fixed income. Market history clearly shows that asset classes go through secular bull and bear markets and we believe this strategy is ideally designed to capitalize on those trends. Additionally, we believe that this strategy can provide important risk diversification for a client’s overall portfolio.

dwtfx 08.31.13 August Arrow DWA Funds Review

 

See www.arrowfunds.com for more information. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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Emerging Markets - Looking Forward

September 7, 2013

Dennis Hudachek at IndexUniverse makes some good points about Emerging Markets:

There is indeed a tremendous amount of pessimism around emerging markets at the moment.

Yet I think it’s important not to get too carried away and assume all emerging markets—as classified by MSCI and lumped together in popular funds like the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM | B-96) and the Vanguard FTSE Emerging Markets ETF (VWO | B-85)—are destined to crash together.

Clearly some economies are holding up better than others.

It’s quite possible that any potential Fed tapering—assuming this hasn’t been fully priced in already—will be a game-changing event, but it won’t be the end of the game for all emerging markets.

It’s difficult to know the extent to which this sell-off will last, but when the dust settles, I wouldn’t be surprised if the resurgence in emerging markets could look very different from its prior meteoric rise over the past decade.

Looking forward, I think it’s possible that a different group countries, sectors and/or companies can lead the pack in the next leg of growth for these markets, now that the emerging middle class has blossomed.

Many of the smaller emerging markets like Indonesia and Turkey have been among the best performers for most of the last couple of years (until recently) while the larger markets like China and Brazil have lagged. Is a leadership change taking place in emerging markets or will those smaller emerging markets resume their leadership after this correction runs its course? Luckily, those employing the PowerShares DWA Emerging Markets Technical Leaders ETF (PIE) don’t have to guess. Our relative strength work will sort out the winners and the losers and the changes will be reflected in the new index weights (this index is reconstituted on a quarterly basis.)

See www.powershares.com for more information. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns.

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Investment Process versus Investment Performance

September 6, 2013

Marshall Jaffe wrote an excellent article on investment process versus investment performance in the most recent edition of ThinkAdvisor. I think it is notable for a couple of reasons. First, it’s pithy and well-written. But more importantly, he’s very blunt about the problems of focusing only on investment performance for both clients and the industry. And make no mistake—that’s how the investment industry works in real life, even though it is a demonstrably poor way to do things. Consider this excerpt:

We see the disclaimer way too often. “Past performance is no guarantee of future results.” It is massively over-used—plastered on countless investment reports, statements and research. It’s not simply meaningless; it’s as if it’s not even there. And that creates a huge problem, because the message itself is really true: Past performance has no predictive value.

Since we are looking for something that does have predictive value—all the research, experience and hard facts say: Look elsewhere.

This is not a controversial finding. There are no fringe groups of investors or scholars penning op-ed pieces in the Wall Street Journal shooting holes in the logic of this reality. Each year there is more data, and each year that data reconfirms that past performance is completely unreliable as an investment tool. Given all that, you would think it would be next to impossible to find any serious investors still using past performance as a guideline. Indeed, that would be a logical conclusion.

But logical conclusions are often wrong when it comes to understanding human behavior. Not only does past performance remain an important issue in the minds of investors, for the vast majority it is the primary issue. In a study I referred to in my August column, 80% of the hiring decisions of large and sophisticated institutional pension plans were the direct result of outstanding past performance, especially recent performance.

The truth hurts! The bulk of the article discusses why investors focus on performance to their detriment and gives lots of examples of top performers that focus only on process. There is a reason that top performers focus on process—because results are the byproduct of the process, not an end in themselves.

The reason Nick Saban, our best athletes, leading scientists, creative educators, and successful investors focus on process is because it anchors them in reality and helps them make sensible choices—especially in challenging times. Without that anchor any investor observing the investment world today would be intimidated by its complexity, uncomfortable with its volatility and (after the meltdown in 2008) visibly fearful of its fragility. Of course we all want good returns—but those who use a healthy process realize that performance is not a goal; performance is a result.

Near the end of the article, I think Mr. Jaffe strikes right to the core of the investment problem for both individual investors and institutions. He frames the right question. Without the right question, you’re never going to get the right answer!

In an obsessive but fruitless drive for performance too many fund managers compromise the single most important weapon in their arsenal: their investment process.

Now we can see the flaw in the argument that an investor’s basic choice is active or passive. An investor indeed has two choices: whether to be goal oriented or process oriented. In reframing the investment challenge that way, the answer is self-evident and the only decision is whether to favor a mechanical process or a human one.

Reframing the question as “What is your investment process?” sidelines everything else. (I added the bold.) In truth, process is what matters most. Every shred of research points out the primacy of investment process, but it is still hard to get investors to look away from performance, even temporarily.

We focus on relative strength as a return factor—and we use a systematic process to extract whatever return is available—but it really doesn’t matter what return factor you use. Value investors, growth investors, or firms trying to harvest more exotic return factors must still have the same focus on investment process to be successful.

If you are an advisor, you should be able to clearly explain your investment process to a client. If you are an investor, you should be asking your advisor to explain their process to you. If there’s no consistent process, you might want to read Mr. Jaffe’s article again.

HT to Abnormal Returns

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Motley Fool on GILD

August 30, 2013

Motley Fool discusses the fundamentals that are driving Gilead Sciences’ earnings growth. Gilead Sciences is currently the biggest holding in the PowerShares DWA Technical Leaders Portfolio (PDP).

Of course, our investment process led us to Gilead Sciences because of its superior relative strength rather than any insight that we had from a fundamental point of view, but it is interesting to listen to analysts who can help provide some perspective on why it has been such a strong stock.

gild1 Motley Fool on GILD

Source: Dorsey Wright

Past performance is not indicative of future results. Potential for profits accompanied by possibility of loss. A list of all holdings for the trailing 12 months is available upon request. See www.powershares.com for more information.

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Finance Theory vs. Portfolio Reality

August 30, 2013

Index Universe carried an interview with Tad Rivelle, the chief investment officer at Trust Company of the West, that touched on the difference between finance theory and the reality in the markets. Mr. Rivelle is mainly a bond guy and the interview mostly discussed interest rates and so on, but it contained this gem:

IU.com: We’re hearing projections of 3.5 percent rates by next year, 4.5 percent by 2015. What happens if the bond market decides to rush there at once rather than to gradually get to those levels? Could it derail the economic recovery?

Rivelle: Yes. In fact, that’s precisely what we saw when we had that taper tantrum back in May and June. It was catalyzed by Bernanke’s statement to the effect that the Fed was carefully considering an initiation of a taper late this year, and the bond market sold off horrifically in a very short period of time. It was a generalized deleveraging. I think it frightened the Fed, and consequently they walked those comments back.

The conflict here is that the Fed tends to approach things from a model-driven academic perspective—what’s supposed to happen in theory versus the realities of the marketplace. When people are looking to front-run one another to offload risk before the next guy does, these models basically go out the window.

How the bond market will respond is absolutely unknown, but it’s more typical for the bond market to move very rapidly, to gallop to what it believes is the next point of equilibrium and not to sell off gradually. I’ve never seen that happen.

I put the fun part in bold—in a real market, academic models go out the window and human behavior takes over. Mr. Rivelle points out that markets trade on perception, and often make adjustments abruptly when perceptions change.

To me, this is the real strength of tactical asset allocation driven by relative strength. As perceptions change, different securities or asset classes come to the forefront and others fade away. As relative strength investors, we don’t have to predict what these changes might be. We simply have to adapt our portfolio as the changes occur. Relative strength adapts to changes in human behavior, not some elusive equilibrium proposed by academics.

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Sector Performance

August 30, 2013

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Performance updated through 8/29/2013.

s c 08.30.13 Sector Performance

Numbers shown are price returns only and are not inclusive of transaction costs. Source: iShares

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Fund Flows

August 29, 2013

Mutual fund flow estimates are derived from data collected by The Investment Company Institute covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

ici 08.29.13 Fund Flows

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Sector Performance

August 23, 2013

The chart below shows performance of US sectors and capitalizations over the trailing 12, 6, and 1 month(s). Performance updated through 8/22/2013.

gics2 08.23.13 Sector Performance

Numbers shown are price returns only and are not inclusive of transaction costs. Source: iShares

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Fund Flows

August 22, 2013

Mutual fund flow estimates are derived from data collected by The Investment Company Institute covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals.

ici 08.22.13 Fund Flows

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High RS Diffusion Index

August 21, 2013

The chart below measures the percentage of high relative strength stocks that are trading above their 50-day moving average (universe of mid and large cap stocks.) As of 8/20/13.

diffusion 08.21.13 High RS Diffusion Index

The 10-day moving average of this indicator is 83% and the one-day reading is 77%.

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Relative Strength Spread

August 20, 2013

The chart below is the spread between the relative strength leaders and relative strength laggards (universe of mid and large cap stocks). When the chart is rising, relative strength leaders are performing better than relative strength laggards. As of 8/19/2013:

spread 08.20.13 Relative Strength Spread

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Is Active Investing Hopeless?

August 19, 2013

Every time I read an article about how active investing is hopeless, I shake my head. Most of the problem is investor behavior, not active investing. The data on this has been around for a while, but is ignored by indexing fans. Consider for example, this article in Wealth Management that discusses a 2011 study conducted by Morningstar and the Investment Company Institute. What they found doesn’t exactly square out with most of what you read. Here are some excerpts:

But studies by Morningstar and the Investment Company Institute (ICI) suggest that fund shareholders may not be so dumb after all. According to the latest data, investors gravitate to low-cost funds with strong track records. “People make reasonably intelligent choices when they pick active funds,” says John Rekenthaler, Morningstar’s vice president of research.

The academic approach produces a distorted picture, says Rekenthaler. “It doesn’t matter what percentage of funds trail the index,” says Rekenthaler. “What matters most is how the big funds do. That’s where most of the money is.”

In order to get a realistic picture of fund results, Rekenthaler calculated asset-weighted returns—the average return of each invested dollar. Under his system, large funds carry more weight than small ones. He also calculated average returns, which give equal weight to each fund. Altogether Morningstar looked at how 16 stock-fund categories performed during the ten years ending in 2010. In each category, the asset-weighted return was higher than the result that was achieved when each fund carried the same weight.

Consider the small-growth category. On an equal-weighted basis, active funds returned 2.89 percent annually and trailed the benchmark, which returned 3.78 percent. But the asset-weighted figure for small-growth funds exceeded the benchmark by 0.20 percentage points. Categories where active funds won by wide margins included world stock, small blend, and health. Active funds trailed in large blend and mid growth. The asset-weighted result topped the benchmark in half the categories. In most of the eight categories where the active funds lagged, they trailed by small margins. “There is still an argument for indexing, but the argument is not as strong when you look at this from an asset-weighted basis,” says Rekenthaler.

The numbers indicate that when they are choosing from among the many funds on the market, investors tend to pick the right ones.

Apparently investors aren’t so dumb when it comes to deciding which funds to buy. Most of the actively invested money in the mutual fund industry is in pretty good hands. Academic studies, which weight all funds equally regardless of assets, don’t give a very clear picture of what investors are actually doing.

Where, then, is the big problem with active investing? There isn’t one—the culprit is investor behavior. As the article points out:

But investors display remarkably bad timing for their purchases and sales. Studies by research firm Dalbar have shown that over the past two decades, fund investors have typically bought at market peaks and sold at troughs.

Active investing is alive and well. (I added the bold.) In fact, the recent trend toward factor investing, which is just a very systematic method for making active bets, reinforces the value of the approach.

The Morningstar/ICI research just underscores that much of the value of an advisor may lie in helping the client control their emotional impulse to sell when they are fearful and to buy when they feel confident. I think this is often overlooked. If your client has a decent active fund, you can probably help them more by combatting their destructive timing than you can by switching them to an index fund. After all, owning an index fund does not make the investor immune to emotions after a 20% drop in the stock market!

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Weekly RS Recap

August 19, 2013

The table below shows the performance of a universe of mid and large cap U.S. equities, broken down by relative strength decile and then compared to the universe return. Those at the top of the ranks are those stocks which have the best intermediate-term relative strength. Relative strength strategies buy securities that have strong intermediate-term relative strength and hold them as long as they remain strong.

Last week’s performance (8/12/13 – 8/16/13) is as follows:

ranks 08.19.13 Weekly RS Recap

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